Operating Reactors Sub-Arena
The Nation's fleet of operating reactors comprises one of four sub-arenas that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) identified in considering which areas of the reactor safety arena to target for greater use of risk information. This page summarizes the following aspects of the Operating Reactors Sub-Arena:
Make continuing, incremental improvements in rulemaking, licensing, and oversight of operating reactors, while focusing on implementing existing risk-informed and performance based activities.
This objective focuses on activities that are already in progress to risk-inform the operating reactor subarena, including completed rulemaking activities, guidance documents, and implementation of some initiatives.
The NRC will revisit and update this objective (as appropriate) once the industry has implemented the currently planned activities and feedback becomes available.
The risk-informed initiatives currently in progress were originally selected using screening criteria similar to those presented in the RPP. Consequently, the five activities (listed below) that support the goals for this subarena satisfy the following screening criteria:
- The risk-informed initiatives that are currently underway help to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the NRC's regulatory process, including improved safety and reduction of unnecessary regulatory burden.
- Information and analytical models of operating reactors, particularly for at-power operations, exist and are fairly mature.
- The cost-beneficial nature of several of the risk-informed initiatives is evidenced by their voluntary adoption by licensees.
- No factors have been identified to date that would motivate changing the regulatory approach in the areas where risk-informed activities are already underway. Stakeholder feedback substantiates that there is no immediate need to initiate any new risk-informed initiatives, and that the NRC should focus on completing currently identified activities and allowing the industry time to implement those activities.
- Goals and activities to meet the objective for this subarena will be performance-based, to the extent that they meet the following four criteria:
- measurable parameters to monitor performance
- objective criteria to assess performance
- flexibility to allow licensees to determine how to meet the performance criteria
- no immediate safety concern as a result of failure to meet the performance criteria
Risk-informed activities for operating reactors occur in five broad categories:
- applicable regulations
- licensing process
- revised oversight process
- regulatory guidance
- risk analysis tools, methods, and data
The activities in these categories are derived from the Commission's policy statements and guidance, and include revisions to technical requirements in the regulations; risk-informed technical specifications; a new framework for inspection, assessment, and enforcement actions; guidance on other risk-informed applications (e.g., in-service inspections); and improved standardized plant analysis risk models.
The following goals are derived from the Commission's policy statements and guidance, which reflect the current phase of NRC and industry development, as well as the current implementation of risk-informed activities:
- Finish the development of current risk-informed regulations (e.g., 10 CFR 50.46a rulemaking) and associated regulatory/staff guidance.
- Implement existing NRC risk-informed activities [e.g., risk-informed technical specifications and pilots for 10 CFR 50.69 and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805].
- Encourage the industry to implement risk-informed rules and approved/endorsed activities.
- Continue making incremental improvements to the established licensing, rulemaking, and oversight activities.
- Modify/update established activities to account for lessons learned.
List of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Activities
This list shows the ongoing licensing initiatives, projects, and activities that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has targeted for greater use of risk information in the Operating Reactors Sub-Arena within the Reactor Safety Arena:
- Risk-Informed In-service Inspection (ISI)
- Implementing Lessons Learned from Fukushima
- Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program
- Risk-Informing Agency Actions on Low Risk Compliance Issues
- Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA)
- Methods, Tools and Guidance for Including Digital Systems in Nuclear Power Plant PRAs
- Risk Assessment of Operation Events
- Maintenance and Development of the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Analysis Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Code
- Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models (SPAR)
- Full-Scope Site Level 3 PRA
- Data Collection for Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
- Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Methods and Practices
- Development of Human Reliability Analysis
- Consequential Steam Generator Tube Rupture Probability and Consequence Assessment
- National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805
- Assess Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Sump Performance, Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191
- Risk Prioritization Initiatives (RPI)
- Emergency Core-Cooling System (ECCS) Requirements: Redefinition of Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA)
- Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Requirements: Loss of Coolant Accident and Loss of Offsite Power (ECCS-LOCA/LOOP)
- Develop Risk-Informed Improvements to Standard Technical Specifications (STS)
- Implement 10 CFR 50.69: Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors
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Risk-Informed In-service Inspection (ISI)
Risk-informed ISI has been utilized by operating reactors. Risk-informed ISI programs focus resources on the most safety-significant systems and components. RG 1.178, "An Approach For Plant-Specific Risk-Informed Decision-making – In-service Inspection of Piping," describes methods acceptable to the NRC staff for integrating insights from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques with traditional engineering analyses into ISI programs for piping, and addresses risk-informed approaches that are consistent with the basic elements identified in RG 1.174. EPRI published a topical report on risk-informed ISI procedures that the NRC found acceptable for referencing in licensing applications.
The staff received the first new reactor risk-informed ISI submittal from VC Summer, Units 2 and 3 on August 12, 2016. A pre-submittal meeting was held on May 26, 2015. Documents were submitted for this meeting on May 17, 2016.
Risk-informed ISI programs use risk-significant information to improve the effectiveness of inspection of pipe segments by focusing on the most safety-significant segments.
Implementing Lessons Learned from Fukushima
Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Plant in Japan, the NRC initiated actions to evaluate lessons learned and to implement appropriate changes in nuclear power plant designs and procedures. Initial recommendations were included in the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) report entitled "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century." Several of the items (e.g., Recommendation 1 regarding improving the regulatory framework and recommendation 2.1 on re-evaluating seismic and flooding hazards) include incorporation of risk-informed, performance-based approaches into NRC activities. The status and program plans for items identified for longer term evaluations were reported to the Commission in SECY 12-0095. Recommendation 1 was closed by the Commission without approving staff proposed improvement activities in SRM-SECY-13-0132. For NTTF recommendation 2.1-Seismic, some licensees are using a probabilistic seismic hazard approach in their responses to NRC's request for updated seismic hazard information. More information is available from the Japan Lessons Learned Web site.
Licensees submitted updated seismic hazard information in FY 2014 and, if required, "expedited seismic evaluation process" results in FY 2015. The updated hazard information and other factors (e.g., risk insights from the Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities) were used to determine whether certain plants need to perform a seismic risk assessment, (on the order of 20 sites screened in for performing the risk assessment.) For those sites, NRC will use that information as part of the determination of whether additional regulatory action is warranted.
The NRC staff has made significant progress in developing the infrastructure to support its review of licensee's submittals of the results of their seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The first such submittal is expected to be received in early calendar year 2017.
Seismic PRAs will be submitted to and reviewed by the NRC staff for about 20 sites. The risk insights from the seismic PRAs will be used by the staff to evaluate the impact of the site-specific reevaluated seismic hazard and determine whether further regulatory actions are warranted.
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program
In 1979, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program in response to the Risk Assessment Review Group report issued in September 1978 (NUREG/CR-0400, "Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission"). The evaluations performed for events that occurred between 1969 and 1979 were the first efforts in this type of analysis. The ASP Program systematically evaluates U.S. nuclear power plant operating experience to identify, document, and rank operational events by calculating a conditional core damage probability (CCDP) or an increase in core damage probability (ΔCDP).
The ASP Program identifies potential precursors by reviewing operational events from licensee event reports on a plant unit basis. An operational event can be one of two types: (1) the occurrence of an initiating event, such as a reactor trip or a loss of offsite power, with or without any subsequent equipment unavailability or degradation; or (2) a degraded plant condition characterized by the unavailability or degradation of equipment without the occurrence of an initiating event.
For the first type of event, the staff calculates a CCDP. This metric represents a conditional probability that a core damage state is reached given the occurrence of the observed initiating event (and any subsequent equipment failures or degradations). For the second type of event, the staff calculates a ΔCDP. This metric represents the increase in core damage probability for the time period during which a component or multiple components were deemed unavailable or degraded.
Starting in 2006, in an effort to minimize overlap and improve efficiency, Significance Determination Process (SDP) results have been used in lieu of independent ASP analyses to the extent practical and consistent with the overall objectives of both programs. More information regarding the details of this change is documented in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-24.
The ASP Program independently identified five precursor events in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. In addition, four precursor events were analyzed by the SDP and accepted into the ASP Program (as described in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-24). See SECY-15-0124, "Status of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models," for more information on the status of the ASP Program for FY2015.
In FY 2016, the ASP Program has undergone a variety of administrative changes. In accordance with Project AIM, and by direction of the Commission, the status of the ASP Program will no longer be reported in the annual SECY paper "Status of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models." However, an annual summary of the ASP Program will be provided as a publicly available document. In addition, the ASP Program is transitioning from a FY reporting cycle to a calendar year (CY) reporting cycle. Operational events will be organized based on the CY in which the licensee event report is submitted to the NRC. As part of this transition, the FY 2015 annual report will be combined with the CY 2016 report. Annual summary reports will be made available to the public in the first quarter the following CY (e.g., the CY 2016 annual report will be made available to the public in the first quarter of CY 2017).
An ASP Program Web page is under construction to serve as a publicly available database for current and historical ASP event analyses, annual reports, and historical documents. The goal is to facilitate easier public access to ASP analyses and insights.
The NRC Risk-Informed Steering Committee initiated an internal evaluation of the ASP Program in July 2016, performed by staff within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. A public meeting was held on October 13, 2016, to solicit feedback from external stakeholders and members of the public. A decision to continue or terminate the ASP Program is expected by mid-2017.
The ASP Program analyzes potential precursors by calculating the probability of an event leading to a core damage state. The analyses of operational events are conducted using the NRC's Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models and the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) software.
The ASP Program is one of three agency programs that assess the risk significance of issues and events. The other two programs are the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) SDP and the event response evaluation process, as defined in Management Directive (MD) 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program." In contrast to the other two programs, a comprehensive and integrated risk analysis under the ASP Program includes all anomalies observed at the time of the event or discovered after the event. These anomalies may include unavailable and degraded plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs); human errors; and/or an initiating event (e.g., reactor trip). An unavailable or degraded SSC does not have to be a performance deficiency (PD) or an analyzed condition in the plant design basis, as required in the SDP. The ASP Program analyzes concurrent, multiple PDs or degraded conditions together, unlike the SDP that analyzes PDs individually.
The ASP Program results are used to support programmatic and regulatory decisions. Specifically, RES provides recommendations for any programmatic or regulatory reviews based on results of adverse ASP trends and results of precursor analyses identifying a potentially generic issue. The ASP program will continue to provide unique and independent inputs to the Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences (NUREG-0090), Congressional Budget Justification (NUREG-1100), Performance and Accountability Report (NUREG-1542), Strategic Plan (NUREG-1614), and will begin to provide input into the Agency Action Review Meeting (AARM) starting in 2017.
Risk-Informing Agency Actions on Low Risk Compliance Issues
The agency is developing a risk-informed approach to resolve licensee design issues that render a technical specification structure, system or component inoperable and are determined to be of low risk/low safety significance. The goal is to provide a tool to the staff that provides a risk-informed alternative to enforcement of technical specification compliance when it can be demonstrated that the non-compliance does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety.
The staff envisions developing a risk-informed process that would ensure that the level of licensee and staff resources applied to a design non-conformance issue correlate to the potential risk and safety significance of the issue. The staff envisions that this approach would focus first on evaluating the risk and safety significance of the non-compliance. If the issue is determined to be of low risk and low safety significance, then the staff interaction with the licensee would focus on establishing a reasonable timetable for corrective action by the licensee combined with implementing appropriate interim compensatory measures that would maintain adequate safety while the corrective action is being taken. The approach would include enforcement discretion (possibly for a long duration) to provide the licensee adequate time for implementing corrective action. This approach is envisioned to be an improvement over the current practice in that it would eliminate the need for urgent action to be taken for low risk significance compliance issues.
This approach is consistent with the NRC's Enforcement Policy (NUREG 1600, "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action", Section 1.5 "Adequate Protection Standard," which states:
"Adequate protection of the public health and safety and assurance of the common defense and security and protection of the environment are the NRC's fundamental regulatory objectives. Compliance with NRC requirements plays a critical role in giving the NRC confidence that safety and security are being maintained. While adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements, circumstances may arise where new information reveals that an unforeseen hazard or security issue or security event exists or that a substantially greater potential exists for a known hazard to occur. In such situations, the NRC has the statutory authority to require action by licensees, their employees and contractors, and certificate holders above and beyond existing regulations to maintain the level of protection necessary to avoid undue risk to public health and safety, and to ensure security of materials.
The NRC also has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations—despite the existence of a noncompliance—where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When noncompliance with NRC requirements occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by that noncompliance to determine whether immediate action is required. If the NRC determines that the noncompliance itself is of such safety significance that adequate protection is no longer provided, or that the noncompliance was caused by a failure of licensee controls so significant that it calls into question the licensee's ability to ensure adequate protection, the NRC may demand immediate action, up to and including a shutdown or suspension of licensed activities. Based on the NRC's evaluation of noncompliance, the appropriate action could include refraining from taking any action, taking specific enforcement action including the use of civil penalties, issuing Orders, or providing input to other regulatory actions or assessments, such as increased NRC oversight of a licensee's activities. Since some requirements are more important to safety than others, the NRC endeavors to use a risk-informed approach when applying NRC resources to the oversight of licensed activities, including enforcement activities."
A working group with members from NRR, the Regions, OGC, and OE has formed, and is currently evaluating the feasibility of the proposed approach, including verifying the legality of the approach determining how the risk significance would be evaluated, and gaging the industry's interest in participating in the process once developed. The working group is also looking at the process for implementing this new approach. One implementation method under consideration is modifying the Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) process for low risk compliance issues.
Three public meetings were held to discuss this initiative. The meetings were held at NRC Headquarters on February 3, 2016, April 11, 2016, and May 23, 2016. The Commission was also briefed on the initiative during the Operating Reactor Business Line briefing on July 7, 2016. A draft outline of the proposed process was developed and circulated within NRR, OE and OGC for comment.
The proposed process will utilize risk insights as one of the criteria to determine if a design issue is a candidate for the licensee to request enforcement discretion under this process.
Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA)
The PFHA research program is a wide-ranging effort to establish a sound technical basis for transitioning flood hazard assessment guidance and tools from deterministic to probabilistic approaches. The PFHA research is guided by a joint NRO-NRR user need that endorsed a Research Plan developed jointly by RES, NRR, and NRO staff. A copy of the plan (cover sheet and final plan) was provided to the Commission in 2014. RES has been implementing the research plan for approximately 2 years.
By supporting development of risk-informed licensing and oversight guidance and tools for assessing flooding hazards and consequences, this research addresses a significant gap in the probabilistic basis for external hazards since seismic and wind hazard assessments are currently conducted on a probabilistic basis. The PFHA research program is designed to support both new reactor licensing (e.g. design basis flood hazard assessments for new sites or facilities) and oversight of operating reactors (e.g. significance determination process analyses for evaluating inspection findings or event assessments involving flood hazards, flood protection, or flood mitigation at operating facilities).
The "Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Plan" has been prepared and endorsed by NRR and NRO. Eleven new research projects have been initiated with the US Army Corps of Engineers, the US Geological Survey, the Department of Interior Bureau of Reclamation, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and the University of California at Davis. A twelfth research activity that was issued for bid as a commercial contract has not yet been awarded. On October 13 and 14, 2015, the first annual program review on the progress for these projects will be held at NRC headquarters. Cooperative efforts are under development with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the Institute de Sûreté Nucléaire et de Radioprotection (IRSN).
Thirteen research projects have been initiated via interagency agreements with the US Army Corps of Engineers, the US Geological Survey, the Bureau of Reclamation, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). A fourteenth project is being conducted with the University of California at Davis via a cooperative research contract with USGS under authority of the Water Resources Research Act. A fifteenth research activity has been implemented as a commercial contract. Cooperative research efforts have been initiated with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) under a Flooding Research Addendum to an existing NRC-EPRI MOU. A cooperative research agreement is under development with the French Institute de Sûreté Nucléaire et de Radioprotection (IRSN).
This activity is risk-informed because it addresses several aspects of risk: (1) probability or frequency of occurrence for various flooding scenarios; (2) fragility of flood protection features; and (3) reliability of flood protection and mitigation procedures.
Methods, Tools and Guidance for Including Digital Systems in Nuclear Power Plant PRAs
The NRC has been investigating reliability modeling of digital systems, which encompasses both hardware and software. The objective of this research is to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems in nuclear power plant probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) and (2) incorporating digital systems in the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities.
Recent accomplishments and near-term objectives include the following:
- NRC support to the development of a failure mode taxonomy for a digital instrument and control (I&C) systems performed by the OECD/NEA Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK) (NEA/CSNI/R(2014)16, "Failure Modes Taxonomy for Reliability Assessment of Digital I&C Systems for PRA").
- In collaboration with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, the staff developed an approach for quantifying software reliability using a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)-based model of the software development cycle quality attributes. A report describing the BBN approach will be submitted for publication in FY2016.
- Pilot an approach for estimating the reliability of the INL Advanced Test Reactor Loop Operating Control System using PRA-based statistical testing. A report describing the statistical testing application will be submitted for publication in FY2016.
More background on this approach can be found in the transcripts from an ACRS subcommittee meeting held in November 2014.
In collaboration with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, the staff completed the development of an approach for quantifying software reliability using a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)-based model. A NUREG/CR report describing the BBN approach was submitted for publication in FY2016. The PRA-based statistical testing method was applied to the INL Advanced Test Reactor Loop Operating Control System. A NUREG/CR report describing the statistical testing application was submitted for publication in FY2016.
This research program aims to develop methods to quantify safety related digital I&C system failure probabilities that enable the inclusion of digital I&C components into current NPP PRAs.
Risk Assessment of Operation Events
Provide guidance and analysis of operating reactor risk-informed operational challenges including internal and external events during both full power and low-power/shutdown operations.
Analyses may be in response to requests from program offices (NRR, NRO, and the Regions) or on-call technical assistance to senior reactor analysts who use PRA models or others using risk analysis software, such as SAPHIRE. Risk-Informed analyses are performed in response to needs identified in: Management Directive 8.3, "Incident Investigation Program"; Reactor Oversight Process; the Significance Determination Process (SDP); and the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program.
The Risk Assessment Standardization Project (RASP) handbook and associated web site provides guidance and a description of the methods the NRC staff uses to achieve consistent results in the performance of risk-informed studies of operational events and licensee performance issues. It is updated periodically based on user comments and insights gained from field application. The handbook consists of four volumes, designed to address internal events analysis, external events analysis, Standardized Plant Assessment Risk (SPAR) model reviews, and shutdown event analysis. The handbook incorporates best practices gleaned from experience on accident precursor events performed in ASP reviews and other insights gained from SDP analyses.
This activity continually provides support to risk analysts and routinely updates the RASP Handbook and the associated Web site to assure accuracy and provide additional references for risk analysts' use.
The staff prepared for the publication of a NUREG on the application of Common Cause Failure (CCF) Analysis in Event and Condition Assessment. The intent of this report is to provide acceptable methods that the staff will accept in the area of CCF when applied to identified component and system failures which typically occur as part of SDP and ASP evaluations.
This activity helps to put a risk perspective on operational events and inspection findings. It is not always obvious how much actual risk is associated with identified violations or component/system failures. This activities attempts to take advantage of insights gained using PRA modeling as applied to operational events discovered during normal operations, which have the potential to contribute to nuclear plant risk. As such, it provides a different and independent perspective on nuclear plant performance than would be available simply by tracking compliance with plant technical specifications and operational directives.
Maintenance and Development of the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Analysis Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Code
The NRC has developed and maintains the SAPHIRE computer code for performing probabilistic risk analyses (PRAs). SAPHIRE offers state-of-the-art capability for assessing the risk associated with core damage frequency (Level 1 PRA) and the risk from containment performance and radioactive releases (Level 2 PRA). SAPHIRE supports the agency's risk-informed activities, which include the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model development plan, the risk assessment standardization project, the Significance Determination Process (SDP), Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program, risk-informing 10 CFR Part 50, vulnerability assessment, advanced reactor assessment, operational experience, generic issues, and regulatory backfit.
A summary of recent activities regarding the status of the SAPHIRE computer code can be found in SECY 15-0124, "Status of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models."
The SAPHIRE development team continues to maintain the code's performance and add new features in accordance with the SAPHIRE software quality assurance program. During FY2016 two new SAPHIRE versions were released for use by NRC staff. Improvements include enhanced seismic hazard modeling capability and development of a new quantification approach with improved accuracy for models involving high failure probabilities.
The SAPHIRE computer code is used to develop and run PRA models (e.g., SPAR models) for a variety of risk-informed regulatory applications.
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models (SPAR)
The SPAR models provide agency risk analysts with an independent risk assessment tool to support a variety of risk-informed agency programs, including the Reactor Oversight Program (ROP) and the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program. SPAR models are built with a standard modeling approach, using consistent modeling conventions, that enables staff to easily use the models across a variety of U.S. NPP designs. Unlike industry PRA models, SPAR models are run on a single software platform, the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) computer code. The staff currently maintains and updates the 75 SPAR models representing 99 commercial NPPs. The scope of every SPAR model includes logic modeling covering internal initiating events at power through core damage (i.e., Level-1 PRA model). A portion of the SPAR models also include external hazard (e.g., seismic and high wind), internal fire, and shutdown models. The staff develops and maintains SPAR models for both operating reactors and new reactor designs (e.g., AP1000).
An updated status of the SPAR model program can be found in SECY 15-0124, "Status of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models."
The staff continued to develop new SPAR model capabilities and provide technical support for SPAR model users and risk-informed programs. The staff maintains and implements a quality assurance (QA) plan for the SPAR models to ensure that the models appropriately represent the as-built, as-operated nuclear plants to support the assessment of operational events within the staff's risk-informed regulatory activities. The SPAR QA Plan provides mechanisms for model benchmarking and reviews, validation and verification, and configuration control of the SPAR models. In addition, about half of the SPAR models are updated to reflect significant plant modifications or other plant or modeling changes.
The staff also continued developing the SPAR model for the AP1000 new reactor design, adding a low power shut down model and a level 2 PRA model for the AP1000 reactor design.
The SPAR models are used by NRC staff in support of risk-informed activities related to the inspection program, incident investigation program, license amendment reviews, performance indicator verification, accident sequence precursor program, generic safety issues, and special studies. These models also support and provide rigorous and peer reviewed evaluations of operating experience, thereby demonstrating the agency's ability to analyze operating experience independently of licensees' risk assessments and enhancing the technical credibility of the agency.
Full-Scope Site Level 3 PRA
As directed in SRM-SECY-11-0089, "Options for Proceeding with Future Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Activities," the staff is conducting a full-scope multi-unit site Level 3 PRA that addresses all internal and external hazards; all plant operating modes; and all reactor units, spent fuel pools, and dry cask storage.
The full-scope site Level 3 PRA project includes the following objectives:
- Develop a Level 3 PRA, generally based on current state-of-practice methods, tools, and data, that (1) reflects technical advances since completion of the NUREG-1150 studies, and (2) addresses scope considerations that were not previously considered (e.g., low power and shutdown, multi-unit risk, and spent fuel storage).
- Extract new risk insights to enhance regulatory decision making and help focus limited agency resources on issues most directly related to the agency's mission to protect public health and safety and the environment.
- Enhance PRA staff capability and expertise and improve documentation practices to make PRA information more accessible, retrievable, and understandable.
- Obtain insight into the technical feasibility and cost of developing new Level 3 PRAs.
Consistent with the objectives of this project, the Level 3 PRA study is based on current state of-practice methods, tools, and data. However, there are several gaps in current PRA technology and other challenges that require advancement in the PRA state-of-practice. The general approach to addressing these challenges for the Level 3 PRA study is to primarily rely on existing research and the collective expertise of the NRC's senior technical advisors and contractors, and to perform limited new research only for a few specific technical areas (e.g., multi-unit risk).
Based on a set of site selection criteria and with the support of the NEI, Southern Nuclear Operating Company's Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, was selected as the volunteer site for the Level 3 PRA study. The Level 3 PRA project team is leveraging the existing and available information on Vogtle and its licensee PRAs, in addition to related research efforts (e.g., SOARCA), to enhance efficiency in performing the study.
The Level 3 PRA project team is using the following NRC tools and models for performing the Level 3 PRA study:
- SAPHIRE, Version 8.
- MELCOR Severe Accident Analysis Code.
- MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, Version 2 (MACCS).
In addition, the Level 3 PRA study is being developed consistent with many of the modeling conventions used for NRC's SPAR models.
A PWR Owners Group (PWROG)-led ASME/ANS PRA Standard-based peer review of the reactor, at-power, high wind, Level 1 PRA and a screening evaluation of reactor, at-power "other" hazards (i.e., hazards other than internal events, internal floods, internal fires, high winds, and seismic events) was performed in November 2014. A PWROG-led ASME/ANS PRA Standard-based peer review of the reactor, at-power, internal event and internal flood Level 2 PRA was performed in December 2014. A PWROG-led workshop was held in January 2015 to identify peer review criteria for dry cask storage PRA. An expert elicitation was completed in June 2015 to address the frequency of interfacing systems LOCAs. The reactor, at-power, internal event and internal flood Level 3 PRA was completed in August 2015 and its peer review will be completed in October 2015. Initial versions of reactor, at-power, Level 1 PRA models for internal fires and seismic events were completed in FY 2015, but they are in the process of being significantly revised to incorporate more recent licensee-supplied information.
A substantial revision was completed for the reactor, at-power, Level 1 PRAs for internal events and internal floods, and the associated reports are nearing completion. The reactor, at-power, Level 1 PRAs for internal fires and seismic events were significantly revised to incorporate more recent licensee-supplied information, and our currently undergoing internal technical review. The dry cask storage (DCS) PRA was completed for all PRA levels and all hazards, and reviewed internally. In response to review comments, the consequence analysis for the DCS PRA is now undergoing revision. An initial reactor, low power and shutdown, Level 1 PRA for internal events is nearing completion. An approach was developed for modeling integrated site risk and a pilot application of this approach was performed based on the results of the revised Level 1 PRAs for internal events for Vogtle, Units 1 and 2. A similar pilot application is being performed based on the results of the initial Level 2 PRAs for internal events for Vogtle, Units 1 and 2.
As described in SECY 12-0123, "Update on Staff Plans to Apply the Full-Scope Site Level 3 PRA Project Results to the NRC's Regulatory Framework," the results and insights of the Level 3 PRA project are expected to benefit a variety of ongoing risk-informed regulatory initiatives.
Data Collection for Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
Consistent with the Commission's policy statements on the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and for achieving an appropriate PRA quality for NRC risk-informed regulatory decision-making, the NRC has ongoing activities to improve the quality of human reliability analysis (HRA). The adequacy of data available for HRA is a concern on the credibility and consistency of human error probability estimates. To address this need, NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) has developed the Scenario Authoring, Characterization, and Debriefing Application (SACADA) system to collect operator performance information in simulator exercises. RES has collaborated with nuclear power plants and research institutes to use the SACADA system to collect their simulator training, examination, and experiment data.
The key near term SACADA research activities include:
- Analyzing the collected data to inform human reliability and human performance. This includes demonstrating the use of the data to inform human error probability (HEP) calculations in HRA.
- Collaborating with more data providers to increase the size of the data pool.
The following two SACADA collaborations were established in FY2016:
- The Taiwan Power Company (TPC): An agreement between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Culture Representative Office (TECRO), with designated representatives of the NRC and the Atomic Energy Council, Taiwan and TPC, respectively, was signed in June 2016 for five years. To support this agreement, RES, with support of TPC, developed a Chinese version of SACADA for TPC's plants to use. RES, with the support of the STPNOC and the Idaho National Laboratory, provided SACADA training to the TPC's instructors. TPC is piloting the SACADA system.
- The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) of the Department of Energy (DOE): The ATR has used the SACADA system and has made data accessible to the NRC since June 2016.
The following are activities are either in process or performed:
- Processing contract award(s) to universities or companies or both to analyze the currently available 10,000 plus data points for HRA.
- Plan to host a SACADA data workshop in 2017 to discuss SACADA data analysis results and system improvements.
- Preparing a tabletop/multimedia presentation of SACADA in the NRC's Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) 2017.
- Prepare Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) to raise US nuclear power plants awareness of the SACADA tool.
- Present SACADA at conferences.
The key near term SACADA research activities include:
- Analyzing the collected data to inform human reliability and human performance. This includes demonstrating the use of the data to inform human error probability (HEP) calculations in HRA.
- Collaborating with more data providers to increase the size of the data pool.
Human reliability analysis (HRA) results are used in the NRC's risk-informed regulation activities such as the reactor oversight process. The SACADA data would improve the reliability of NRC's HRA methods. That, in turn, improves the reliability of the NRC's risk-informed decision-making.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Methods and Practices
The purpose of the HRA method effort is to improve the methods for regulatory applications. This enhancement involves improving the consistency amongst HRA practitioners in the use of methods and developing guidance on the rigor needed for quantifying human reliability given the scarcity of empirical data available to evaluate human performance. The ongoing activities include:
- Developing the IDHEAS General Methodology for risk analyses of all NPP HRA applications (SRM-M061020)
- Completing and publishing the IDHEAS at power method under an NRC/EPRI collaboration
- Developing IDHEAS application for event and condition analysis
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200 provides an acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) results for risk-informed regulation. HRA is a key element in the PRA. Because various HRA methods often have different assumptions and approximations that could lead to significant variability in results affecting regulatory decisions, enhancing the consistency and quality of HRA could improve regulatory decision-making.
The report "Cognitive Basis for HRA" is finalized and will be published in 2015. The staff has been working with the ACRS Reliability and PRA Subcommittee to construct the IDHEAS General Methodology so that it can be implemented in various NPP applications. The IDHEAS internal, at-power application is currently being tested.
The report, NUREG-2199, Vol.1, "An Integrated Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) for Nuclear Power Plant Internal Events At-Power Application," is in publication. The testing of IDHEAS for internal at-power applications was completed in 2016. The staff has been working with the ACRS Reliability and PRA Subcommittee to finalize the IDHEAS General Methodology. The staff also started to develop the IDHEAS application for event and condition analysis (ECA). The development of IDHEAS ECA Application includes a computerized version of the method to facilitate its use.
The purpose of the HRA method efforts is to improve the method to be used for regulatory applications and consistency among HRA practitioners in performing HRA. This will help improve HRA/PRA quality and provide a basis for risk-informed rule-making.
Development of Human Reliability Analysis
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200 provides an acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of PRA results for risk-informed activities. However, RG 1.200 (including the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standards reflected and endorsed by RG 1.200) is a high-level regulatory guide, addressing what to do but not how to do it. Consequently, there may be several approaches for addressing certain analytical elements, which may meet the RG 1.200 and associated standards, but may do so by making different assumptions and approximations and, therefore, may yield different results. This is particularly true for human reliability analysis (HRA) for which many methods are available to analyze the human actions modeled in PRA. The staff is addressing this issue by developing guidance documents to support the implementation of RG 1.200. Additional information is available.
The report, NUREG-2199, Vol.1, "An Integrated Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS) for Nuclear Power Plant Internal Events At-Power Application," is in publication. The testing of IDHEAS for internal at-power applications was completed in 2016. The staff has been working with the ACRS Reliability and PRA Subcommittee to finalize the IDHEAS General Methodology. The staff also started to develop the IDHEAS application for event and condition analysis (ECA). The development of IDHEAS ECA application includes a computerized version of the method to facilitate its use.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200 provides an acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) results for risk-informed regulation. HRA is a key element in the PRA. Because various HRA methods often have different assumptions and approximations that could lead to significant variability in results affecting regulatory decisions, enhancing the consistency and quality of HRA could improve regulatory decision-making. The purpose of the HRA method efforts is to improve the method to be used for regulatory applications and consistency among HRA practitioners in performing HRA. This will help improve HRA/PRA quality and provide a basis for risk-informed rule-making.
Consequential Steam Generator Tube Rupture Probability and Consequence Assessment
Consequential steam generator tube ruptures (C-SGTRs) are potentially risk-significant events because thermally-induced steam generator tube failures caused by hot gases from a damaged reactor core can result in a containment bypass event and a large release of fission products to the environment. The main accident scenarios of interest are those that lead to core damage with high reactor pressure, a dry-steam generator, and low steam generator pressure (high-dry low) conditions. A typical example of such an accident scenario is a station blackout with loss of auxiliary feedwater. The objective of this program is to develop a simplified methodology for the quantitative assessment C-SGTR probability and large early-release frequency (LERF) for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs). A draft report was updated using the latest thermal hydraulic MELCOR results for Combustion Engineering (CE) plants.
A draft report is being finalized to document the research results from this study. It is expected that the report will be issued for public review and comment in late calendar year 2015 and finalized in 2016. This work was presented to the ACRS Metallurgy and Reactor Fuels Subcommittee on April 7, 2015. A draft version of the report was provided to the ACRS.
A draft NUREG-2195 was issued for public comments. Public comments were received and are being addressed. A final NUREG is expected to be issued in 2017.
This project provides a method to assess the conditional SGTR probability given SG tube challenge (temperature-induced) during severe accidents or as an initiating event (pressure-induced). This probability can be used to assess the potential plant risk.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805
In 2004, the Commission approved a voluntary risk-informed and performance-based fire protection rule for existing nuclear power plants. The rule endorsed NFPA consensus standard NFPA 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants." In addition, the NEI developed NEI 04-02, "Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 50.48(c)," dated September 2005. The staff endorsed NEI 04-02 in RG 1.205, "Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," issued in May 2006. To date, nearly half of the nuclear power units operating in the United States, including those that participated in the pilot program, have committed to transition to NFPA 805 as their licensing basis. The Oconee Nuclear Station (Oconee) and Shearon Harrison Nuclear Power Plant (Shearon Harris) were the pilot plants for 10 CFR 50.48(c). In June 2010, a safety evaluation approved the Shearon Harris NFPA 805 pilot application. A safety evaluation in December 2010 approved the Oconee NFPA 805 pilot application. NEI 04-02 was revised (Revision 2) in April 2008 and the staff revised RG 1.205 (Revision 1) in December 2009 to reflect lessons learned from the pilot reviews. The staff developed NUREG-800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Chapter 9, "Auxiliary Systems," Section 126.96.36.199, "Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Review Responsibilities," issued December 2009, to provide staff guidance for the review of licensee applications to transition to NFPA 805. In addition, the NRC developed a Frequently Asked Question process to review and establish a preliminary staff position on NFPA 805 application, review, and implementation issues.
Lessons learned from the pilot applications indicated that the staff and the industry underestimated the complexity and resources necessary to complete the reviews. In SRM-SECY-11-0033, "Proposed NRC Staff Approach to Address Resource Challenges Associated with Review of a Large Number of NFPA 805 License Amendment Requests," dated April 20, 2011, the Commission approved the staff's recommendation to increase resources to review NFPA 805 applications, develop a staggered review process, and modify the current enforcement policy. The NRC sent the revised enforcement policy to the Commission in SECY-11-0061, "A Request to Revise the Interim Enforcement Policy for Fire Protection Issues on 10 CFR 50.48(c) to Allow Licensees to Submit License Amendment Requests in a Staggered Approach," dated April 29, 2011 and approved in SRM SECY-11-0061, dated June 10, 2011. To enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the NFPA 805 application reviews, the industry developed an application template and the staff developed a safety evaluation template. The staff has received 26 applications to date and expects another two by the end of calendar year 2016.
The NRC staff issued six non-pilot NFPA 805 license amendments with three more expected to be completed by the end of the year. Thirteen LARs are currently under review. Additional FY2015 information is available.
The NRC staff issued five non-pilot NFPA 805 license amendments. Five license amendment requests (LARs) are currently under review. Additional FY2016 information is available.
Risk-Informed Licensing Reviews. NFPA 805 is a performance-based standard, endorsed via 10 CFR 50.48(c) that critically depends on risk information in the form of Fire PRA to enable licensees to transition from existing "deterministic" fire protection programs to ones that are "risk-informed, performance-based." Fire PRA is an integral part of the new licensing basis, and includes both quantitative evaluations of base risk and changes to base risk in accordance with RG 1.174 guidelines as well as supporting qualitative considerations, such as traditional defense in depth and safety margin, also as per RG 1.174.
Assess Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Sump Performance, Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191
This generic issue concerns the possibility that following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in a PWR, debris accumulation on the containment sump strainer(s) may inhibit flow to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and the Containment Spray System. An additional concern is that debris may penetrate or bypass the sump strainer(s) and block flow to the core.
In SECY-12-0093, dated July 9, 2012, the staff identified several options for resolving GSI-191. These options included two risk-informed approaches. One approach, piloted by South Texas Project (STP), would address both strainer and in-vessel effects using risk. The other approach would use risk for in-vessel effects and would resolve strainer issues deterministically.
The Commission endorsed the staff's proposed options for resolving GSI-191 in SRM-SECY-12-0093, dated December 14, 2012. Since the Commission's endorsement, 11 licensees (18 units) have proposed to implement a risk-informed approach to address GSI-191 concerns. In consideration of the additional time required to implement risk informed approaches and/or complete further testing, subject licensees have implemented mitigative measures to address the potential for debris blockage of the strainer or reactor core.
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 50.46c, addresses ECCS performance during a LOCA. SECY-12-0034, dated January 7, 2013, directed that a provision allowing NRC licensees, on a case-by-case basis, to use risk informed alternatives should be included as part of proposed revisions to 10 CFR 50.46c. The proposed rule containing this provision was published in the Federal Register on March 24, 2014 (79 FR 16106).
In accordance with SRM-COMSECY-13-006, dated May 9, 2013, draft guidance related to implementation of the GSI-191 risk informed alternative was developed in parallel with its review of the STP pilot submittal, and published it in the Federal Register for public comment on April 20, 2015 (75 FR 21658).
The staff has continued to review the STP pilot and has published draft guidance (DG-1322) for licensees choosing to implement the optional, risk-informed provision in 10 CFR 50.46c.The draft guide (which will ultimately be published as RG 1.229) was issued for public comment on April 20, 2015. The public comment period closed on July 6, 2015, and the staff has since resolved all public comments and updated the DG accordingly. RG 1.229 is scheduled to be issued with the new 10 CFR 50.46c rule in the second quarter of FY 2016.
Preparations were made to ensure that final regulatory guidance (RG 1.229, "Risk-Informed Approach for Addressing the Effects of Debris on Post-Accident") could be issued concurrent with the revised 10 CFR 50.46c rule. Proposed 50.46c rule changes were still pending Commission approval at the end of FY16. Several pre-submittal public meetings were conducted in preparation for forthcoming GSI-191 risk-informed closure submittals.
Site-specific closeout of GSI-191 according to the risk-informed approach involves the use of a systematic processes to evaluate the risk from debris in terms of core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF). The systematic risk assessment would rely on, at minimum, a plant-specific at-power, internal events probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and take into consideration all hazards, initiating events, and plant operating modes. The risk attributable to debris would be compared to the risk calculated assuming debris is not present yielding values for the change in CDF and LERF (∆CDF and ∆LERF, respectively).
Licensees pursuing risk-informed approaches to address GSI-191 concerns, will be submitting license amendment requests subject to RG 1.174, Revision 2, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decision on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis."
Risk Prioritization Initiatives (RPI)
In February 2013, the Commission approved SRM-COMGEA-12-0001/COMWDM-12-0002, "Proposed Initiative to Improve Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Efficiency", to further explore the idea of enhancing nuclear safety and regulatory efficiency by applying PRA. This initiative could encourage the use and development of high quality, plant-specific PRA models by allowing licensees to use qualitative and quantitative risk insight to propose a schedule for implementing regulatory actions on a plant-specific basis.
In October 2013, NEI began to develop a draft process as a potential way to address RPI for operating power reactors. The NEI's draft process consists of three main elements: (1) generic prioritization by an industry generic assessment expert team, (2) plant-specific prioritization by an integrated decision-making panel of licensee experts, and (3) issue aggregation for plant specific scheduling. The NRC staff provided comments on NEI's guidance. The guidance described the process at various stages using insights gained from tabletop exercises and discussions with stakeholders during public meetings.
Subsequently, the NRC staff informed the Commission about its observation of tabletop exercises of the NEI draft process in COMSECY-14-0014. Afterwards, six licensees also participated in the industry-led demonstration pilots that were conducted between May and September of 2014 to exercise the draft guidance prioritizing plant-specific issues. Lastly, a public meeting in September 2014 was held to further exercise the process in the areas of security, emergency preparedness, and radiation protection.
Other information about the NRC staff's observations can be found in "Summary of the NRC Staff Observations on the Nuclear Energy Institute Demonstration Pilots for Prioritizing and Scheduling Implementation." In addition, NEI provided its summary and observations of the demonstration pilots in the "Nuclear Energy Institute, Report on Prioritization and Scheduling Pilot." The latest version of the NEI guidance was submitted to the NRC by letter dated November 14, 2014.
Based on insights and feedback obtained from the public and with experience gained during tabletop exercises and demonstration pilots, the staff presented four options to the Commission in SECY-15-0050, "Cumulative Effects of Regulation Process Enhancements and Risk Prioritization Initiative: Response to Commission Direction and Recommendations" dated April 1, 2015. In the SRM-SECY-15-0050 issued on August 25, 2015, the Commission did not approve separate RPI activities, but supported the consideration of risk insights in regulatory decision-making through existing agency processes.
In March 2015, the staff briefed ACRS with respect to a draft version of the Commission paper in which the staff presented options of RPI as a tool to reduce cumulative effects of regulation (CER). In its letter on this topic, ACRS agreed with the staff's recommendations and recommended that the staff should explicitly include risk information as an input to decisions and priorities for proposed regulatory actions regardless of the Commission's decisions about specific options or approaches in the SECY paper.
On April 1, 2015, the staff submitted SECY-15-0050, "Cumulative Effects of Regulation Process Enhancements and Risk Prioritization Initiative: Response to Commission Direction and Recommendations." This paper responds to the Commission's direction in SRM-COMSECY-14-0014, "Cumulative Effects of Regulation and Risk Prioritization Initiative: Update on Recent Activities and Recommendations for Path Forward," dated July 18, 2014. This paper provided the Commission with four options of using RPI as a tool to reduce CER for operating reactor licensees.
The first option would have maintained the status quo. Option 2 would have augmented existing regulatory processes allowing licensees to request exemptions and changes to implementation schedules for existing regulatory commitments. This option would have allowed licensees to use a risk-informed prioritization methodology as a basis for such request. Option 3 would have allowed licensees to submit a risk-informed, plant-specific implementation plan when the NRC adopts a new rule. Option 4 would have established a voluntary process that enables licensees to make plant-specific, risk-informed changes to implementation schedules for certain regulatory issues without requesting prior NRC approval.
On May 19, 2015, the staff, along with an external panel, briefed the Commission on issues related to CER and RPI. The discussions included the staff's identified lessons learned, possible approaches for implementing the RPI, as well as licensee experiences with RPI pilot projects. In the SRM-SECY-15-0050 issued on August 25, 2015, the Commission did not approve the RPI options. However, the Commission stated that it supports consideration of risk insights in regulatory decision-making through existing agency processes. The staff is exploring the development of additional guidance to enhance licensees' ability to use risk information in existing agency processes such as Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.12, "Specific Exemptions." Additional FY2015 information is available.
This initiative, discontinued since August 2015, intended to encourage the use and development of high quality, plant-specific PRA models by allowing licensees to use qualitative and quantitative risk insight to propose a schedule for implementing regulatory actions on a plant-specific basis.
Emergency Core-Cooling System (ECCS) Requirements: Redefinition of Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCA)
As part of the staff's program to risk-inform the technical requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 (discussed under Option 3 from SECY-98-300), the staff identified 10 CFR 50.46, "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors", Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50, "ECCS Evaluation Models," and General Design Criteria (GDC) 35, "Emergency Core Cooling," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, as regulations that warranted revision.
The staff prepared a proposed rule (SECY-10-0161; ML102210460) containing ECCS evaluation requirements that could be used as an alternative to the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.46. The proposed rulemaking was designed to redefine the large-break LOCA (LBLOCA) requirements to provide a risk-informed alternative maximum break size. In 2012 the staff requested withdrawal of the 10 CFR 50.46a final rule from Commission consideration so that the staff could review the rule and ensure its compatibility with the ongoing regulatory framework activities under Recommendation 1 of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report. The Commission approved the staff's request in SRM-SECY-10-0161.
In SECY-16-0009, the NRC staff requested Commission approval to discontinue work on the 10 CFR 50.46a rulemaking. The reasons for the staff's request were that the licensees indicated that the rule, as proposed, would not provide them the benefits that were originally expected, and that the NRC has higher priority work. In SRM-SECY-16-0009, the Commission approved discontinuing the 50.46a ECCS rulemaking. In addition, per Commission directive in SRM-SECY-16-0009, the NRC staff published a Federal Register notice (81 FR 69446) to inform the public that the rule is being discontinued. As a result of these actions, the 50.46a rule has not been issued and work on this effort has been discontinued.
No action in fiscal year (FY) 2015, as this item is on hold.
No activities were performed and the effort has been discontinued per Commission directive in SRM-SECY-16-0009. Federal Register notice (81 FR 69446) published to inform the public that the rule is being discontinued.
The proposed rule would have utilized risk insights, such as frequency of occurrence, to redefine the large-break LOCA (LBLOCA) requirements. The proposed rule relied heavily on risk insights to provide a risk-informed transition break size for analysis.
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Requirements: Loss of Coolant Accident and Loss of Offsite Power (ECCS-LOCA/LOOP)
The proposed rule would amend the Commission's regulations to eliminate, based upon appropriate risk considerations, the assumption of a coincident LOOP for postulated LBLOCAs (low frequency) in General Design Criterion (GDC) 35. The proposed rule would provide a voluntary alternative to existing requirements in situations where specified acceptance criteria are satisfied, and also would address a petition for rulemaking submitted by Bob Christie (Performance Technology) (PRM-50-77). The staff's approach was to develop the technical basis for a LOOP-LOCA rule by reviewing the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) topical report (TR), NEDO-33148, "Separation of Loss of Offsite Power from Large Break LOCA," dated April 27, 2004. In the March 31, 2003, a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) directing the staff to go forward with a risk-informed rule decoupling LOOP from LOCA, the Commission stated that the rule should consider the risk impacts of a "delayed LOOP and possible double-sequencing of safety functions." During the review of the BWROG TR, the potential safety impact of a LOCA followed by a delayed LOOP became a major issue. Existing nuclear plants are designed to handle only the simultaneous LOCA and LOOP. The capability of many plants to successfully mitigate upsets causing a delayed LOOP has not been determined. In December 2007, in COMSECY-07-0041, "Status of Staff Activities on Proposed Rule for Risk-Informed Decoupling of Assumed Loss-of-Offsite Power From Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analyses," the staff indicated its plans to reassess the need for a LOOP-LOCA rule after making final decisions on the BWROG TR and on the 10 CFR 50.46a risk-informed ECCS rule. In an SRM related to SECY-07-0082 dated August 10, 2007, the Commission agreed with the staff's recommendation that completing the rulemaking should be assigned a medium priority. Prior to competing its review of the TR, the staff concluded that the approach could not be approved without evaluating an individual plant's capability to successfully cope with a delayed LOOP. By letter dated June 12, 2008, the BWROG withdrew the TR from further NRC review after concluding that continued development of the report was no longer cost effective, and if ultimately approved in the form desired by NRC staff, adoption by licensees would most likely be prohibitively expensive. In September 2009, SECY-09-0140, "Rulemaking Related to Decoupling an Assumed Loss of Offsite Power from a Loss of Coolant Accident, 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 35," provided options for completing the rulemaking and recommended the option to discontinue the rulemaking effort. The staff's recommendation was based on the lack of a fully developed regulatory basis and expenditures of staff time to develop one would not be expected to result in a quantifiable safety improvement. In the SRM related to SECY-09-0140 dated July 12, 2010, the Commission directed the staff to defer the decision on the rulemaking effort until the 10 CFR 50.46a rule is implemented. In 2012 the staff requested withdrawal of the 10 CFR 50.46a final rule from Commission consideration. The Commission approved the staff's request in SRM-SECY-10-0161. In response to the SRM-SECY-13-0132, "Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Recommendation for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Report", the staff requested extension to this and other initiatives, across all NRC program areas, to evaluate the Risk Management Regulatory Framework (RMRF) approach recommended in NUREG-2150 as well as alternative approaches for a achieving a risk-informed regulatory framework. The Commission, via SRM-SECY-15-0168, directed the staff to: 1) maintain the existing regulatory framework for the nuclear power reactor safety program area, and 2) refrain from developing an overarching, agency-wide risk management policy statement. The proposed 50.46a rule was not subsequently issued and work on this effort has been discontinued. As a result, the staff has started engaging with the industry to determine the need for and interest in the rulemaking decoupling LOOP assumption from LBLOCA analysis.
No action in FY 2015, as this item is on hold. Additional FY2015 information is available.
In July 2016, the NRC held a public meeting to provide an opportunity for external stakeholders and the NRC staff to exchange information on the need for a rulemaking action to risk-inform decoupling of assumed LOOP from the LOCA analysis. NRC staff will consider the comments provided during the public meeting and plans to hold additional meetings solicit stakeholder feedback on interest in the rulemaking. Additional FY2016 information is available.
Risk insights, such as relative likelihood occurrence, are used to determine the categorize break sizes and to decouple the assumption of a coincident LOOP from the analysis of postulated large break sized LOCA (low likelihood of occurrence events). Such breaks must also be mitigated but they may be analyzed with more realistic analytical methods and initial conditions without postulating the loss of offsite power or the worst case single failure.
Develop Risk-Informed Improvements to Standard Technical Specifications (STS)
The staff continues to work on the risk-informed technical specifications (RITS) initiatives to add a risk-informed component to the STS. The following summaries highlight these activities:
Initiative 1, "Modified End States," would allow licensees to repair equipment during hot shutdown rather than cold shutdown. The Topical Reports (TRs) supporting this initiative for boiling water reactor (BWR), Combustion Engineering (CE), Babcock & Wilcox (B&W), and Westinghouse Electric Company (Westinghouse) plants have been approved, and revisions to the BWR, CE, B&W, and Westinghouse STS are available at ADAMS Accession Nos. ML093570241 and ML103360003.
Initiative 4b, "Risk-Informed Completion Times," modifies technical specification completion times to reflect a configuration risk-management approach that is more consistent with the approach described in the Maintenance Rule, as specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). As reported previously in SECY-07-0191, "Implementation and Update of the Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Plan," dated October 31, 2007, the staff issued the license amendment for the first pilot plant, South Texas Project (STP), in July 2007.
In July 2010, Southern Nuclear Company (SNC) submitted a letter of intent for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) (Units 1 and 2) to implement RITS Initiative 4b. The NRC granted an associated fee waiver request and received a pilot application in September 2012. The NRC staff is nearing completion of its review of the application, and is actively working to resolve the remaining technical issues. The associated Technical Specification Task Force guidance (TSTF-505) to revise the STS was published in March 2012. Five additional applications to implement TSTF-505 have been received and are currently being reviewed by the technical staff. The five additional applications were received on November 25, 2013; December 5, 2014; December 23, 2014; July 31, 2015 and February 25, 2016. The five additional applications are not classified as "pilot applications."
Initiative 6, "Add Actions to Preclude Entry into LCO 3.0.3," modifies technical specification action statements for conditions that result in a loss of safety function related to a system or component included within the scope of the plant technical specifications. The staff approved the industry's TR for CE nuclear power plants (Revision 2 to WCAP-16125-NP-A, "Justification for Risk-Informed Modifications to Selected Technical Specifications for Conditions Leading to Exigent Plant Shutdown") in August 2010. The associated Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) guidance (Revision 5 of TSTF-426) to revise the CE STS was submitted for NRC review by letter dated November 2011. Based on the approved CE TR, the industry has also submitted requests to revise the B&W STS (Revision 0 of TSTF-538) and the STS for BWRs (Revision 0 of TSTF-540) in March 2012 and May 2012, respectively. However, these TSTFs were withdrawn per letters dated January 6, 2014, and October 6, 2014, after the NRC requested additional information and the participating licensees decided not to pursue these initiatives.
The NRC staff continued review of STS initiatives as they were received. Additional FY2015 information is available.
The NRC staff performed reviews of STS initiatives based license amendment applications as they were received. Additional FY2016 information is available.
The activity uses risk insights and results to identify appropriate improvements to the current STS and to determine appropriate compensatory risk management actions associated with plant equipment that is deemed inoperable per STS. Decisions concerning changes to STS are reached in an integrated fashion, considering traditional engineering and risk information, and may be based on qualitative factors as well as quantitative analyses and information.
Implement 10 CFR 50.69: Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors
In 1998, the Commission decided to consider issuing new regulations that would provide an alternative risk-informed approach for special treatment requirements in the current regulations for power reactors. The NRC published the final rule (10 CFR 50.69, "Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components [SSCs] for Nuclear Power Reactors") in the Federal Register on November 22, 2004 (69 FR 68008). The NRC staff issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.201, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Categorizing Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Power Plants According to Their Safety Significance," in May 2006.
By letter dated December 6, 2010, the Southern Nuclear Company (SNC) informed the NRC of its intent to submit a license amendment request for implementation of 10 CFR 50.69 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2, and requested pilot plant status and a waiver of review fees. By letter dated June 17, 2011, the staff informed SNC that the NRC granted the fee waiver request for the proposed licensing action in accordance with 10 CFR 170.11(b). SNC submitted a pilot plant application to implement 10 CFR 50.69 on August 31, 2012. By letter dated December 17, 2014, the NRC staff issued a License amendment to SNC revising the licensing basis for the VEGP by adding license conditions that allow for the voluntary implementation of 10 CFR 50.69. Lessons learned from the application review will be used to revise the associated industry guidance and RG 1.201.
In addition, the NRC staff issued draft Inspection Procedure 37060, "10 CFR 50.69 Risk Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components Inspection," on February 16, 2011. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and one licensee provided comments on the procedure. The NRC staff addressed the comments and issued the revised inspection procedure in 2011. The NRC will focus its inspection efforts on the most risk-significant aspects related to implementation of 10 CFR 50.69 (i.e., proper categorization of SSCs and treatment of Risk-Informed Safety Class [RISC]-1 and RISC-2 SSCs).
As part of the Regulatory Guide Periodic Review, the NRC reviewed RG 1.201 to determine whether changes were necessary to incorporate lessons learned from the VEGP pilot application. The review concluded that the RG could be updated, but identified no safety concerns if the guide is not updated. The NRC staff did not recommend an update because no additional License Amendment Requests (LARs) have been submitted.
Completed the pilot application for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) in December 2014. Additional FY2015 information is available.
Although no new submittals seeking to implement 10 CFR 50.69 were received by the NRC in FY2016, the industry has expressed interest in its widespread implementation. The NRC staff met with industry representatives in August 2016 to discuss future 50.69 LAR submittals and their content. Additional FY2016 information is available.
10 CFR 50.69 and its implementation relies heavily on risk insight and metrics, such as importance measures, to categorize the safety significance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs). The rule revises requirements with respect to 'special treatment,' that is, those requirements that provide increased assurance (beyond normal industrial practices) that SSCs perform their design basis functions. This rule permits licensees (and applicants for licenses) to remove SSCs of low safety significance, as determined based on the risk metrics, from the scope of certain identified special treatment requirements and to revise requirements for SSCs of greater safety significance. The plant-specific Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model is utilized to generate the risk metrics used for the categorization resulting in a quantifiable method of determining the risk significance of the components on the safe operation of the nuclear plant.