Item A-25: Non-Safety Loads on Class 1E Power Sources

DESCRIPTION

Historical Background

The Class 1E power sources provide the electric power for the plant systems that are essential to reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, containment heat removal or are otherwise essential in

preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment. This NUREG-0371[1] item addresses the issue of whether or not non-safety loads should also be allowed to share these sources.

Safety Significance

If non-safety loads are allowed to be connected to the Class 1E power system, it is possible that they may cause degradation by introducing loss of redundancy or other failure mechanisms.

Possible Solutions

Possible solutions include prohibiting the connection of non-safety loads or requiring special precautions for cases where a nonsafety load is connected to the 1E source.

CONCLUSION

This issue has been addressed by Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.75[2] which was issued in September 1978 and includes special requirements for connection of non-safety loads to a Class 1E source. As an alternate to the Regulatory Guide requirements, current licensing practice permits the use of periodically-tested, redundant Class 1E fault-interrupting devices as an acceptable isolation device between the Class 1E power source and the connected non-Class 1E load. This current practice is being formalized as a BTP for incorporation into the SRP.[3] Therefore, this issue has been RESOLVED.



Item A-26: Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection (Rev. 2)



[1] NUREG-0371, "Task Action Plans for Generic Activities (Category A)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1978.

[2] Regulatory Guide 1.75, "Physical Independence of Electric Systems," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1974, (Rev. 1) January 1975 [8605300425], (Rev. 2) September 1978. [7810050139]

Page Last Reviewed/Updated 06/24/2025