Resolution of Generic Issue A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies" Pursant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Generic Letter 91-06)



The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has completed the 
evaluation of Generic Issue (GI) A-30 as part of the resolution of GI-128, 
"Electrical Power Reliability."  GI A-30 focuses on safety-related dc 
systems.  Enclosure 1 to this generic letter provides a brief description 
and history of this GI.  Additional details are provided in NUREG/CR-5414, 
"Technical Findings for Proposed Integrated Resolution of Generic Issue 128, 
'Electrical Power Reliability.'"  As a result of its evaluation, the staff 
believes that certain maintenance, surveillance, and monitoring provisions 
are appropriate for safety-related dc systems.  The staff believes that most 
plants have already implemented most of these provisions because of a number 
of actions taken previously by the staff and industry.  

In order for the NRC to determine whether any further staff action is 
required to modify, suspend or revoke your license, addressees are required, 
pursuant to Section 182 of The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 
CFR 50.54(f), to provide written responses to the questions in Enclosure 1 
within 180 days of the date of this letter.  This information should be 
submitted to NRC, signed under oath or affirmation.  

The actions requested in this generic letter are not considered a backfit in 
accordance with NRC procedures and do not represent a change in staff 
positions.  This generic letter is a request for information only to 
determine if licensee's plant specific maintenance, surveillance, and 
monitoring provisions are appropriate and that these provisions have been 
implemented.  An evaluation of this letter was performed in accordance with 
the charter of the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) and 10 
CFR 50.54(f) and will be made available in the Public Document Room with the 
minutes of the 163rd meeting of the CRGR. 

NRC has recognized that an "Individual Plant Examination (IPE) For Severe 
Accident Vulnerabilities" could enable licensees to address unresolved 
safety and generic safety issues as outlined in generic letter 88-20, 
provided that the details defined in NUREG-1335 (Section 2.1.6, Subitem 7), 
"Individual Plant Examination:  Submittal Guidance",  are included.  
Therefore, the enclosure to this letter gives licensees the option of 
providing certain supporting information as part of the IPE instead of 
supplying it in response 

Technical Contacts:
O. Chopra, NRR
(301) 492-3265

D. Thatcher, RES
(301) 492-3935


Generic Letter 91-06                - 2 -

to this letter.  However, a decision to address this generic issue as 
provided in Enclosure 1 (i.e., by addressing questions 5 and 9) does not 
relieve licensees from searching for other plant-specific vulnerabilities of 
dc systems as part of your IPE. 

This request is covered by Office of Management and Budget Clearance Number 
3150-0011, which expires June 30, 1991.  The estimated average number of 
burden hours is 100 person hours per licensee response, including the time 
required to assess the questions, search data sources, gather and analyze 
the data, and prepare the required reports.  Comments on the accuracy of 
this estimate and suggestions to reduce the burden may be directed to Ronald 
Minsk, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011), NEOB-3019, 
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503, and to the U. S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information and Records Management Branch, 
Division of Information Support Services, Office of Information and 
Resources Management, Washington, D.C.  20555. 

If you have any questions, please contact your project manager. 


                                        James G. Partlow 
                                        Associate Director for Projects 
                                        Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

1.  10 CFR 50.54(f) Request For GI A-30 "Adequacy of
    Safety-Related dc Power"
2.  List of Recently Issued generic letters





The specific area of concern of GI A-30 "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power 
Supplies" is the adequacy of the safety-related dc power in operating 
nuclear power plants, particularly with regard to multiple and common cause 
failures.  Risk analysis and past plant experience support conclusions that 
failure of the dc power supplies could represent a significant contribution 
to the unreliability of shutdown cooling.  Analysis indicates that 
inadequate maintenance and surveillance and failure to detect battery 
unavailability are the prime contributors to failure of the dc power 

During the development of plans to resolve GI A-30, it was observed that 
several previously issued regulatory notices (IENs), bulletins (IEBs) and 
letters (GLs) submitted to licensees include recommendations similar to 
those that have been identified to resolve GI A-30.  More specifically, it 
has been determined that recommendations contained in notifications IEN 
85-74, "Station Battery Problems", IEB 79-27, "Loss of Non-Class 1E 
Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus during Operation," and separate 
actions being taken to resolve GI 49, "Interlocks and LCOs for Class 1E Tie 
Breakers" include the elements necessary to resolve GI A-30.  It is 
therefore concluded that licensees that have implemented these 
recommendations and actions will have resolved GI A-30.  The response to the 
questions that follow is necessary to provide the staff with information to 
determine whether any further action is required for your facility.


The following information is to be provided for each unit at each site: 

1.   Unit                          

2.   a.   The number of independent redundant divisions of Class 1E or 
          safety- related dc power for this plant is                    .  
          (Include any separate Class 1E or safety-related dc, such as any 
          dc dedicated to the diesel generators.) 

     b.   The number of functional safety-related divisions of dc power 
          necessary to attain safe shutdown for this unit is           .

3.   Does the control room at this unit have the following separate, 
     independently annunciated alarms and indications for each division of 
     dc power?

     a.   alarms

          1.   Battery disconnect or circuit breaker open?                   

          2.   Battery charger disconnect or circuit breaker open (both 
          input ac and output dc)?              


                                    - 2 -

          3.   dc system ground?                 
          4.   dc bus undervoltage?              
          5.   dc bus overvoltage?               
          6.   Battery charger failure?              
          7.   Battery discharge?                
     b.   Indications 
          1.   Battery float charge current?             
          2.   Battery circuit output current?           
          3.   Battery discharge?             
          4.   Bus voltage?             
     c.   Does the unit have written procedures for response to the above 
          alarms and indications?            
4.   Does this unit have indication of bypassed and inoperable status of 
     circuit breakers or other devices that can be used to disconnect the 
     battery and battery charger from its dc bus and the battery charger 
     from its ac power source during maintenance or testing?                
5.   If the answer to any part of question 3 or 4 is no, then provide 
     information justifying the existing design features of the facility's 
     safety-related dc systems.  *See note below. 
6.   (1)  Have you conducted a review of maintenance and testing activities 
     to minimize the potential for human error causing more than one dc 
     division to be unavailable? and 
     (2) do plant procedures prohibit maintenance or testing on redundant 
     dc divisions at the same time?              
If the facility Technical Specifications have provisions equivalent to those 
found in the Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering Standard Technical 
Specifications for maintenance and surveillance, then question 7 may be 
skipped and a statement to that effect may be inserted here. 

7.   Are maintenance, surveillance and test procedures regarding station 
     batteries conducted routinely at this plant?  Specifically: 
     a.   At least once per 7 days are the following verified to be within 
          acceptable limits: 
          1.   Pilot cell electrolyte level?              

                                    - 3 -

          2.   Specific gravity or charging current?            
          3.   Float voltage?              
          4.   Total bus voltage on float charge?              
          5.   Physical condition of all cells?              
     b.   At least once per 92 days, or within 7 days after a battery 
          discharge, overcharge, or if the pilot cell readings are outside 
          the 7-day surveillance requirements are the following verified to 
          be within acceptable limits: 
          1.   Electrolyte level of each cell?              
          2.   The average specific gravity of all cells?              
          3.   The specific gravity of each cell?              
          4.   The average electrolyte temperature of a representative 
               number of cells?              
          5.   The float voltage of each cell?              
          6.   Visually inspect or measure resistance of terminals and 
               connectors (including the connectors at the dc bus)? 
     c.   At least every 18 months are the following verified: 
          1.   Low resistance of each connection (by test)?              
          2.   Physical condition of the battery?              
          3.   Battery charger capability to deliver rated ampere 
               output to the dc bus?              
          4.   The capability of the battery to deliver its design duty 
               cycle to the dc bus?              
          5.   Each individual cell voltage is within acceptable limits 
               during the service test?              
     d.   At least every 60 months, is capacity of each battery verified by 
          performance of a discharge test?              
     e.   At least annually, is the battery capacity verified by performance 
          discharge test, if the battery shows signs of degradation or has 
          reached 85% of the expected service life?              

                                    - 4 -

8.   Does this plant have operational features such that following loss of 
     one safety-related dc power supply or bus: 
     a.   Capability is maintained for ensuring continued and adequate 
          reactor cooling?              
     b.   Reactor coolant system integrity and isolation capability are 
     c.   Operating procedures, instrumentation (including indicators and 
     annunciators), and control functions are adequate to initiate systems 
     as required to maintain adequate core cooling?              
9.   If the answer to any part of question 6, 7 or 8 is no, then provide 
     your basis for not performing the maintenance, surveillance and test 
     procedures described and/or the bases for not including the operational 
     features cited.  *See note below. 
*Note:  For questions involving supporting type information (question 
numbers 5 and 9) instead of developing and supplying the information in 
response to this letter, you may commit to further evaluate the need for 
such provisions during the performance of your individual plant examination 
for severe accident vulnerabilities (IPE).  If you select this option, you 
are required to: 

     (1)  So state in response to these questions, and (2)  Commit to 
          explicitly address questions 5 and 9 in your IPE submittal per the 
          guidelines outlined in NUREG-1335 (Section 2.1.6, Subitem 7), 
          "Individual Plant Examination:  Submittal Guidance."


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021