Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Fuel Cycle Facilites - A

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NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
AlliedSignal, Inc., IL
05/05/1998 Programmatic breakdown in following procedures that resulted in an uranium hexafluoride release and physical injury of workers.
American Centrifuge Operating, LLC
ORDER 09/21/2023 On September 21, 2023, the NRC issued a confirmatory order (CO) to American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (licensee) confirming commitments reached as part of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation settlement agreement between the licensee and the NRC. The ADR mediation and subsequent CO were based on the results of an inspection at the licensee’s facility in which the NRC identified apparent violations. In consideration of the licensee commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed to not pursue any further enforcement action based on the apparent violations and the CO will not count as escalated enforcement in the civil penalty assessment process for future enforcement cases involving the licensee. Details regarding the apparent violations and corrective actions contain security-related information and are therefore documented in a non-public version of the Confirmatory Order.
ORDER 04/26/2010 On April 26, 2010, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to AREVA NP – Richland, Inc. (AREVA) to formalize commitments reached as part of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session involving a violation of a facility procedure by an employee who willfully defeated the function of an Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) on April 21, 2009. Specifically, an electronic eye sensor known as the vacuum wand interlock was deliberately bypassed by an employee and made to work by using tape. As a result, IROFS 1111 was not available and reliable as required by 10 CFR 70.61(e). Although the vacuum wand interlock was disabled, sufficient system IROFS remained in service to perform the intended safety function for identified accident scenarios and protect the health and safety of the public. As part of the settlement agreement, AREVA agreed to take a number of actions in addition to those already completed. These additional actions include: (1) incorporating lessons learned from this incident, including enhanced safety conscious work environment (SCWE) training, into General Employee training for new employees and annual refresher training for all Richland employees; (2) implementing a management observation program for the purpose of reinforcing task performance standards and work practices; (3) performing a survey to determine the results of efforts to increase supervisor availability in the work area; and (4) developing a presentation on the incident and lessons learned with regard to work practices for a future industry forum. In recognition of these actions, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation or other enforcement action.
6/13/2008 On June 13, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to properly prepare a package containing fuel service equipment such that dose rates on the surface of the package would not exceed 10 CFR 71.5(a) and 49 CFR 173.441(a) limits. Specifically, on February 3, 2008, AREVA shipped surface contaminated equipment as an open conveyance on a flatbed trailer. On February 4, 2008, the shipment arrived at a nuclear power facility with measured contact radiation levels between 800-2000 mr/hr in a localized area on the bottom of the container. The localized area was not easily accessible and no measurable radiation exposures to workers or members of the public occurred as a result of this event.
AREVA NP, Inc. (formerly B&W Fuel Company), VA

03/04/1997 The action involved five violations involving an event in which a low-enriched, unirradiated fuel assembly was inadvertently returned in its original shipping container to its point of origin in Germany. The violations, which are being characterized as a Severity Level III problem, include B&W's failure to: (1) follow its procedures for the downloading operation; (2) provide adequate procedures for the downloading operation; (3) conduct a reasonable survey of the shipping container; (4) comply with numerous transportation requirements; and (5) adequately implement material control and accounting procedures to verify the presence of the fuel assembly.
EA-96-236; EA-95-215
AREVA NP, Inc. (formerly B&W Fuel Company), VA
01/30/1996 Licensee failure to use shipping packages which were constructed in compliance with regulations, to maintain the inventory of natural uranium within the limits of authorization, and to provide complete and accurate information concerning use of packaging and possession of material.
CPORDER 04/29/1996
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Monday, September 25, 2023