United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Spent Fuel Pool Safety Analysis of TRACE in Chinshan NPP (NUREG/IA-0452)

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Publication Information

Manuscript Completed: November 2014
Date Published: March 2015

Prepared by:
Chunkuan Shih*, Jong-Rong Wang*, Hao-Tzu Lin, Hui-Chen Wang*, Show-Chyuan Chiang**,
Chia-Chuan Liu**

Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, Atomic Energy Council, R.O.C.
1000, Wenhua Rd., Chiaan Village, Lungtan, Taoyuan, 325, Taiwan

*Institute of Nuclear Engineering and Science, National Tsing Hua University
101 Section 2, Kuang Fu Rd., HsinChu, Taiwan

**Department of Nuclear Safety, Taiwan Power Company
242, Section 3, Roosevelt Rd., Zhongzheng District, Taipei, Taiwan

K. Tien, NRC Project Manager

Division of Systems Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Prepared as part of:
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

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In this research, loss of spent fuel pool cooling system and loss of pool coolant inventory accident in Chinshan nuclear power plant (NPP) were simulated by using TRACE code, the latest best-estimate thermal-hydraulic system code developed by the U.S.NRC. Besides, the mitigation capability of spray system during the accidents was discussed.

In TRACE input model, the calculation of decay thermal power of spent fuel was based on ASB 9-2 decay heat correlation of U.S. NRC standard review plan report. To simulate the accident mitigation, spray system initiation time, spray flow rate, and spray flow temperature sensitivity studies were performed in the loss of pool cooling system accident simulation. In the simulation of concurrent loss of pool cooling system and pool inventory, the focus was mainly on the excessive inventory loss which the initial leakage rate was beyond 500 gpm.

The capability of mitigation strategy was evaluated by using simulation results including spent fuel pool water level and fuel cladding temperature variation. The results depicted that in the loss of pool cooling system cases, the earlier the spray system initiated, the shorter pool inventory recover time was needed, and the cladding temperature was lowered effectively by performing a larger spray flow rate. In the loss of both pool cooling system and pool inventory cases, the cladding temperature was controlled even the fuels were partially uncovered, and the spray flow should not less than 200 gpm to avoid the sharp increase of cladding temperature.

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