Information Notice No. 86-51: Excessive Pneumatic Leakage in the Automatic Depressurization System
SSINS. No. : 6835
IN 86-51
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
June 18, 1986
Information Notice No. 86-51: EXCESSIVE PNEUMATIC LEAKAGE IN THE
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
Addressees:
All boiling water reactor (BWR) nuclear power facilities holding an
operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially
significant problem pertaining to possible pneumatic supply leakage through
pathways near the accumulators serving automatic depressurization system
(ADS) safety relief valves. It is expected that recipients will review this
notice for applicability to their facilities. However, suggestions contained
in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Past Related Documents:
IE Bulletin No. 80-01: "Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply,"
January 11, 1980
IE Bulletin No. 80-25: "Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief
Valves at BWRs," December 19, 1980
Information Notice No. 85-35: "Failure of Air Check Valves to Seat,"
April 30, 1985
IE Inspection Report 50-458/84-18: "Integrated Design Inspection of the
River Bend Station," Section 2.4, "Automatic Depressurization System
Design," August 16, 1984
Description of Circumstances:
On March 19, 1986, after noting that the booster compressors were operating
more than was normal, the licensee at Grand Gulf determined that excessive
instrument air flow was required to maintain the ADS's normal operating
pressure of 183 psig. The licensee isolated the air supply and observed
header pressure to decrease from 183 to 155 psig in 1 hour. Based on
licensee measurements, the air system was leaking at a rate of 600-1200
standard cubic
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feet per hour (SCF/hr). This pressure decrease and the previously observed
excessive air makeup indicated that the ADS receiver and accumulator
combined leakage exceeded the long-term requirements for ADS safety relief
valve actuation specified in the final safety analysis report (FSAR). The
FSAR assumes a leak rate of 1.0 SCF/hr for each valve on the system.
Technical Specifications (TS) require that eight ADS valves be operable, but
they do not specify leakage requirements.
The air supply to the ADS valves was reinstated and the instrument air
pressure remained above the minimum operating pressure of 150 psig. However,
if there had been a failure of the non-safety portions of the instrument air
system (the compressors or the piping upstream of the receiver), the ADS
system would have not remained operable. Therefore, the licensee declared
the ADS inoperable and shut down the reactor for repairs. Investigation of
the cause of the high leak rate showed that the accumulator relief valves in
the drywell were defective. It was determined that 16 of 17 were leaking and
required rework and these valves were repaired. Normal operating pressure
was reduced from 183 psig to 165 psig. This increases the margin between the
operating pressure and the relief set point (190 psig). The operating
pressure is now below the pressure (171 psig) at which seat leak tightness
is tested yet sufficiently above the minimum required pressure (110 psig)
for meeting FSAR commitments.
Discussion:
Previous generic correspondence has identified problems in pneumatic systems
that could affect ADS operability. IE Bulletins 80-01 and 80-25 noted
problems with the control air system in maintaining operability of the ADS.
In the case of Bulletin 80-01, the ADS was not operable for all events
because of combined misapplication of the accumulator inlet check valve,
lack of accumulator testing, and seismic considerations. For Bulletin 80-25,
excessive pressure in the pneumatic supply system caused an ADS safety
relief valve to stay open when it should have closed. The reactor coolant
system was then depressurized while the reactor was operating at power.
The problem at Grand Gulf described above is analogous to the situation
described in Information Notice 85-35 and the referenced inspection report
on the River Bend plant. In that case, back leakage through the inlet check
valve (rather than accumulator relief valves) resulted in reduced
accumulator pressure. The Grand Gulf ADS accumulators are designed as
Section III, Class 3 components, according to the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code. Relief valves are attached to the accumulators for overpressure
protection. Such relief valves may not be found at all plants, depending on
the accumulator design. This event indicates that such leaking relief valves
and any other leaking mechanical joints provide pathways for air leakage
that compromise the operability of the ADS during accident conditions.
Only portions of pneumatic systems in nuclear power plants are designed as
safety systems. In general, the air compressors are not powered from
emergency buses; therefore, the supply of air is dependent on the
availability of off-site power. Further, piping between the air compressors
and the safety grade
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portions of the system is not designed to withstand major seismic events.
Thus the components that require compressed air to perform their safety
function are heavily dependent on the leak-tightness of the seismic
resistant portions of the pneumatic systems, including appurtenances such as
relief valves and check valves. Although the TS do not require monitoring of
the ADS pneumatic supply system makeup rate, lack of monitoring the makeup
rate subjects the ADS to potentially undetected excessive leakage. This
could result in the ADS being unable to meet its design bass requirements
upon loss of the non-safety-related instrument air system.
No written response to this information notice is required. If there are any
questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: Vern Hodge, IE
(301) 492-7275
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
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