Information Notice No. 86-27: Access Control at Nuclear Facilities
SSINS No: 6835
IN 86-27
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555
April 21, 1986
Information Notice No. NO 86-27: ACCESS CONTROL AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel
fabrication and processing facilities using or possessing formula quantities
of special nuclear material
Purpose:
This information notice is provided to describe examples of significant
physical security problems in the area of access control It is expected
that recipients will review the information for applicability to their
facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar
problems from occurring at their facilities However, suggestions contained
in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required at this time
Description of Circumstances:
In recent months, the number of incidents related to degraded access control
at nuclear facilities appears to have increased considerably Breakdowns in
positive access control, especially those that could have allowed access
into vital areas (VAs) and material access areas (MAAs), are among the most
significant safeguards vulnerabilities that can occur at nuclear facilities
Examples of the most frequent access control problems are:
o Weapons have been found on vehicles by security personnel during
protected area exit searches instead of entry searches Also,
individuals already granted access have discovered that they mistakenly
brought weapons on site via vehicle or package In some cases, no entry
search was conducted, while in others, a search was conducted but the
weapon was not detected Security personnel have asked drivers of
vehicles if they had any weapons on their persons, but failed to ask if
there were any weapons in the vehicles
o Individuals have gained access to facilities by tailgating or by using
someone else's badge Also, individuals not authorized access to VAs
and MAAs ave tailgated into those areas In many cases, they were not
challenged by the person being tailgated or by personnel working in the
area Some violators displayed badges that clearly indicated they were
not authorized to be in the area, while others did not even display a
badge
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IN 86-27
April 21, 1986
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o VA and MAA doors have been found unsecured because they would not close
properly Also, these doors have been found taped or propped open for
operational convenience In other instances, the closure time for
power-controlled VA and MAA doors has been excessive, inviting
tailgating or unauthorized entries Poor maintenance programs and
inadequate compensatory measures have frequently compounded these
problems
o Guards being used as compensatory measures for VA and MAA barriers
and/or security alarm systems, have been found asleep at their posts or
have left their posts before barriers and/or alarm systems have been
returned to an effective state of operation
o Responses to protected area and VA and MAA alarms have been very
untimely and, in some cases, no responses have been made
In several of these cases, NRC has taken escalated enforcement action for
failure to properly control access to the site protected area and VAs Under
the NRC Enforcement Policy, failure to control access such that contraband
is introduced into the site protected area or individuals are allowed access
to protected areas or VAs without proper authorization may be categorized as
Severity Level III or higher violations Depending on the particular
circumstances of such incidents, a substantial civil penalty may be imposed
Discussion:
The above examples of frequent access control problems indicate that many
licensees may share some of the following program management problems:
o Failure to properly train and motivate security personnel and other
employees in discharging their security-related responsibilities
o Failure to place appropriate priorities on maintenance of security
equipment
o Poor security awareness or attitudes by employees
o Poor access control procedures, especially concerning searches,
issuance of badges, and use of turnstiles
Human error, ineffective training, and poor attitudes towards the security
program appear to be the most significant factors in the problem areas
identified NRC inspectors are directing more inspection effort in these
areas, and violations will be processed in accordance with NRC Enforcement
Policy
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April 21, 1986
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No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the
Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this
office
Edward L Jordan Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: N Ervin, IE
(301) 492-7855
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021