Information Notice No. 85-80: Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, And Emergency Notifications
SSINS No.: 6835
IN 85-80
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
October 15, 1985
Information Notice No. 85-80: TIMELY DECLARATION OF AN EMERGENCY CLASS,
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EMERGENCY PLAN, AND
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS
Addressees:
All nuclear power facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided to describe an instance when an
emergency condition was not classified and declared in a timely manner and
to clarify the requirement for licensees to adequately notify the NRC
Headquarters Operations Officer of emergencies. The NRC expects that
recipients will review this notice for applicability to their facilities.
Suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
Davis-Besse:
At 1:35 a.m. on June 9, 1985, the Davis-Besse plant experienced a complete
loss of main and auxiliary feedwater for nearly 12 minutes. This event is
described in more detail in Information Notice 85-50, "Complete Loss of Main
and Auxiliary Feedwater at a PWR Designed by Babcock & Wilcox," and NUREG-
1154, "Loss of Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Event at the Davis-Besse Plant
on June 9, 1985." The emergency plan identified the loss of feedwater event
as a Site Area Emergency, However, it appears that all knowledgeable person-
nel in the control room were occupied with stabilizing the plant and, thus,
were not able to classify the event as a Site Area Emergency and activate
the emergency plan. It is possible that had the plant not been brought to a
stable condition quickly and had plant safety further degraded, the efforts
of all knowledgeable personnel in the control room would have been required
for recovery efforts, further delaying initiation of appropriate onsite and
off-site emergency response.
At 2:11 a.m., the shift technical advisor (STA) called the NRC Operations
Center from the control room using the Emergency Notification System to re-
port the event pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. At the beginning of the event, the
STA had been in his quarters in the administration building, which is
outside the
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protected area about a half mile from the plant. Although the STA mentioned
the trip of the main and auxiliary feedwater pumps, the STA did not describe
the length of time that the plant was totally without feedwater or the
difficulty the plant had in restoring auxiliary feedwater. No Emergency
Class was declared, nor was the fact conveyed to the NRC that plant
conditions which warranted the declaration of a Site Area Emergency had
existed for nearly 12 minutes.
At 2:26 a.m., the STA informed the NRC that an Unusual Event had been
declared at 2:25 a.m. The STA also informed the NRC that although the
emergency plan identified the total loss of feedwater event as a Site Area
Emergency, the plant was no longer in this emergency action level at this
time. At 2:29 a.m., the licensee informed the county that an Unusual Event
had been declared. The licensee depended on a procedure that required the
county to notify the State of Ohio. However, because the county could not
reach the local state representative, the State of Ohio was not notified of
the Unusual Event declaration until after the event had been terminated,
more than 6 hours after its declaration.
At Davis-Besse, the emergency plan is initially implemented by the shift
supervisor, who also has primary responsibility for ensuring that the plant
is maintained in a safe condition. Because of the competing priorities of
(1) directing attention to necessary recovery actions to obtain a safe and
stable plant and (2) reviewing the emergency plan and initiating its
actions, there was a substantial delay in declaring an Emergency Class and
implementing the emergency plan. If the June 9 event had progressed in
severity, valuable time needed to initiate appropriate onsite and offsite
response to the emergency would have been lost.
Corrective actions being undertaken by the licensee as a result of this
event include a number of operational and procedural changes that include
but are not limited to the following: The STA shift schedule will be changed
from a 24-hour duty day to rotating 12-hour shifts. The STA will spend the
entire shift within the prOtected area, and the STA office will be located
within 1 to 2 minutes of the control room. The STA will be trained as an
Interim Emergency Duty Officer to advise the shift supervisor in event
classification and protective action. The licensee will make emergency
notifications directly to the State of Ohio.
Point Beach:
On July 25, 1985, at 7:25 a.m. (eastern time), Point Beach Unit 1
experienced an event involving loss of offsite power. Point Beach Unit 2
continued to operate normally during this event. Because of the incomplete
understanding of the event by those making the notification to the NRC
Operations Center, the NRC Operations Center was not made aware of the
details of the event. At 7:37 a.m., a security guard called the NRC
Operations Center to notify the NRC that Point Beach Unit 1 had declared an
Unusual Event. The explanation for the Unusual Event was that the plant had
a turbine runback. When the NRC Headquarters Operators Officer asked
questions, the security guard was unable to provide additional information
because of his limited technical knowledge of the plant and because the call
was made from a location outside the con-trol room where the security guard
could not obtain additional information from the operators involved.
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IN 85-80
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Page 3 of 3
The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer called the control room, and as a
result of asking questions learned that a station transformer had been lost.
However, not until 2 1/2 hours later, when the plant notified the NRC Head-
quarters Operations Officer that the Unusual Event was terminated, did the
NRC Headquarters Operations Officer learn that there had actually been a
loss of offsite power.
Discussion:
Licensees should not delay the declaration of an Emergency Class when condi-
tions warrant such a declaration. Delaying the declaration can defeat the
appropriate response to an emergency. It is the licensee's responsibility to
ensure that adequate personnel, knowledgeable about plant conditions and
emergency plan implementing procedures, are available on shift to assist the
shift supervisor to classify an emergency and activate the emergency plan,
including making appropriate notifications, without interfering with plant
operation.
When 10 CFR 50.72 was published in the Federal Register (48 FR 39039), the
NRC made clear its intent that notifications on the Emergency Notification
System to the NRC Operations Center should be made by those knowledgeable of
the event. If the description of an emergency is to be sufficiently accurate
and timely to meet the intent of the NRC's regulations, the personnel
responsible for notification must be properly trained and sufficiently
knowledgeable of the event to report it correctly. The NRC did not intend
that notifications made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 would be made by those who
do not understand the event that they are reporting.
No written response to this information notice is required. If you need
additional information about this matter, please contact the Regional Admin-
istrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contact
listed below.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: Eric W. Weiss, IE
(301) 492-9005
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021