Information Notice No. 84-84: Deficiencies in Ferro-Resonant Transformers
SSINS No.: 6835
IN 84-84
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
November 27, 1984
Information Notice No. 84-84: DEFICIENCIES IN FERRO-RESONANT
TRANSFORMERS
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided as a notification of two potentially
significant deficiencies pertaining to ferro-resonant transformers
manufactured by General Electric Company (GE). Such transformers have been
used by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) as integral
components of vital 7.5 kVA inverters. In addition, similar deficiencies may
exist on 30 and 45 kVA inverters utilizing similar but larger ferro-resonant
transformers. Westinghouse has provided such inverters to several utilities
for non-safety related applications such as supplying power to computers. It
is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar
problems occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
The subject ferro-resonant transformers produce a simulated ac signal from
either an ac or dc source; the inverters provide instrumentation power to
both protection and control systems of nuclear power facilities.
Westinghouse recently informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of
two deficiencies involving the subject ferro-resonant transformers. In
addition, Westinghouse identified its utility customers known to have
received inverters with suspect transformers and stated that these customers
had been informed of the issue. Westinghouse also stated that it was
possible that other utilities could be affected by these issues; therefore,
this notice is being issued to ensure that all affected utilities are aware
of the potential deficiencies.
First Deficiency:
By letter dated September 14, 1984, Westinghouse informed the NRC of the
first of two deficiencies involving the subject ferro-resonant transformers.
This deficiency was discovered by Westinghouse during its long-term aging
program, and reportedly occurred at the manufacturer's plant in 1977, at
which time
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IN 84-84
November 27, 1984
Page 2 of 3
the capacitor terminals had been changed from "ring-tongue" to "fast-on"
terminal connections. It is our understanding that GE made these changes
concurrent with changing the capacitors from a polychlorinated biphenyl
(PCB) design to a non-PCB design. Since all capacitors may not have been
changed to a non-PCB design, this notice also informs the addressees that
their facilities may be using ferro-resonant transformers with capacitors
containing PCB.
Westinghouse described its concern with the capacitor fast-on terminations
in its September 14, 1984, letter as follows:
Each capacitor terminal has three connection points--two fast-on
lugs and one solder lug. The capacitor wire terminations are
fast-on style as well. For the two transformers in the Westinghouse
test program, some wire terminations had incorrectly been forced
on the solder lugs. Were this connection to fall off due to a
seismic event, the most severe consequence would be a detuning of
the transformer, increased harmonic distortion and reduced output
(from 118 volts to as low as 60 volts). This decreased voltage
could both increase the error of instrumentation powered by this
inverter and could potentially cause an indeterminant number of
relays in both the protection and control systems to drop out due
to the reduced voltage.
Westinghouse issued a technical bulletin (Attachment 1) to facilities
potentially having capacitors with incorrect terminations. This attachment
describes the potential problem and provides instructions for proper
connection of the capacitors. However, because facilities other than those
listed may be using inverters with suspect ferro-resonant transformers, a
copy of the Westinghouse technical bulletin is attached, thereby assuring
that affected plants are aware of the deficiency and Westinghouse's
recommendations.
Second Deficiency:
By letter dated September 26, 1984, Westinghouse informed the NRC of the
second deficiency involving the subject ferro-resonant transformers.
Westinghouse was informed of this deficiency by Comanche Peak where three
separate transformers failed shortly after they were initially electrically
loaded. The failed units were returned to the manufacturer, GE, for
evaluation. The determination made by GE was that the affected transformer
reactors were inadequately secured, thereby allowing the center leg to shift
and vibrate while energized. The vibration, in turn, caused an insulation
breakdown.
The Westinghouse letter of September 26 indicates that if a transformer were
to short to ground, the inverter would continue to try to supply the load
resulting in a collapsing output voltage (e.g., 60-65 volts was noted at
Comanche Peak). GE has determined that if the transformer has been under
load for six months, the magnetic forces applied would have caused a failure
if the manufacturing defect were initially present.
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IN 84-84
November 27, 1984
Page 3 of 3
Westinghouse has issued a technical bulletin (Attachment 2) to facilities
potentially having transformers with loose reactor legs. This attachment
describes the potential problem and provides recommended corrective actions
for the suspected defect. However, because facilities other than those
listed in Attachment 2 may be using inverters with the above described
defects, a copy of the Westinghouse technical bulletin is attached, thereby
ensuring that affected plants are aware of the deficiency and Westinghouse's
recommendations.
No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice; however, if you have any question regarding this notice, please
contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or
the technical contact listed below.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: I. Villalva, IE
(301) 492-9006
Attachments:
1. Westinghouse Technical Bulletin No. NSD-TB-84-08
2. Westinghouse Technical Bulletin No. NSID-TB-84-11
3. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
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