Information Notice No. 84-64: BWR High-pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Initiation Seal-in and Indication
SSINS No.: 6835
IN 84-64
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555
August 15, 1984
Information Notice No. 84-64: BWR HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION
(HPCI) INITIATION SEAL-IN AND INDICATION
Addressees:
All boiling water reactor (BWR) licensees and applicants for an operating
license.
Purpose:
This notice is provided to inform recipients of a potential problem in the
initiation logic (both automatic and manual) that might prevent the HPCI
initiation from going to completion. The problem is compounded by erroneous
system status indication that could be confusing to the operator. This
potential problem could also exist on the reactor core isolation cooling
(RCIC) system. It is expected that recipients will review the information
for applicability to their facilities and take appropriate action. Suggested
actions in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
The NRC senior resident inspector at the Shoreham Station discovered that
the HPCI initiation logic did not go to completion in all cases but did
cause a status light to come on indicating that the HPCI initiation was
sealed-in. The problem arose from a combination of two design
characteristics. First, the HPCI pump discharge valve was interlocked with
the HPCI turbine steam valves. Second, contacts from the seal-in circuit
operated the "initiation sealed-in" indicator and operated all the required
components for HPCI startup, except the HPCI pump discharge valve.
On automatic actuation, the HPCI pump discharge valve would not start to
open until both the turbine steam inlet valve and turbine stop valve were no
longer at their fully closed positions and the initiation signal was still
present. If the initiation signal was not present when the steam valves
moved off their seats, the pump discharge valve would not open. If the pump
discharge valve did not open, the HPCI system would not perform its required
safety function and the initiation seal-in circuitry would not satisfy its
design objective.
.
IN 84-64
August 15, 1984
Page 2 of 3
For manual initiation, a system-level manual pushbutton switch at Shoreham
was wired in parallel with the low water level relay contacts. The switch
itself had no mechanical seal-in feature. Therefore, unless the operator
held the pushbutton for about 12 seconds, which was long enough for the
turbine steam valves to leave their fully closed positions, the HPCI would
not inject into the vessel and the HPCI system would come up to an active
standby mode with the flow being recirculated through the miniflow bypass
line. Manual operation of the pump discharge valve would then be required to
achieve injection flow.
Discussion:
Besides Shoreham, at least one other late-model BWR-4 design (Hope Creek)
was known to have a similar design deficiency. Design changes at both
Shoreham and Hope Creek have provided for a seal-in of the HPCI initiation
signal.
In some earlier BWR designs, HPCI manual initiation is provided at the
component level rather than at the system level. With these designs, the
manual open switch contact for the pump discharge valve bypasses the
interlock with the steam valves. Operation of this switch will cause the
valve to open, but the valve may immediately cycle back to the closed
position if the steam valves have not yet opened sufficiently to satisfy the
interlock at the time the switch is released. Manual startup of the HPCI
system in a particular sequence of components may avoid the manual
initiation problem.
In many plant designs, both old and new, the system status indication that
the HPCI logic is sealed-in could be anomalous and unnecessarily generate
the potential for operator confusion. However, there are other system
indicators (such as HPCI flow) that do give reliable information regarding
the status of the HPCI system.
Licensees and applicants should review their system descriptions, operating
procedures, and operator training programs to ensure that special
characteristics of the HPCI and RCIC initiation logics and system status
indicators are adequately addressed. Appropriate operator awareness may be
sufficient to allay short-term safety concerns while longer term actions to
rectify any design deficiencies are being investigated and implemented.
In particular, if manual initiation of HPCI requires holding a switch for
several seconds, then licensees may wish to consider appropriate
precautionary statements in procedures and precautionary labels next to the
HPCI manual initiation switch.
.
IN 84-64
August 15, 1984
Page 3 of 3
No written response to this information notice is required. If you need
additional information about this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical
contacts listed below.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: J. T. Beard, NRR
(301) 492-7465
Eric W. Weiss, IE
(301) 492-4973
Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021