Information Notice No. 84-32: Auxiliary Feedwater Sparger and Pipe Hanger Damage
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 84-32 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 18, 1984 Information Notice No. 84-32: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SPARGER AND PIPE HANGER DAMAGE Addressees: All holders of nuclear power reactor operating licenses (OLs) or construction permits (CPs) for pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Purpose: This information notice is provided to advise licensees and applicants of an event involving sparger and pipe hanger damage, which apparently was caused by water hammer in the auxiliary feedwater system despite specific design considerations intended to preclude such an event. We expect recipients of this notice will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or response is required. Description of Circumstances: During a recent inspection following shutdown for refueling at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, damage to the auxiliary feedwater system was found. As shown on the attached figure, the damage included: Steam Generator "A" Steam Generator "B" Thermal sleeve cracked Weld at elbow broken (see 3 on attached figure) (see 1 on attached figure) One (of three) hold down clamp Clamp broken on riser pipe to for sparger missing sparger (see Detail "C" on attached figure) (see 2 on attached figure) An inspection conducted just prior to the discovery of the internal steam generator damage revealed that eight hangers were loose or damaged on the auxiliary feedwater piping external to the steam generators. These hangers were inspected before the beginning of the fuel cycle and were known to have been in good repair at that time. The damage described above is consistent with the occurrence of water hammer during the cycle. 8404130404 . IN 84-32 April 18, 1984 Page 2 of 3 Palisades Nuclear Power Plant began feedwater testing in May 1980, following water hammer events at other nuclear power plants. At that time, the auxiliary feedwater system discharged through two independently controlled branches and through check valves to the main feedwater lines immediately outside containment. From this point, the flow of the auxiliary feedwater was through the main feedwater lines, through containment penetrations to the steam generators, and through the main feedwater spargers internal to the steam generators. During the testing, water hammer was induced at low pressure and high flow rates; so, testing was stopped, and operational limits were established for auxiliary feedwater flow rates. In the fall of 1981, Palisades began modifications that consisted of disconnecting the auxiliary feedwater lines from the main feedwater lines; routing the lines through existing spare containment penetrations to the existing, but previously unused, auxiliary feedwater nozzles on the steam generators; and providing a separate,auxiliary feedwater sparger inside each steam generator. The existing auxiliary feedwater nozzle forgings were equipped with thermal liners to allow cold feed injections, and the acceptable number of such cycles was analytically determined. The piping reaction at the nozzles also was evaluated for acceptability. The new spargers for auxiliary feedwater were designed in accordance with the current design practice for Combustion Engineering (CE) steam generators. A number of design features were incorporated specifically to reduce the susceptibility to water hammer. The piping in the vicinity of the steam generators was sloped down away from the generators. The sparger was arranged with top discharge "L" tubes and provided with a water trap to prevent the sparger from draining when the steam generator water level drops below the sparger. A vent was provided at the highest point of the, sparger water trap. In December 1981, Palisades Nuclear Power Plant completed a series of apparently successful water hammer tests on the newly installed auxiliary feedwater system. These tests included use of auxiliary feedwater with the steam generators at 200 psi and 900 psi. From December 1981 until August 1983, auxiliary feedwater was used and tested routinely without apparent incident. Testing included monthly surveillances at 150 gpm to each steam generator with the plant at near full power. Discussion: The auxiliary feedwater system damage both internal and external to the steam generators is thought to be the result of water hammer in the auxiliary feedwater system. This event is one of approximately 30 water hammers that have occurred in top feed ring design steam generators. Two of the steam generator water hammers have resulted in rupture of the secondary side pressure boundary. The first instance was at Indian Point 2 in November 1973, when the feedwater piping cracked and steam was released to the containment building. The second was at Maine Yankee in January 1983, when the #2 main feedline ruptured. . IN 84-32 April 18, 1984 Page 3 of 3 Unlike these two earlier events, the Palisades event did not result in pipe rupture external to the steam generators. One aspect of the auxiliary feedwater system design suggesting the possibility of water hammer is the placement of the new spargers. These spargers are located at the normal steam generator water level of 65%. With the expected variation of water level (+-2%), it would be expected that the sparger and its top mounted discharge "L" tubes are alternately and frequently covered and uncovered. Whether or not the damage to the auxiliary feedwater system at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant is ultimately attributed to water hammer, this event demonstrates the need for continued vigilance on the part of operations and engineering staff. Plant operations staff should be alert to the possibility of water hammer phenomenon even though the plant is designed to reduce susceptibility to it. Plant engineering staff should investigate loose or damaged hangers and operational parameters for the possibility of the water hammer phenomenon. Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: E. Weiss, IE (301) 492-4973 Attachments: 1. Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Auxiliary Feedwater 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021