Information Notice No. 82-51: Overexposures in PWR Cavities
SSINS No.: 6835
IN 82-51
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
December 21, 1982
Information Notice No. 82-51: OVEREXPOSURES IN PWR CAVITIES
Addressees:
All nuclear power plant facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information notice is provided as notification of a significant,
whole-body exposure in excess of regulatory limits to a shift engineer while
inspecting for water leaks into the cavity beneath the reactor vessel
(hereafter called reactor cavity). This is the sixth overexposure since 1972
that has occurred under similar circumstances; consequently, each licensed
senior reactor operator (SRO) should be provided a copy of this information
notice. SROs are specified because they frequently make the decision whether
a cavity entry is needed and they supervise facility operations.
Although the radiation doses received by personnel in this and previous
incidents have not been greater than about 10 rems, extremely high radiation
fields are created in reactor cavities by withdrawn, irradiated incore
instrumentation thimbles. Radiation levels of thousands of roentgens per
hour (R/hr) are possible and, in at least one of the incidents, an
individual entered a field of at least 2000 R/hr. Entry into radiation
fields of this magnitude seriously jeopardizes the health and safety of
personnel. All SROs should be cognizant of this information.
It is expected that licensees will review the information for applicability
to their facilities. No specific action or response is required at this
time.
Description of Circumstances:
Commonwealth Edison's Zion Unit 1 was in cold shutdown for refueling and
maintenance. Incore instrumentation thimble retraction started during the
evening shift on March 23, 1982, and was completed about six hours later at
approximately 0400 hours on March 24. The governing maintenance procedure
for retracting and inserting incore instrumentation thimbles required that
all access doors to the reactor cavity be locked and all incore detectors be
in the storage position before the thimbles were retracted. Control of keys
to the locks was administratively assigned to the shift engineer on duty.
After thimble retraction was completed on March 24, the licensee began to
flood the refueling cavity in preparation for refueling. At about 1030
hours, it was determined that the water level in the refueling cavity was
decreasing. At about noon, a shift foreman entered the reactor cavity in an
effort to
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locate the leakage source. The shift foreman saw that the leakage was
massive. The licensee decided to lower the water in the refueling cavity,
reinstall the reactor vessel head, and investigate the leakage source. At
about 2300 hours, the licensee found an excore nuclear instrumentation cover
gasket had slipped and was apparently the cause of the leak.
After the gasket was replaced, the licensee raised the vessel head and
partially flooded the refueling cavity. At about 1800 hours on March 25, the
shift engineer entered the reactor cavity to determine if there was further
leakage. During this entry which only took about 70 seconds, the shift
engineer received a whole-body radiation dose of approximately five rem.
"Power Reactor Events", Vol. 4, No. 4, published in November, 1982 describes
the event at Zion in more specific detail."
The Zion overexposure resulted from failure to follow good radiation
protection practices and programmatic weaknesses in the radiation protection
program. The following specific weaknesses contributed to the overexposure:
1. Failure of Shift Operations Personnel in Leadership Positions to
Exhibit Good Radiation Protection Practices
Shift operations personnel in leadership positions failed to exhibit
good radiation practices. On March 24, a shift foreman entered the
unsurveyed cavity area without observing survey instrument readings
until he had, descended the cavity ladder; at the bottom of the ladder
(a 50 R/hr radiation field) the shift foreman noted his survey
instrument was offscale, high. On March 25, a shift engineer entered an
unsurveyed area (moved closer to the bottom of the reactor vessel)
fully aware that exposure rates would increase significantly as he
approached the reactor vessel. Of all the personnel directly involved
in the two cavity entries, these two managers were the most
knowledgeable of the specific cavity radiological hazards.
2. Lack of Preplanning and Communication Among Individuals and Work Groups
There was a lack of preplanning and briefing of all participants prior
to the start of the job. No Radiological Work Permit (RWP) was
completed which could have: defined the intended actions (the shift
engineer went further into the cavity than expected); communicated the
"stay time" allowed (the shift engineer was not told his "stay time");
assured that precautions were identified (the plant health physicist
and radiation/chemistry foreman each assumed the other had discussed
precautions with the shift engineer); and provided for proper equipment
(the shift engineer only had a film badge and a [0-200 mr] self-reading
pocket dosimeter). Under Zion's procedures an RWP was not required
since a radiation/chemistry technician (RCT) was to provide continuous
job coverage.
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3. Lack of Understanding by Radiation Protection Personnel of Reactor
Cavity Radiological Hazards
The RCT and foremen involved had a general lack of understanding of the
reactor cavity's specific radiation hazards. The RCT and RCT trainees
providing job coverage for the cavity entries were not familiar with
the nature and strength of the radiation sources present with the
incore thimbles withdrawn. RCT training prior to the overexposure
described reactor cavity hazards only in general terms, with no
specific description of the radiation sources or the expected exposure
rates. The RCT thought the radiation source strength was uniformly
distributed along the length of the incore tubes (which run the entire
length of the reactor cavity); thus, the RCT, did not warn the engineer
to stop advancing into higher radiation fields.
As a result of this event, the licensee has initiated certain corrective
actions which include the following:
1. The incore thimbles will be required to be re-inserted prior to
personnel entry into the reactor cavity area beyond the base of the two
ladders extending down to the reactor cavity area. A special lock will
be placed on the door to the reactor cavity when the thimbles are
removed and the procedure for insertion and withdrawal of the incore
thimbles will be revised to include a sign off for rad-chem department
notification. An information sign showing the locations of the thimbles
and incore detectors during outages will be posted in the rad-chem
office.
2. All jobs where greater than 50 mrem could be received will require an
RWP.
3. Operator and radiation department training and retraining programs will
include special emphasis on the incore instrumentation system and its
radiations hazards. In addition, the licensee will evaluate the need to
upgrade the radiation department training program on plant systems and
their operations.
4. The licensee will evaluate other major problem areas where a potential
for high radiation doses exist.
Discussion:
Since 1972 there have been five other overexposures and one near
overexposure (see Table 1) associated with individuals entering the reactor
cavity where extremely high radiation dose rates have been present. The
purpose of most of these entries was to check for water leakage while
filling the refueling pool. The major causes of these overexposures were
nearly identical in every case and included: (1) failure of operations
personnel in leadership positions to follow good radiation protection
practices, (2) inadequate preplanning for the entries including a breakdown
in communication among Health Physics (HP) and Operations Groups, and (3)
inadequate training of the HP technicians in the radiological aspects of the
incore detection system operation and anticipated dose rates in the cavity.
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In September of 1976, the NRC issued IE Circular No. 76-03 "Radiation
Exposures in Reactor Cavities" which described the first three events listed
in Table 1 and specified controls to be implemented to prevent their
recurrence. Licensees' responses to that circular, including improved
training of the staff and establishment of administrative controls, have not
been totally effective as indicated by the four subsequent similar
incidents.
A particular concern of the NRC is that the person charged with the
responsibility for implementing these controls, the Shift Supervisor, has
frequently been the individual directly involved. Three of the four exposure
incidents that have occurred since the issuance of Circular 76-03 have
resulted from Shift Supervisors entering the cavity to check for leaks.
It appears that Shift Supervisors and other licensed senior reactor
operators should exert greater control over reactor cavity entries if
serious overexposures are to be avoided. Therefore, each licensee and CP
holder is requested to provide a copy of this information notice to each
licensed senior reactor operator.
A civil penalty of $100,000 was proposed and was paid by Commonwealth Edison
following the March 1982 event. NRC considers continued overexposures to be
unacceptable and intends to apply its full enforcement authority for future
occurrences.
If you need additional information about this matter, please contact the
Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or this
office.
Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: R. Pedersen, NRR
(301) 492-7541
J. Wigginton, IE
(301) 492-4967
Attachments:
1. Table 1
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
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Attachment 1
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TABLE 1
DATE PLANT DOSE
October 1972 Point Beach 5 rems
March 1976 Zion 8 rems
April 1976 Indian Point 10 rems
May 1978 Kewaunee 2.8 rems*
April 1979 Surry 2 10 rems
April 1980 Davis Besse 5 rems
March 1982 Zion 5 rems
*Near overexposure
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