Information Notice No. 82-08: Check Valve Failures on Diesel Generator Engine Cooling System
SSINS No.: 6835
Accession No.:
8202040113
IN 82-08
UNITED STATED
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
March 26, 1982
Information Notice No. 82-08: CHECK VALVE FAILURES ON DIESEL GENERATOR
ENGINE COOLING SYSTEM
Description of Circumstances:
On October 23, November 19, and December 1, 1981, the Dresden Station
experienced events concerning degradation of the Unit 2/3 and Unit 3 diesel
generator (DG) cooling water systems. The Unit 2/3 DG is a single diesel
generator that can be electrically aligned to serve either Unit 2 or Unit 3.
The Unit 3 DG serves only Unit 3.
At approximately 0217 on October 23, 1981, a monthly DG surveillance test
was commenced on the Unit 2/3 DG. The diesel was started normally from the
control room. At approximately 0224, the Unit 2/3 DG tripped on high engine
temperature. Cooling water flow to the DG heat exchanger was found to be
inadequate. Attempts to restore adequate water pressure to the DG heat
exchanger were unsuccessful and Unit 2/3 DG was declared inoperable. At
approximately 0400, surveillance was commenced on the Unit 3 DG.
Indications of insufficient cooling water flow were observed and a DG
shutdown was commenced by the control room operators at about 0407. A few
seconds later, the diesel tripped on high engine temperature. The Unit 3 DG
cooling water pump (DGCWP) was cycled several times, during which time the
pump was vented. At about 0417, immediately after one of the pump starts,
Unit 3 DGCWP discharge pressure increased and the observed DG heat exchanger
pressure returned to normal. The pump was cycled several more times without
incident. A hot restart of the Unit 3 DG was then conducted, and the DGCWP
and DG functioned normally. The Unit 2/3 DGCWP was then tested, found to
operator satisfactorily and returned to service. Because of the unusual
nature of the event, the licensee agreed to conduct daily surveillance tests
on the Unit 2/3 and Unit 3 DGCWPs for 7 days while investigating the event.
At about 0453 on November 19, during a surveillance test of the Unit 3 DG,
the diesel tripped on high engine temperature. The Unit 3 DGCWP was
declared inoperable and the Unit 3 DG was removed from service. Dresden
Unit 3 then operated under a Technical Specification limiting condition for
operation while the event was investigated. On November 23, 1981, a broken
check valve on the discharge of the Unit 3 DGCWP was found and replaced.
The valve disc had broken free of the pivot arm and was lodged in the
discharge side of the valve, restricting nearly all flow. The valve was
replaced and DG 3 was returned to service. The failure of the 2/3 DGCWP on
October 23 was not yet explained.
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IN 82-08
March 26, 1982
Page 2 of 2
On December 1, 1981, the Unit 2/3 DGCWP exhibited a slow decrease in
indicated discharge pressure accompanied by increasing noise and vibration
levels at the pump. This decrease in indicated pressure and the increase in
noise and vibration levels were later determined (through visual
inspections, testing, and determination of actual bearing clearance) to have
been caused by excessive wear of the DGCWP bearings. The pump was replaced.
During the pump replacement, the licensee inspected the Unit 2/3 DGCWP
discharge check valve and found it was broken. As was the case with the
Unit 3 pump discharge check valve, the disc had broken free of the pivot
arm. In the instance of the Unit 2/3 pump, however, the disc had not lodged
into the body of the valve, but was free to move in any direction within the
valve body. Although the Unit 2 diesel had functioned properly throughout
the foregoing events, the discharge check valve for the Unit 2 DGCWP was
inspected, found to be broken, and replaced. In the case of the Unit 2
DGCWP discharge check valve, the pivot arm remained attached to the valve
disc, but was broken at the hinge to the valve body.
All three DGCWP systems at Dresden Units 2 and 3 involved check valve
failures which were discovered during a short period of time. These
failures were not adequately characterized by operator observations and
instrument readings during diesel generator surveillance tests, but were
discovered by direct inspection of the internals of the check valve. It is
not known how long these check valve discs were free to move within the
valve bodies and may have been that way for some time before coming to rest
in a position which would restrict flow enough to cause the diesel to trip
on high engine temperature. The subject check valves are horizontally
mounted Crane, 8-inch, tilting-disc check valves, Type 373, and have a
pressure rating of 125 psi.
This information is provided as notification of a potentially significant
matter. It is noted that these check valves are not routinely covered by
inservice testing programs or routine surveillances to verify valve
operability. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response
is requested at this time. If you have questions regarding this matter,
please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional
Office.
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