Bulletin 77-08: Assurance of Safety and Safeguards During an Emergency – Locking Systems
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
December 28, 1977
IE Bulletin 77-08
ASSURANCE OF SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS DURING AN EMERGENCY - LOCKING SYSTEMS
Description of Circumstances:
Under emergency conditions, prompt ingress into certain safety-related areas
must be assured to enable safe shutdown of a nuclear power plant, and
unimpeded egress from all parts of the facility must be assured in the
interest of life safety. The circumstances described below indicate that
prompt ingress and unimpeded egress under emergency conditions may not be
assured at all nuclear power plants.
At one nuclear power plant, upon loss of offsite power resulting in a scram
of the reactor, all electrically locked doors to vital areas failed for lack
of auxiliary power. (Although, the electrical circuit blue prints indicated
that the electrical locking system was connected to the vital bus to provide
uninterrupted auxiliary power, the control console for the locking system
had not in fact been so connected.) This failure delayed ingress by
operations personnel into several safety-related areas because they had to
await arrival of a guard with the one immediately available key. Other
security keys were at the facility but were either secured or held by a
person who was unaware of what the keys would unlock.
Concurrent with the above situation, three employees were isolated without
an adequate emergency escape route available to them. The two accessible
doors on that level had been secured, one by a failed electrical locking
device and the other by a lock which could be opened only by the
grand-master key which they did not possess. Further, the second door was
blocked from the opposite side. The only other escape route which could be
considered was an unenclosed stairwell leading to other levels, but it was
blocked by hot water flowing from the turbine floor above. The employees
telephoned for assistance and were released by a guard who came through the
cable spreading room and opened the failed door from within.
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IE Bulletin No. 77-08 December 28, 1977
During an NRC inspection at another nuclear power plant it was observed that
two exterior emergency exit doors were chained and padlocked from within.
Although the padlocks were of the "breakable" shackle type, substantial
force would be required to break them and unimpeded egress in an emergency
was not assured.
At a third nuclear plant, a technician conducting tests accidently caused a
scram, turbine trip, and loss of station power. Some electrical locking
devices securing safety-related areas were supplied only from non-vital
buses which were stripped of their loads in the process of transferring to
secondary power sources. The electrical locking devices failed and delayed
the ingress of additional plant personnel to assist in the shutdown of the
plant.
Finally, information available to the NRC indicates that licensees at many
other nuclear power plants utilize or plan to utilize electrical locking
devices for vital areas, protected areas, and non-security areas. Some of
the plants do not have auxiliary power for a portion of or all of the
electrical locking systems, and these systems could fail in such a way that
prompt ingress or unimpeded egress would not be assured.
Discussion of Applicable Requirements:
Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 provides that (a) the capability for plant
evacuation, and (b) the capability for facility reentry in order to mitigate
the consequences of an accident or, if appropriate, to continue operations,
must be assured.
Electrical locks not provided with auxiliary power cannot be maintained in
an operable condition (10 CFR 73.55(g)(1)), and electrical locks which fail
in the open mode are not providing the required locking (73.55(d)(7)). It
should be noted that the NRC is currently reviewing amended Security Plans
submitted in response to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. That review will
encompass prompt emergency ingress and unimpeded egress through security
related doors in conjunction with positive access controls at facilities
having an operating license.
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IE Bulletin No. 77-08 December 28, 1977
The National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 101 is a generally
accepted national standard known as the "Life Safety Code." NFPA 101 is the
basis of certain regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (29 CFR 1910) and the fire regulations and life safety codes
of a significant number of States. This standard addresses in detail the
number, locations, widths, and routes to emergency exits. It further details
safety requirements for stairwell escape routes, describes route and exit
markings, and specifically instructs against the installation of a lock or
other fastening on an emergency exit that would prevent escape from the
inside of the building.
Action to be Taken by Licensee and Permit Holders:
1. Survey your facility and facility plans to determine whether the
following situations exist:
a. Prompt emergency ingress into electrically locked safety-related
areas by essential personnel is assured in any postulated
occurrence through the combined use of features (1), (2), and (3)
below or the equivalent.
(1) Provide reliable and uninterruptable auxiliary power to the
entire electrical locking system, including its controls; and
(2) Provide the electrical locking devices, which are required to
fail in the secure mode for security purposes, with secure
mechanical means and associated procedures to override the
devices upon loss of both primary and auxiliary power (e.g.,
key locks with keys held by appropriate personnel who know
when and how to use them); and
(3) Provide periodic tests of all locking systems and mechanical
overrides to confirm their operability and their capability
to switch to auxiliary power.
b. Unimpeded emergency egress is assured from all parts of your
facilities, the security hardware and systems are designed and
installed so as to not degrade life safety, and such hardware and
systems are in conformance with applicable (State/Local) fire
regulations and life safety codes.
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IE Bulletin 77-08 December 28, 1977
2. Review existing emergency plans and procedures to assure that
prompt emergency ingress and unimpeded emergency egress are
fully and effectively addressed for any postulated
occurrence.
3. Assure that prompt emergency ingress and unimpeded egress
through security doors at facilities with an operating
license are thoroughly described in submittals pursuant to 10
CFR 73.55.
4. In the event that surveys or reviews required by action items
1 and 2 establish that the facility does not meet the
requirements noted in these items, holders of an operating
license shall provide a written report to the appropriate NRC
Regional Office within 45 calendar days of receipt of this
Bulletin. The required report will clearly describe all
identified problem areas together with proposed corrective
actions. Holders of construction permits will respond in like
manner within 60 calendar days of receipt of this Bulletin.
If your facility is in full conformance with the requirements
noted, no response to this Bulletin is required.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was
given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic
problems.
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