Bulletin 74-007: Personnel Overexposure - Irradiator Facility
BL74007
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545
JUN 26 1974
J. P. O'Reilly, Director of Region I
N. C. Moseley, Director of Region II
J. G. Keppler, Director of Region III
E. M. Howard, Director of Region IV
R. H. Engelken, Director of Region V
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS, RO BULLETIN #74-7
PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE - IRRADIATOR FACILITY
The enclosed RO Bulletin #74-7 should be transmitted to all Irradiator
Licensees in your Region, that are listed on the enclosed List A and to
those licensees on List B who rely on interlocks, radiation alarms and/or
administrative controls to preclude exposure of personnel. These notices
should be transmitted by certified mail, return receipt requested.
John G. Davis, Deputy Director
for Field Operations
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Enclosure:
DRO Bulletin #74-7
cc: D. F. Knuth, RO
P. A. Morris, RO
B. H. Grier, RO
C. W. Kuhlman, RO
G. W. Roy, RO
S. H. Smiley, L
G. R. Grove, L
G. A. Blanc, L
.
NAME AND ADDRESS Date: 6/26/74
DRO Bulletin #74-7
License No(s).
Gentlemen:
The enclosed Directorate of Regulatory Operations Bulletin No. 74-7
"Personnel Overexposure - Irradiator Facility" is sent to provide you with
information obtained during an investigation. This information may have
applicability to your facility(ies). The action to be taken by you is
identified in Section B of the enclosed Bulletin.
If you have any questions on the contents of this Bulletin, please do not
hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
Director
Enclosure:
DRO Bulletin #74-7
.
RO BULLETIN
PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE - IRRADIATION FACILITY
A recent investigation of a serious overexposure of an employee at an
Irradiator Facility revealed safety problems which may exist at other plants
where radioactive materials are similarly utilized.
A. Description of Circumstances:
An experienced operator received a whole body exposure of from 300 to
400 rems when he entered a cell where a 120,000-Curie cobalt 60 source
was in the unshielded position.
This entry resulted from several significant contributing causes which
included:
1. A radiation alarm circuit required by the license had been
deactivated. If operating it would have alerted the operator to an
unsafe condition.
2. The operator failed to perform a physical radiation survey as he
entered the cell.
3. The operator failed to follow approved pre-cell-entry operating
procedures, which required visual assurance that the source had
been returned to its shielded position.
4. The cell operator was unaware that the radiation alarm circuit had
been or could be deactivated.
B. Action Requested:
In view of the above you should take the following steps:
1. Perform a complete operational test of all interlocks, radiation
alarms and other devices which have been installed to prevent
radiation exposure of personnel.
2. Review your administrative controls to assure that all regulatory
requirements are being met. Such controls, if license conditions
permit, must provide conservative criteria under which any
protective devices may be bypassed or reduced in effectiveness.
3. Conduct special training of all operating personnel on the proper
operation of all protective devices and safety related procedural
requirements to assure that these devices are properly operated
and procedures are followed.
.
-2-
4. The above actions along with any necessary repairs, should be
completed within ten (10) days of the receipt of this notice. A
record detailing the actions taken, findings, and corrective
measures if any, shall be retained for review during the next
inspection.
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