Bulletin 73-06: Jersey Central Power & Light Company

                                                             IEB 73-06

                                 UNITED STATES
                           ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
                     DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
                                   REGION I
                                631 PARK AVENUE
                      KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

                                        November 27, 1973


Jersey Central Power & Light Company                        Docket No. 50-219
Attention:  Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
            Vice President - Generation
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Directorate of Regulatory Operations Bulletin No. 73-6,
"Inadvertant Criticality in a Boiling Water Reactor," is sent to you to
provide you with information that was reported* to the AEC by the Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation concerning an inadvertant criticality
incident that was experienced in the Vermont Yankee facility.  This
information may have direct applicability to your facility(ies).  Action
requested on your part is identified in Section A of the enclosed bulletin.

                                        Sincerely,


                                        James P. O'Reilly
                                        Director


______________________
* Letter, dated November 14, 1973, to the Directorate of Licensing, USAEC, 
  Washington, D.C.


cc:  Mr. J. T. Carroll, Plant Superintendent

.

                                                RO Bulletin 73-6
                                                November 26, 1973

INADVERTENT CRITICALITY IN A BOILING WATER REACTOR

We recently received an abnormal occurrence report from the Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corporation relating to an inadvertent criticality incident that
was experienced at their Vermont Yankee facility.  A copy of this report is
being sent to you under separate cover to provide you with pertinent details
of this event.

At the time of the inadvertent criticality incident, the reactor vessel and
primary containment heads were removed, the refueling cavity above the reactor
vessel was flooded, control rod friction tests were in progress, the rod worth
minimizer was bypassed, and core verification had been in progress.  As a
result of the incident, no measurable radioactivity was released, no fuel
damage resulted and no personnel exposures were experienced.  The incident is
currently under review and evaluation by the Regulatory Staff.

Action requested by this bulletin is contained in Section A.

A.  Action Requested by Licensees

In light of this occurrence you are requested to take the following actions. 
Upon completion of these actions you are requested to inform this office in
writing, within 45 days of the date of this letter, of the status of each item
identified in each paragraph and subparagraph listed below:

1.  Procedural Review

a.  Control Rod Drive Operating and Testing Procedures

(1)  Conduct a review of your control rod drive operating and testing
procedures to determine that approved procedures exist for all operations and
tests.

(2)  Verify that appropriate prerequisites are included in the procedures to
require testing of associated interlocking and protection features before
control rod testing is permitted.

(3)  Assure that prerequisites and detailed instructions are provided that
demonstrate compliance with technical specification requirements and design
bases.
.

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b.  Bypass Installation Procedures (Jumpers or Lifting of Leads)

Assure that existing bypass installation procedures have been conservatively
reviewed for technical adequacy and for administrative controls.


c.  Radiation Protection Procedures

Assure that procedures for access control and personnel accountability in
areas subject to accidents are current.


d.  Shift Transition Procedure (Turnover)

Assure that complete and detailed procedures are in effect that provide
instructions for a proper and conservative turnover of shift responsibilities. 
Such procedures must include requirements for communicating the status of all
safety related equipment and conditions.

2.  Management Controls

Assure that your management controls that are in effect provide for qualified
technical and administrative reviews and approvals of temporary circuitry
changes and temporary off-normal plant conditions.  This review should assure
that the responsibilities and requirements associated with the review and
approval, installation, verification, removal, and subsequent testing of
temporary circuitry changes and temporary off-normal plant conditions are
clearly delineated in station procedures, are understood by the station staff,
and are being properly implemented.

3.  Licensed Operator Performance

Assure that management provides the necessary opportunities and time so that
operators are adequately trained to carry out their assigned responsibilities. 
In particular, confirm that shift crew members are provided special training
for safety related activities that are infrequent, complex, or have unusual
safety significance.
.

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If you have any questions concerning this request, please contact this office.


Attachment:

Vermont Yankee AO No. 73-31 - Letter dated November 14, 1973, to the
Directorate of Licensing, USAEC, Washington, D.C.