



Seeking Excellence in Nuclear Safety Culture at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

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Purpose

- Where we were
- Where we are now
- Where we expect to be going forward

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Where We Were

- RED Finding and NRC Column 4
- Longstanding NRC SCCIs in P.1.c and P.1.d
- Near term NRC SCCI in H.2.c
- INPO Policy Note 14 plant
- Longstanding INPO "Related" Areas for Improvement (AFIs) in Maintenance Worker Practices, as well as Work Management
- Longstanding INPO "Continuing" AFIs in Equipment Reliability for safety related systems (HPCI, LPCI, EDGs, RHR)

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Where We Were.... What Didn't Work?


- Monitoring the trend to failure
 - 2006 through 2011 in bottom quartile/decile
 - No external driver (95003 inspection, Chilling Effects Letter)
- Treating the Independent Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment (INSCA) surveys as routine
 - Actions were superficial
 - Participation was low
 - Importance not reinforced by Senior Team
- Under reacting to employee concerns
 - Senior Manager behaviors
- Infrequent manager engagement in field activities
- NSCMP meetings that were too process driven

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The Transition Over Time

Browns Ferry Safety Culture Trends



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Where We Are Now....What is Working?

- Alignment as a fleet on NEI 09-07
- Designating SLT lead for NSC recovery
- SLT engagement during conduct of INSCA surveys
- Over communication of INSCA results
- Laser beam focus on Priority organizations
- Employee behaviors have significantly improved

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Where We Are Now

NSC Dimensions	Metric	Description	Industry Quartile	Trend since 2011 INSCA
Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC)	4.03	AOC	2 nd	+4.8%
-Nuclear Safety Values, Behaviors & Practices (NS VB&P)	3.89	AOC	2 nd	+5.8%
-Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)	4.47	AOC	2 nd	+2.8%
-Employee Concerns Program (ECP)	3.87	AOC	2 nd	+5.1%
General Culture & Work Environment (GCWE)	3.80	AOS	1 st	+4.3%
Leadership, Management, Supervision (LMS) Quality of Communication (QOC)	3.84	AOS	1 st	+5.7%
Leadership, Management, Supervision (LMS) Environment of Trust & Mutual Respect	3.86	AOS	1 st	+5.1%

AOC – Area of Competency
AOS – Area of Strength

Data is from Synergy Corporation

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Where We Expect to be Going Forward

- Strong alignment with NEI 09-07 process
- Strong process governing fleet Nuclear Safety Culture
 - Robust procedures
 - Corporate oversight and mentoring of NSCMP and SLT meetings
 - Establishing corporate NSCMP, SLT, and “ELT”
 - Continued benchmarking with industry
- Become a benchmark in the industry

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Key Lessons Learned

- Consistent and relentless pursuit of higher standards by the Senior Leadership Team
- Over reacting to poor behaviors
- Strong senior team engagement in the field (“you know because you’ve looked”)
- Over communicate gaps to excellence in Nuclear Safety Culture (+/delta) to workforce

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Summary

- BFN had a culture that did not model the right nuclear safety culture behaviors, but that changed when.....
 - We became hyper sensitive and hyper responsive to employee concerns and organizational friction
 - We consistently demonstrated conservative operational decision making
 - We recognized that we were being watched continuously as a leader, not because people were trying to find fault with us, rather to see if they can trust us
 - When we began to show humility and make people feel comfortable bringing bad news to us
- Continuous improvement and sustainability is our focus going forward
