Status Indication of Control Power for Circuit Breakers Used In Safety-Related Applications
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
November 28, 1991
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-78: STATUS INDICATION OF CONTROL POWER FOR
CIRCUIT BREAKERS USED IN SAFETY-RELATED
APPLICATIONS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to problems with control logic circuitry for
circuit breakers which have fuses for closing coils or closing actuating
relays that are wired separately from the remainder of the control
circuitry. This separate circuitry allows blown fuses or improperly
installed fuses to remain unnoticed because there would be no alarm or loss
of local or control room indication. It is expected that recipients will
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On May 23, 1991, personnel at the Palisades Nuclear Power Station were
performing routine surveillance testing on the containment spray pumps. The
"C" containment spray pump failed to start locally on two attempts.
Personnel confirmed that the control power lights, both in the control room
and locally at the circuit breaker, were lit. An auxiliary operator removed
the closing coil fuses, found them to be adequate, and reinstalled them. On
the third attempt, the pump started (LER 50-255/91-016).
The fuse holder fingers, which connect the fuses to the circuit, had become
sufficiently deformed such that poor or no contact was made in the closing
coil circuit. The NRC questioned how control power lights could be
energized with no power available to the closing coil circuit. In addition,
the NRC inspector questioned the "as found" operability of the pump (NRC
Inspection Report 50-255/91012). The licensee and the inspector reviewed
wiring schematic
9111220068
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IN 91-78
November 28, 1991
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diagrams and found that the closing coil circuits were wired and fused sepa-
rately from the remainder of the control power circuits for most of the
plant's 2400 volt and 4160 volt circuit breakers. Thus, the closing coil
fuses could be blown, removed, or improperly installed, and there would be
no indication or alarm that the breaker could not be closed when needed. At
Palisades, this situation existed for both the emergency diesel generator
(EDG) tie breakers, the breakers that supply power to several station power
transformers, and to the following pumps: primary coolant, condensate,
service water, auxiliary feedwater, component cooling water, low pressure
safety injection, high pressure safety injection, and containment spray.
The licensee decided to change this wiring arrangement for all the
safety-related circuit breakers above during the next refueling outage. The
licensee has scheduled changes of the wiring arrangement for the
non-safety-related circuit breakers during the following refueling outage.
This lack of indication of a loss of control power (closing coil power)
could prevent personnel from recognizing when required safety equipment
becomes inoperable. Under these conditions, the equipment may remain
inoperable for an extended period until its condition is discovered through
testing or initiation of an actuation signal (NRC Inspection Reports
50-255/91017 and 50-255/91020).
Figures 1 and 2 are simplified schematic diagrams of control circuits for
circuit breakers that illustrate these circumstances. These diagrams
represent circuit breakers used at Palisades in 2400 and 4160 volt
applications and at the Ft. Calhoun Station in 4160 and 480 volt
applications.
Discussion
The common purpose of a circuit breaker is to open an energized circuit for
a piece of equipment upon a fault condition. Designers sometimes ensure
this action by separately fusing the trip coil circuit in the circuit
breaker so the circuit breaker can always be tripped (to open the circuit)
even if a malfunction occurs in the control circuit that energizes the
closing circuit. However, when the function of the equipment is important,
designers also provide a means to indicate a loss of control power to the
closing circuit. The circuitry providing this indication also ensures that
if the fuse is blown, improperly installed, or even removed, then either the
lights indicating the breaker position are no longer illuminated or an alarm
is energized.
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IN 91-78
November 28, 1991
Page 3 of 3
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Edward R. Schweibinz, RIII
(708) 790-5542
Vern Hodge, NRR
(301) 492-1861
Attachments:
1. Figures 1 and 2. Typical Simplified Electrically
Operated Circuit Breaker Control Circuit at
Palisades and Ft. Calhoun
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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