Information Notice No. 91-64: Site Area Emergency Resulting from a Loss of Non-Class 1E Uninterruptible Power Supplies
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
October 9, 1991
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-64: SITE AREA EMERGENCY RESULTING FROM A LOSS OF
NON-CLASS 1E UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees to problems resulting from the common mode
failure of uninterruptible power supplies used in nonsafety-related
applications at Unit 2 of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. It is
expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances
On August 13, 1991, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 was operating at full power when
a fault occurred on phase B of the main transformer which caused the
generator, turbine, and reactor to trip. Station loads were transferred
automatically from the normal station service transformer, which receives
power from the generator, to the reserve station transformer, which receives
power from the grid. During the transient which lasted for about 12 cycles,
voltage on the station's phase B buses decreased to approximately 50 percent
of normal value before returning to normal.
The voltage transient resulted in loss of the power output from five of
eight nonsafety-related uninterruptible power supplies. Loss of these power
supplies caused the loss of control room annunciators, indication of control
rod positions, the core thermal limits computer, the process computer, the
safety parameter display system computer, the feedwater control system, some
instrumentation for balance-of-plant systems, some instrument recorders, the
plant radio and paging systems, and some of the lighting for the plant.
Some of the instrument recorders that were lost failed "as is." For
example, the average power range monitors continued to indicate 100% after
the reactor tripped. Nevertheless, control room operators were able to
verify from average power range meters and local power range lights mounted
on back panels and from other indications that the reactor actually had
tripped and was shut down.
9110030270
.
IN 91-64
October 9, 1991
Page 2 of 4
Because of the loss of control room annunciators and the reactor transient
resulting from automatic tripping of the generator, turbine, and reactor,
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) declared a site area
emergency in conformance with the emergency plan. The operators shut down
the plant in accordance with emergency operating procedures. Thirty-four
minutes after the trip, plant personnel had restored power output from the
five nonsafety-related uninterruptible power supplies using the alternate
maintenance power sources. Thirteen hours after the trip, the reactor was
in the cold shutdown condition, and an hour later, the licensee ended the
site area emergency.
As shown in Attachment 1, each uninterruptible power supply cabinet receives
3-phase 600-Vac power from the plant's electrical distribution system. This
system is connected to either the generator or the grid. Inside the
cabinet, the 600-Vac input power passes through an ac-to-dc converter to
obtain approximately 140-Vdc power which then passes through an inverter to
generate quality 3-phase 208/120-Vac power that is within specified limits
for voltage amplitude, frequency, and phase. The output from the cabinet is
distributed to critical loads, many of which are sensitive to the voltage
irregularities that are sometimes present with normal ac power. To prevent
the interruption of power to these loads when the normal supply of power is
lost, a 125-Vdc battery is connected to the uninterruptible power supply
between the ac-to-dc converter and the dc-to-ac inverter.
The uninterruptible power supply cabinet also receives three-phase
208/120-Vac maintenance power. This power is provided through a voltage
regulator and is used to supply critical loads when the supply of uninter-
ruptible power from the inverter is not available. Within the cabinet, a
control logic system selects either inverter or maintenance power for
distribution to the critical loads.
Prior to and at the time of the event, the control logic power supply
normally received power from phase B of the maintenance power source. If
maintenance power was not available, the input for the control logic power
supply automatically transferred to the output of the inverter. However, on
August 13, 1991, the control logic tripped the uninterruptible power supply
in response to the transient on phase B of the maintenance power source.
The licensee had expected that the control logic power supply would transfer
to the output of the inverter and, when inplant electrical distribution
system voltages returned to normal, would transfer back to the maintenance
source. Had this happened, the uninterruptible power supply would have
continued to supply the critical loads.
If the control logic power supply had been wired to receive its normal power
from the inverter and backup power from the maintenance source, the control
logic would have had a continuous source of power and the loss of power
output from the uninterruptible power supplies would not have occurred. The
control logic power supplies for the three nonsafety-related and the two
safety-related uninterruptible power supplies that were not lost during the
event normally receive dc power for control logic through a dc-to-dc
converter.
.
IN 91-64
October 9, 1991
Page 3 of 4
Six battery packs, each consisting of 3 small rechargeable lead-acid cells
within the uninterruptible power supply, provide power to the control logic
and the indicator lights when no other power is available. If the battery
packs had been functional during the transient, they would have provided
sufficient power to the control logic for the necessary time to have
prevented loss of the uninterruptible power supplies. After the event, the
licensee found that the electrolyte in the lead-acid cells was dry.
Although the preventative maintenance section in the vendor's manual does
not address the battery packs, another section of the manual states that
they should be replaced every 4 years. The vendor had installed the battery
packs in the units in 1984. Subsequently, the licensee determined that the
battery packs should be replaced more frequently because of the
environmental conditions within the cabinets.
The licensee obtained the uninterruptible power supplies from Exide
Electronics in 1981. In 1985, the licensee obtained a revised manual for
the uninterruptible power supplies from Exide Electronics which recognized
the importance of reversing the connections of normal and backup power for
the control logic power supplies. New units supplied by Exide Electronics
did have the connections reversed. However, Exide Electronics did not
specifically advise the licensee of this change. The licensee had obtained
the uninterruptible power supplies as commercial grade products.
The licensee has modified the uninterruptible power supplies to provide
normal input power to the control logic power supplies from the output of
the inverter and alternate power from the maintenance source. The licensee
has also replaced the battery packs for the control logic and has
established an annual replacement schedule. The licensee intends to
evaluate the performance of the switching circuitry for supplying input
power to the control logic under various conditions and to process
appropriate changes to the vendor's manual.
Discussion
The transformer fault caused the generator, turbine, and reactor trips. The
transformer fault also led to a momentary degradation of voltage on the
plant's electrical distribution system and, in turn, the common mode failure
of the five uninterruptible power supplies. Because of the loss of control
rod position indicators due to loss of the uninterruptible power supplies,
the operators could not immediately verify that all control rods had fully
inserted into the reactor core. This resulted in some difficulty in
implementing the emergency procedures. However, the reactor was in a safe
condition at all times, and operators were able to monitor all safety
parameters, except for control rod positions, throughout the event. The two
safety-related uninterruptible power supplies were not lost. Had a design
basis accident occurred in conjunction with this event, power would have
been available for the instrumentation and control components in the
required safety systems.
.
IN 91-64
October 9, 1991
Page 4 of 4
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jack E. Rosenthal, AEOD
(301) 492-4440
Roger Woodruff, NRR
(301) 492-1152
Attachments:
1. Uninterruptible Power Supply Before Design Change
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021