Information Notice No. 91-52: Nonconservative Errors in Overtemperature Delta-Temperature (OTdT) Setpoint caused by Improper Gain Settings
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
August 29, 1991
Information Notice No. 91-52: NONCONSERVATIVE ERRORS IN OVERTEMPERATURE
DELTA-TEMPERATURE (OTdT) SETPOINT CAUSED
BY IMPROPER GAIN SETTINGS
Addressees:
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for Westinghouse
(W)-designed nuclear power reactors.
Purpose:
This information notice is intended to alert addressees to potential
problems resulting from improper voltage gain settings applied to components
in the overtemperature delta-temperature (OTdT) reactor protection system
trip circuitry at Westinghouse (W)-designed nuclear power reactors. It is
expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to
their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances:
On July 17, 1991, Duke Power Company notified the NRC of a problem with the
OTdT reactor trip circuit at McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations which may
have prevented the system from operating correctly over its entire operating
range for reactor coolant loop average temperature (T-avg). Engineers dis-
covered the problem at McGuire while attempting to rescale their OTdT
setpoints for the upcoming new fuel load. The engineers found that the gain
applied to the lead/lag amplifier for the T-avg portion of the OTdT circuit
was set too high (Westinghouse 7300 series process equipment card TY412A),
based on the current scaling of the hardware. This caused the T-avg input
to "saturate" at approximately 597�F for McGuire and 592�F for Catawba which
prevented the OTdT circuit from reducing the OTdT setpoint as the T-avg
increased above these temperatures. The required input temperature range
for T-avg is 530�F to 630�F. Therefore, the OTdT setpoint calculation was
in error above these "saturation" temperatures since the lead/lag amplifiers
would not produce a proportional output.
Following discussions with Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the licensee
corrected the problem at both McGuire and Catawba by redistributing the gain
associated with the T-avg term of the OTdT setpoint. This was accomplished
by replacing resistors in the lead/lag circuit to ensure that the gain was
not so high that it could cause "saturation" of its output over the entire
input
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IN 91-52
August 29, 1991
Page 2 of 3
range. On July 19, 1991, the licensee modified the OTdT instrumentation at
both facilities.
On July 31, 1991, the Commonwealth Edison Company informed the NRC that it
had reviewed the gain settings for the OTdT circuits at its Braidwood and
Byron Stations and had discovered conditions similar to those at McGuire and
Catawba.
Discussion:
The OTdT reactor trip protects against departure from nucleate boiling
(DNB). The trip function operates by comparing indicated loop
delta-temperature (dT) to the calculated setpoint, causing a reactor trip
when two or more dT channels exceed their setpoint. Analog circuitry for
each reactor coolant loop continuously calculates the setpoint for this trip
according to the temperature in the loop, the neutron flux distribution in
the reactor, and reactor coolant system (pressurizer) pressure. The
principal concern for the function of the OTdT trip is for certain rod
withdrawal events in which OTdT could be the primary safety-related trip
mitigating the event. It also functions as a safety-related backup for
several other transients.
The problem involves the scaling used in the OTdT hardware. If the hardware
is scaled such that the output gain on the T-avg lead/lag amplifier is
greater than unity (1.0), the amplifier will saturate at some T-avg and
prevent further adjustment of the OTdT setpoint. The equation for the OTdT
setpoint at McGuire and Catawba includes as parameters lead-lag and lag
constants, a bias (K1), and gains (K2 and K3). Gains K2 and K3 are the
adjustments for the effects of temperature and pressure, respectively, on
DNB limits.
The licensee indicated that the OTdT hardware had operated in the degraded
condition since 1983 for McGuire and since startup for Catawba. The
original K2 value, provided by Westinghouse, was 0.0133/�F for McGuire. The
hardware was scaled by Westinghouse such that the lead/lag amplifier gain
corresponding to this K2 was less than 1.0. With a gain setting of less
than 1.0, the amplifier does not overrange since the gain output voltage
cannot exceed 10 volts. The degraded condition was introduced at McGuire
when the licensee rescaled the OTdT trip hardware as a function of
performing a core reload analysis to allow for the use of Westinghouse
"optimized" fuel. As part of this change to the OTdT parameters, K2 was
increased to its current value of 0.0222/�F. Using the Westinghouse scaling
methodology, however, the licensee scaled the OTdT hardware such that the
output gain on the T-avg lead/lag amplifier was greater than 1.0, which
introduced the problem.
Preliminary information concerning Catawba indicated that the original K2
value, supplied by Westinghouse, was also 0.0133/�F. Sometime in 1983 or
1984, following a McGuire transient which indicated the need to modify the
OTdT and overpower delta-temperature (OPdT) setpoints, K2 was increased to
its current value of 0.02401/�F. It was then that the licensee incorrectly
scaled the OTdT hardware such that the output gain on the T-avg lead/lag
amplifier was greater than 1.0.
At some plants licensees have avoided the problem by using different scaling
methodologies or have identified the problem during the scaling process and
.
IN 91-52
August 29, 1991
Page 3 of 3
modified the hardware (redistributing the gain) similar to the corrective
measures performed by Duke Power Company.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please call one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project
manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: William Orders, RII
(803) 831-2963
Thomas Koshy, NRR
(301) 492-1176
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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