Information Notice No. 88-66: Industrial Radiography Inspection and Enforcement
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
August 22, 1988
Information Notice No. 88-66: INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY INSPECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT
Addressees:
All NRC industrial radiography licensees.
Purpose:
This information notice is being provided to emphasize the importance of
compliance with NRC regulations in all aspects of industrial radiography.
Recipients should review the information for applicability to their operations
to ensure that all radiography personnel are fully trained and qualified and
that they conduct operations in accordance with all applicable requirements.
It is expected that licensees will review this notice, distribute it to
responsible radiation staff, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid
similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice
do not constitute any new NRC requirements and no written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances:
In August 1987, the NRC received allegations that Finlay Testing Laboratories,
Inc. (FTL) of Aiea, Hawaii, was improperly transporting radiographic exposure
devices containing radioactive sources on passenger-carrying aircraft. The
NRC Region V office conducted an inspection, and the Office of Investigations
(OI) investigated possible wrongdoing. These efforts revealed numerous
instances where FTL personnel concealed radiographic exposure devices
containing radioactive material, so as to transport them on passenger-carrying
civilian and military flights. These actions, which violated NRC and U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, apparently were taken to avoid
the inconvenience of shipping devices containing radioactive material in the
required manner.
Additional inspection findings revealed: (1) failures to survey devices to
ensure that the sources were in the shielded position; (2) individuals acting
as radiographers and radiographers' assistants without required Part 34
training; (3) violations of radiation safety program requirements for posting
of radiation areas, surveillance of restricted areas, and locking of
radiographic exposure devices; (4) use of partially discharged dosimeters; and
(5) failures to maintain required records.
As a result of these findings, the NRC suspended FTL's license and
subsequently issued an order to show cause why the license should not be
revoked. In accordance with a settlement between the NRC and the licensee,
the license was terminated and Gordon Finlay, owner of the licensee, agreed
not to perform
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certain functions in radiographic operations until September 1990. Mr. Finlay
also agreed to provide written notice to the NRC or any Agreement State before
performing duties related to any licensed activities for a similar period. In
addition, the matter has been referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for
investigation of possible criminal wrongdoing.
Discussion:
Licensees are responsibile for ensuring the safe performance of licensed
activities in accordance with NRC regulations and the terms of their licenses.
In so doing, licensees should not only use trained individuals, provide
adequate procedures and maintain accurate records, but should also exercise
close supervision over their employees to ensure compliance with procedures
and with NRC and any other applicable requirements. Licensees are also
responsible for ensuring that an employee's prior experience, if any, has been
satisfactory and complies with regulatory requirements.
Transportation of radiographic material, with its potential for impact on the
public health and safety, is a matter of significant regulatory concern. This
case highlights the need to ensure that material is packaged and shipped in
approved ways to avoid potential exposure to the public.
Moreover, the NRC will not excuse licensee employee violations in radiography
operations because management was unaware of the violations; because the
employees were not trained to recognize applicable regulatory requirements; or
because compliance with the applicable regulations would have been
inconvenient. Similarly, violations of NRC requirements caused by inattention
to detail are unacceptable and may result in substantial civil enforcement
action. In addition, violations caused by intentional acts may subject
wrongdoers to criminal prosecution. As evidenced by the cases described in
Information Notice 86-54, "Criminal Prosecution of a former Radiation Safety
Officer who Willfully Directed an Unqualified Individual to Perform
Radiography," and Information Notice 87-64, "Conviction for Falsification of
Security Training Records," criminal sanctions may include a fine and/or
imprisonment.
No written response is required by this information notice. If you have any
questions about this matter, please call the technical contact listed below or
the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Richard E. Cunningham, Director
Division of Industrial and
Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS
Technical Contact: M. Lamastra, NMSS
(301) 492-3416
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
. Attachment
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LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No._____Subject_______________________Issuance_______Issued to________
88-65 Inadvertent Drainages of 8/18/88 All holders of OLs
Spent Fuel Pools or CPs for nuclear
power reactors and
fuel storage
facilities.
88-64 Reporting Fires in Nuclear 8/18/88 All holders of OLs
Process Systems at Nuclear or CPs for nuclear
Power Plants power reactors.
88-63 High Radiation Hazards 8/15/88 All holders of OLs
from Irradiated Incore or CPs for nuclear
Detectors and Cables power reactors,
research reactors
and test reactors.
88-62 Recent Findings Concerning 8/12/88 All holders of NRC
Implementation of Quality quality assurance
Assurance Programs by program approval
Suppliers of Transport for radioactive
Packages material packages.
88-61 Control Room Habitability - 8/11/88 All holders of OLs
Recent Reviews of Operating or CPs for nuclear
Experience power reactors.
88-60 Inadequate Design and 8/11/88 All holders of OLs
Installation of Watertight or CPs for nuclear
Penetration Seals power reactors.
88-04, Inadequate Qualification 8/9/88 All holders of OLs
Supplement 1 and Documentation of Fire or CPs for nuclear
Barrier Penetration Seals power reactors.
88-59 Main Steam Isolation Valve 8/9/88 All holders of OLs
Guide Rail Failure at or CPs for nuclear
Waterford Unit 3 power reactors.
88-58 Potential Problems with 8/8/88 All holders of OLs
ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L or CPs for nuclear
Time-Overcurrent Relays power reactors.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
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