Information Notice No. 83-82: Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at BWR - Final Report
SSINS No.: 6835
IN 83-82
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
December 20, 1983
Information Notice No. 83-82: FAILURE OF SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES TO OPEN
AT BWR - FINAL REPORT
Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This information is being provided as a final supplement and update to
Information Notices 82-41 and 83-39. An update is provided on meetings,
testing results, conclusions, and courses for future action involving the
Target Rock two-stage safety/relief valves (SRVs). No specific action or
response is required.
Description of Circumstance:
Synopsis of Triggering Event: On July 3, 1982, Georgia Power Company's Plant
Hatch was operating at 100% power when a spurious high-pressure signal
caused a reactor scram. A Group 1 isolation occurred, high pressure coolant
injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbines
auto-started and injected, and the recirculation pumps tripped. HPCI, RCIC,
and the feedwater pump turbines tripped at the high water level setpoint.
Repressurization continued beyond the high-pressure scram setpoint without
relief valve actuation until the system pressure reached 1180 psig, at which
point three of the eleven SRVs actuated, rapidly relieving pressure.
Setpoints for the eleven SRVs were 1080, 1090, and 1100 psig.
Synopsis of Industry Response to the Event: Georgia Power and a number of
other utilities using the two-stage Target Rock SRVs formed an owners' group
and, together with General Electric and the Target Rock Company, began a
testing program designed to learn the cause of the Hatch event and the cause
for the apparent setpoint drift upward in bench testing of SRVs from other
plants. Test parameters and initial results are given in Information Notices
82-41 and 83-39.
Recent Additional Information: A total of 34 valves were subjected to
screening tests, establishing a data base from which it was concluded that
labyrinth seal friction and disc-to-seat sticking were the causes for the
setpoint drift phenomenon. A characteristic pop "signature" was plotted for
each event. The labyrinth seal problem was found to have been caused by
lower than design tolerance clearances. This may have been an "as-built"
condition or the result of
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IN 83-82
December 20, 1983
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creep during operation. The disc-to-seat sticking problem resulted from
corrosion of the stellite material. The magnitude of the Hatch problem was
likely to have been related to an earlier event in which there was an
intrusion into the primary system of a nonionic chlorinated hydrocarbon
which decomposed under reactor conditions and caused a conductivity of 21
micromhos per centimeter and a pH of 4.6. The stellite material is
susceptible to this type of corrosion.
Based on discussions with General Electric Company representatives we
understand that a program of revised maintenance procedures intended to
minimize upward setpoint drift are in preparation for potential issuance as
a Service Information Letter.
If you have any question regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, or this office.
Edward L. Jordan Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: Mary S. Wegner, IE
(301) 492-4511
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
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