Information Notice No. 83-62: Failure of Redundant Toxic Gas Detectors Positioned at Control Room Ventilation Air Intakes
SSINS No.: 6835
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
September 26, 1983
Information Notice No. 83-62: FAILURE OF REDUNDANT TOXIC GAS DETECTORS
POSITIONED AT CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP).
This information notice is provided as notification of events that involve
the degradation and subsequent common-cause failure of toxic gas detectors
for control room ventilation systems. It is expected that recipients will
review the information herein for applicability to their facilities. No
specific action or response is required at this time.
Description of Circumstances:
During the five-year period, 1977 through 1982, approximately 64 licensee
event reports have involved the failure of one or more chlorine and ammonia
detectors positioned at the air intakes of control room ventilation systems.
To date, for the present year, there have been four such failures. The
frequency of events corresponds to a significant failure rate, since not all
nuclear power plants have toxic gas detectors.
There have been several instances of releases of toxic gases at nuclear
power plant sites. Although these events apparently were not complicated by
concurrent failure of toxic gas detectors, this certainly is a possibility.
During 1977 to 1982 actual chlorine gas releases occurred at Millstone
(March 1978) and Browns Ferry (June 1979). While neither release involved
more than a gallon of liquid chlorine, a total of 20 persons, including one
control room operator, were hospitalized because of chlorine gas inhalation
during both incidents. IE Circular No. 80-03 titled "Protection From Toxic
Gas Hazards" provided detailed information pertaining to the Millstone and
Browns Ferry releases, potential source's of toxic gas, and applicable
regulations for toxic gas hazards. Information Notice No. 82-43 also
dealt with deficiencies in LWR air filtration and ventilation systems.
September 26, 1983
Page 2 of 2
More recently, an incident involving a chlorine gas release occurred on June
6, 1983 at the Oyster Creek nuclear plant. A plastic pipe failed on the
outlet side of an evaporator, expelling the toxic gas. The reactor and the
turbine buildings were evacuated. Of the 25 people transported to the
hospital, all but one were permitted to leave the same day. This occurrence
and the other two previously noted, typify the significant and potentially
fatal repercussions associated with chlorine or ammonia gas releases, and
the need to have operable toxic gas detectors.
The toxic gas detector most susceptible to failure is the type which
utilizes a dripping electrolyte. This detector can fail because of a clogged
electrolyte wick or orifice, excess electrolyte consumption between
scheduled replenishments, and absorption of the electrolyte by dust
accumulation. Other factors contributing to failures are dust raised by
nearby construction, periods of high wind or low humidity, and seasonal high
Redundant toxic gas detectors are exposed to the same intake airflow for
ventilation systems, and may therefore fail from a common cause, i.e.,
exposure to the same source of dirty air. The personnel of some facilities
using such toxic gas detectors are considering either increased surveillance
or replacement with a more reliable type of detector to preclude continuing
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office, or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: R. M Young, IE
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