Information Notice No. 83-30: Misapplication of Generic Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Guidelines
SSINS No.: 6835
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555
May 11, 1983
Information Notice No. 83-30: MISAPPLICATION OF GENERIC EMERGENCY
OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOP) GUIDELINES
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or
construction permit (CP).
This information notice is provided as notification of the potential
misapplication of generic Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) technical
guidelines to operating modes for which they were not designed and to
conditions for which they do not apply.
Description of Circumstances:
On March 18, 1983, at the Summer Station, an inadvertent safety injection,
(SI) occurred while the reactor was being cooled down. The licensee's EOP,
based upon the Westinghouse Technical Guidelines, constrained the operators
from terminating SI flow prior to achieving a reactor coolant system (RCS)
pressure of 2000 psig. At the time of the SI, the primary system temperature
was 340F and pressure was 1000 psig while the main steam pressure was
Consistent with their procedures, the reactor operators did not terminate SI
flow until the RCS pressure reached 2000 psig. This generated a pressure
differential across the steam generator tubes which exceeded the 1600 psi
design differential pressure by about 300 psi.
The problem arose because the generic technical guidelines, which include a
2000 psig constraint, were not intended for application during reactor
cooldown, and the plant procedures did not differentiate for this condition.
On March 19, 1983, a second inadvertent SI occurred at the Summer Station
while the RCS was water-solid at 325 psig and 150 F. However, this time
the reactor operator quickly identified the SI as being spurious and
terminated the SI after approximately two minutes without waiting for the
EOP termination criteria of 2000 psig RCS pressure to be reached. Since the
RCS was watersolid, the plant's cold overpressure protection system (COPS)
was in service and the power operated relief valve (PORV) was set to relieve
at about 750 psig. However, because of the prompt operator action, SI was
terminated before the PORV setpoint was reached. In this instance, because
of the plant's operating mode, terminating SI prior to meeting the EOP
termination criterion was appropriate.
May 11, 1983
Page 2 of 2
The problem being highlighted by this notice is the misapplying of EOPs by
not taking into account the operating modes for which the EOPs should be
imposed. Although no written response to this notice is required, it is
suggested that holders of operating licenses review the information in this
Notice for applicability at their facilities.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or the technical
contact listed below.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact: I. Villalva, IE F. Jape, Region II
(301) 492-9635 (404) 221-4182
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