Information Notice No. 83-30: Misapplication of Generic Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Guidelines

                                                         SSINS No.:  6835  
                                                         IN 83-30          

                               UNITED STATES 
                       NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                            WASHINGTON, DC  20555
                                     
                                May 11, 1983 

Information Notice No. 83-30:   MISAPPLICATION OF GENERIC EMERGENCY 
                                   OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOP) GUIDELINES 

Addressees: 

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or 
construction permit (CP). 

Purpose: 

This information notice is provided as notification of the potential 
misapplication of generic Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) technical 
guidelines to operating modes for which they were not designed and to 
conditions for which they do not apply. 

Description of Circumstances: 

On March 18, 1983, at the Summer Station, an inadvertent safety injection, 
(SI) occurred while the reactor was being cooled down. The licensee's EOP, 
based upon the Westinghouse Technical Guidelines, constrained the operators 
from terminating SI flow prior to achieving a reactor coolant system (RCS) 
pressure of 2000 psig. At the time of the SI, the primary system temperature
was 340F and pressure was 1000 psig while the main steam pressure was 
100 psig. 

Consistent with their procedures, the reactor operators did not terminate SI
flow until the RCS pressure reached 2000 psig. This generated a pressure 
differential across the steam generator tubes which exceeded the 1600 psi 
design differential pressure by about 300 psi. 

The problem arose because the generic technical guidelines, which include a 
2000 psig constraint, were not intended for application during reactor 
cooldown, and the plant procedures did not differentiate for this condition.

On March 19, 1983, a second inadvertent SI occurred at the Summer Station 
while the RCS was water-solid at 325 psig and 150 F. However, this time
the reactor operator quickly identified the SI as being spurious and 
terminated the SI after approximately two minutes without waiting for the 
EOP termination criteria of 2000 psig RCS pressure to be reached. Since the 
RCS was watersolid, the plant's cold overpressure protection system (COPS) 
was in service and the power operated relief valve (PORV) was set to relieve 
at about 750 psig. However, because of the prompt operator action, SI was 
terminated before the PORV setpoint was reached. In this instance, because 
of the plant's operating mode, terminating SI prior to meeting the EOP 
termination criterion was appropriate. 

8303040034 
.

                                                             IN 83-30      
                                                             May 11, 1983  
                                                             Page 2 of 2   

The problem being highlighted by this notice is the misapplying of EOPs by 
not taking into account the operating modes for which the EOPs should be 
imposed. Although no written response to this notice is required, it is 
suggested that holders of operating licenses review the information in this 
Notice for applicability at their facilities. 

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or the technical 
contact listed below. 



                              Edward L. Jordan, Director 
                              Division of Emergency Preparedness 
                                and Engineering Response 
                              Office of Inspection and Enforcement 

Technical Contact:  I. Villalva, IE          F. Jape, Region II 
                    (301) 492-9635           (404) 221-4182 

Attachment: 
List of Recently Issued Information Notices
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