Information Notice No. 81-14: Potential Overstress of Shafts on Fisher Series 9200 Butterfly Valves with Expandable T Rings
SSINS No.: 6835
Accession No.:
8011040292
IN 81-14
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
April 7, 1981
Information Notice No. NO- 81-14: POTENTIAL OVERSTRESS OF SHAFTS ON FISHER
SERIES 9200 BUTTERFLY VALVES WITH
EXPANDABLE T RINGS
Description of Circumstances:
Northern States Power Company recently informed NRC that the design of
certain butterfly valves at Monticello Nuclear Generating Station contained
a design error that shows the calculated maximum shaft stress to be
underestimated. The valves affected are Fisher Controls Company Series 9200
butterfly valves (6 to 48 inches) with expandable T rings (inflatable seals)
manufactured from 1968 to 1972. In the calculation of the shaft stress, the
length between the shaft bushing and the attachment of the shaft to the
valve disc used in the stress calculations was shorter than the actual
length. From discussions with the valve manufacturer, the cause of the
difference in the design calculation dimension and the actual dimension was
that the shaft bushings were recessed into the valve body to accommodate the
pneumatic passages for the inflatable seals. Evaluation of the design error
for the valves at Monticello indicate that the maximum shaft stress in the
closed position remains less than the minimum yield strength of the shaft
material. The licensee intends to keep the affected valves closed while
operating and plans to replace the shafts with ones of higher strength
material.
The potential consequences of the design error is that, under accident
loading conditions, there is a possibility for excessive deformation of the
shaft. Therefore, these valves when closed under the dynamic conditions of a
LOCA or, if already closed, may not seal essentially leaktight. Since these
valves are used primarily in the containment purge and vent lines, a
substantial safety hazard would exist if these valves could not be closed or
if there was excessively leakage past these valves. Containment integrity
therefore could not be assured. The operability of containment purge and
vent valves is item II.E.4.2 in the TMI Action Plan.
The facilities identified that may have the Fisher valves include Duane
Arnold, Monticello, Palisades, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3, and Point Beach
Units 1 and 2. Discussions with the valve vendor indicate that the reviews
of the valve calculations affected should be completed by mid-April.
This information is provided as an early notification of a significant
safety matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected
that licensees will review the information for possible applicability to
their plants. If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may
be requested.
.
IN 81-14
April 17, 1981
Page 2 of 2
No written response to this information notice is required. If you need
additional information with regard to this matter contact the Director of
the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Attachment:
Recently issued Information Notices
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021