IE Circular No. 79-08, Attempted Extortion - Low Enriched Uranium
CR79008
May 17, 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: B. H. Grier, Director, Region I
J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III
K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV
R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V
FROM: E. Morris Howard, Director
Division of Safeguards Inspection, IE
SUBJECT: IE CIRCULAR NO. 79-08, ATTEMPTED EXTORTION - LOW
ENRICHED URANIUM
The subject document is transmitted for issuance on May 18, 1979 and is a
follow-up to IE Information Notice No, 79-02. A summary of the GE Wilmington
event is attached.
This circular should be issued to all fuel facilities and reactors licensed
by NRC. Also, enclosed is a copy of the transmittal letter.
No inspection follow-up is necessary since no action by the licensee is
requested.
E. Morris Howard, Director
Division of Safeguards Inspection
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
1. IE Circular No. 79-08
with attachments
2. Draft Transmittal Letter
CONTACT: N. Ervin
492-7077
.
(Draft transmittal letter for IE Circular 79-08, to each operating reactor
(power and nonpower) and fuel facility licensee.)
IE Circular No. 79-08
Addressee:
The enclosed IE Circular 79-08, is forwarded to you for information. If
there are any questions related to the contents or intent of the Circular or
its attachments, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
Signature
(Regional Director)
Enclosure:
IE Circular No. 79-08
w/attachments
.
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
May 18, 1979
IE Circular No. 79-08
ATTEMPTED EXTORTION - LOW ENRICHED URANIUM
Background
In January 1979, a temporary contractor employee who was working at the
General Electric plant in Wilmington, North Carolina, allegedly entered the
plant and removed a drum containing two 5-gallon cans of low enriched
uranium from the facility with the intention of extorting money for the
return of the material. The Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an
intensive investigation leading to the arrest of the employee on February 1,
1979. All material was recovered and returned to the plant.
Discussion
Based on preliminary information provided the NRC, the theft was allegedly
carried out in the following manner:
On Friday, January 26, 1979, the subject worked the day shift. At 10:50
p.m. the same day he drove back to the plant and entered with the night
shift. He showed his Florida driver's license at the entrance gate
instead of his yellow contractor badge because it had a blue background
similar to that on the picture badge which he thought was required to
gain access to the area of the plant that he wanted to penetrate. He
had allegedly gained access using his driver's license on previous
occasions.
Once inside the plants, the subject would have been guided by gates and
fences into a parking area had it not been for the fact that one gate
had been removed to allow installation of truck scales. He proceeded
down the unprotected road to an area adjacent to the building he wanted
to enter.
After the subject entered the building through a personnel door, he
proceeded to his normal working station which was the Chem Tech Lab and
entered, using his own key. In the lab he picked up his protective
clothing, a two wheel cart used to move 55 gallon drums and a container
used to ship chemicals. The container could hold two 5-gallon cans. He
then proceeded to a door leading up a stairwell into the radiation
.
IE Circular No. 79-08 May 18, 1979
Page 2 of 2
controlled area. The door was normally locked even though not required
by regulations; however, at this time it was slightly ajar due to
malfunction of the locking mechanism. Once inside the door, the subject
put on his protective clothing and proceeded up the stairs to the Blend
Queue Area. He removed two 5-gallon cans of U02, carried them down the
stairs and put them in the shipping container. He then removed his
protective clothing and retraced his steps on to the Chem Tech Lab.
Once back in the lab he opened one can and removed some of the material
which he intended to use to effect his blackmail scheme. Using the 2
wheel cart, he transported the remaining material to his car and loaded
it in his trunk. He retraced his steps and left the plant just before
midnight on Friday, January 26. Procedures require anyone leaving the
plant after midnight to sign out. He had been in the plant
approximately one hour. He had come in with the incoming plant change
and had left with the outgoing shift.
Conclusion
The G. E. Wilmington plant had an industrial security system in operation at
the time of the incident. This theft was facilitated by a failure of this
system. The failure to check the subjects identification badge closely
enough to distinguish a Florida driver's license from a General Electric
badge authorizing access other than normal working hours and the failure to
protect a disabled remotely operated gate which would have denied automobile
access to the immediate area where material was stored were significant
factors in the success of this theft. A third contributing factor was access
to the material through an emergency exit which was normally closed and
locked against access to the area where the material was stored.
Although the circumstances surrounding the possible occurrence of an event
similar to this will vary according to each licensee's operation and
safeguards system, the attached summary of this event clearly demonstrates
the interrelationships of minor problems that seem insignificant if taken
alone, but when combined, can allow a loss to occur. It also emphasizes that
the possibility of an insider threat against a licensed facility does exist.
This Circular is issued for your information.
No action is requested of you and no written response to this Circular is
required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter,
contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Attachments:
1. Sanitized Summary of
GE Wilmington Incident
2. List of IE Circulars Issued
in the Last Twelve Months.
.
Sanitized Summary of G. E. Wilmington Incident
I. Summary
On Monday, January 29, 1979, at 11:45 a.m., Region II was notified by
telephone by the General Manager of the Wilmington, North Carolina,
General Electric Company plant, that an extortion letter and a sample
of UO2 powder were found at his office door when he came to work about
8:00 a.m. The letter stated that the writer had in his possession two
5-gallon containers of UO2 powder which he had taken from the plant.
The containers were identified in the letter by serial numbers and by
the gross weight (approximately 145 pounds total). The letter further
stated that enough UO2 had been removed from one of the containers to
furnish samples to newspaper editors, senators, anti-nuclear group
leaders and others if his demand for $100,000 in cash was not met by
Thursday, February 1. The writer further stated that after the samples
had been delivered, if he had not received the money, one container of
UO2 powder from the second container would be dispersed through another
large city if an additional $100,000 in cash was not provided at that
time.
The General Manager verified the authenticity of the container numbers
and the fact that the containers were not in their assigned locations.
Region II advised the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC,
Headquarters, and the Atlanta office of the FBI. The Atlanta FBI turned
the case over to the Charlotte, North Carolina FBI office.
The FBI assumed investigative jurisdiction on Monday, January 29. It
was decided not to send NRC investigators to the plant at that time,
but that the NRC would wait for further developments and concentrate on
planning and related safety evaluations. On Tuesday, January 30, two
Region II investigators, knowledgeable in accountability and health
physics, were sent to the plant to furnish technical expertise in the
areas of material control accountability and health physics, and to
review GE activities to determine how the event occurred, without
interfering with the FBI investigation.
A temporary employee of a General Electric Company subcontractor was
subsequently arrested by the FBI on 2/1/79.
The containers and all the SNM were recovered by the FBI and returned
to GE.
Attachment 1
Page 1 of 2
.
IE Circular NO. 79-08 May 18, 1979
II Conclusions
The special inspection disclosed that: (a) the material control and
accountability system functioned as designed and identified the missing
containers in accordance with regulatory requirements; (b) health
physics procedures were followed in accordance with regulatory
requirements; (c) normal industrial security procedures were followed;
and (d) no items of noncompliance with regulatory requirements were
identified.
Attachment 1
Page 2 of 2
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