Bulletin 84-02: Failures of General Electric Type HFA Relays in Use in Class 1E Safety Systems
SSINS No.: 6820 OMB No.: 3150-00012 Expiration Date: 4/30/85 IEB 84-02 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 3, 1984 IE BULLETIN NO. 84-02: FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE HFA RELAYS IN USE IN CLASS 1E SAFETY SYSTEMS Addressees: All holders of nuclear power reactor operating licenses (OLs) or construction permits (CPs) for action. Purpose: One purpose of this bulletin is to inform licensees and CP holders about recent HFA relay failures that indicate they are similar in nature to previous HFA relay failures reported in several General Electric (GE) Service Advice Letters (SALs) and Service Information Letters (SILs) which were issued to end-users in 1980 and 1982. (See Attachments to this bulletin.) Another purpose of this bulletin is to ask licensees and CP holders to inform the NRC about their plans, including schedules, for implementing the manufacturer's recommendations discussed in the subject GE letters. In addition, licensees are asked to provide information concerning their plans to upgrade surveillance and to justify continued operation in the interim. Description of Circumstances: During 1983, the NRC has received reports of several Class 1E relay failures at the Duane Arnold, Pilgrim, and Hatch nuclear power reactor plants. The subject relays are identified as GE type HFA 51 Series AC, using Lexan as the coil spool material. These latest failures indicate that this model HFA relay is still being used in safety-related systems at most boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized water reactors, including the reactor protection systems at BWR nuclear power plants. The recently reported relay failures all involved relays that were continuously energized in ac circuits and failed to open when de-energized. GE states the cause of failure of continuously energized HFA ac excited relay applications is the deterioration of the coil wire insulation as a result of the effects of aging. Failure mechanism begins with wire insulation failure resulting in shorted turns, causing increased coil temperature and eventual coil failure. 8402090031 . IEB 84-02 March 12, 1984 Page 2 of 6 In the event of failure, coil temperature can reach a level which can vaporize the insulating materials and can melt the coil spool. These materials may deposit on cooler surfaces of the relay and cause armature damage and/or fail to make a contact circuit. Approximately 25 failures of normally energized safety-related HFA relays have been reported to the NRC in the past 2-1/2 years, six of these have occurred since August 1983. GE believes that these recent failures are the result of the above-mentioned end-of-life situation. According to GE, some commercial ac rated HFA relays (predating the Century Series available since 1978) manufactured with standard Class A insulation (nylon or Lexan coil spools and standard temperature wire) which are continuously energized can fail in approximately 10-12 years. Many of the licensed facilities are now approaching this time period, thus increasing the likelihood of concurrent failures. This potential for concurrent failure may be considered a precursor of ATWS (anticipated transient without scram), since concurrent failure of certain safety-related relays at nuclear power plants could result in failure of the reactor trip function. Background: Failures of HFA relays have been reported to the NRC since 1973, and GE has responded to these failures by issuing SALs from the Power Systems Management Department located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and/or SILs from its Nuclear Energy Products Division located in San Jose, California. These GE letters discuss the relay failures and recommend replacing subject relays with relays considered more suitable. Additionally, the NRC has issued IE Bulletin 76-02 and Information Notices 81-01 and 82-13 referencing these GE letters. Licensees began replacing HFA relays in 1976 in response to IE Bulletin 76-02. IE Bulletin 76-02 referenced GE SAL 152.1 which recommended replacing relay coils. At that time, the relay coil of the HFA relay was wound on nylon spools. Winding failures occurred because of a moisture/halogens problem and affected mostly dc-excited normally de-energized relays. GE recommended replacing the nylon coil spool with one made of Lexan material. Subsequently the Lexan coils exhibited extensive cracking, which is considered a major precursor to the current HFA relay failures. To resolve the Lexan spool cracking problem, GE Philadelphia issued SAL 152.2 in 1980 recommending that end-users replace the Lexan spool-type HFA relay with their new "Century Series" HFA relay. The Century Series relay uses a high-temperature-rated plastic material called "Tefzel" for coil spool construction and high-temperature coil wire, and employs a vacuum-impregnated insulation. According to GE this relay has been both environmentally and seismically qualified to the latest applicable IEEE standards and has been subjected to an accelerated life test which verified a continuously energized relay life in excess of 40 years. In addition to SAL 152.2, other documents which recommended that end-users replace the relays having a Lexan coil spool with the newer Century Series HFA relay are: GE SAL 152.2A, 1982; SIL No. 44, Supplements 2 and 4, 1981 and 1982, respectively; and NRC documents IN 81-01 and IN 82-13 issued in 1981 and . IN 84-02 March 12, 1984 Page 3 of 6 1982, respectively. It should be noted that the SILs from GE (San Jose) offered an alternative to replace the existing coil spools with the Century Series Tefzel coil spool only, not the complete relay unit. The NRC believes that these two methods of replacement are equivalent. Additionally, since past relay failures appear to be more predominant in normally energized ac circuits, it is suggested that affected licensees develop plans with replacement schedules which ensure that these types of applications are the first to be replaced with either the complete Century Series HFA relay or the Century Series Tefzel coil spools or equivalent. Copies of the above-mentioned GE SALs and SILs are attached for your information and use. The NRC IEB 76-02, IN 81-01, and IN 82-13 can be obtained from your local public document room. Actions for All Holders of Operating Licenses or Construction Permits: Since GE asserts that the new Century Series HFA relay has been successfully tested to the environmental and seismic requirements specified in IEEE-323-1974 and IEEE-344-1975 Standards, this relay, or one of equal qualification, may be an acceptable replacement for Lexan/Nylon HFA relay now in service at many nuclear power plants. However, the licensee is responsible for determining that all safety grade equipment in the plant, including relays, is qualified for its intended service. That is, the licensee must establish and document that the service life and reliability of the relay is acceptable, and that the relays have been qualified for the environmental and seismic conditions that this equipment may encounter at its installed location in the plant. 1. Plants in Operation a. Develop plans and schedules for replacing (1) nylon or Lexan coil spool-type HFA relays used in normally energized safety-related * applications and (2) nylon coil spool-type HFA relays used in normally de-energized safety-related applications. The replacement relays and any replacements made in the future should meet the requirements of the applicable IEEE standards. The replacement program for energized and de-energized relays should be performed on a "best efforts" basis during plant outages of sufficient duration. The entire replacement program should be completed within two years from the date of this bulletin. * For the purpose of the applicable actions of this bulletin, "safety-related" constitutes those systems covered by the definition given in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A Sections III.(c)(1), III.(c)(2), and III.(c)(3). In assessing the impact of Lexan/Nylon coil spool-type HFA relay in other systems at their facilities, licensees should consider the provisions of GDC 1 to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. . IEB 84-02 March 12, 1984 Page 4 of 6 The replacement schedule should consider the following recommended priority: Nylon or Lexan normally energized in the reactor trip system Nylon or Lexan normally energized in other safety-related applications Nylon normally de-energized in the reactor trip system Nylon normally de-energized in other safety-related applications b. During the period before relay replacement, develop and implement surveillance plans that include: (1) Monthly functional tests of all reactor trip system normally energized relays that verify relay contacts change state when the relay coil is de-energized; (2) Visual inspections of all safety-related normally energized relays as soon as practical upon receipt of this bulletin. Thereafter, similar inspections should be accomplished in conjunction with the monthly functional test. These visual inspections should verify that relay coils are not deteriorating (e.g., inspect coil bobbins for visible cracks or melting), and should confirm cleanliness of the relay pole pieces. c. Provide a basis for continuing operation for the period of time until the normally energized relays are replaced. This basis should include a discussion of those measures addressed in Items 1a and 1b and any other preventive and/or corrective measures taken or planned. d. Provide a written report of the above actions, including schedules for completion. This report is to be submitted to the NRC within 120 days of receipt of this bulletin. 2. Plants Under Construction a. Provide plans and schedules for replacing both normally energized and normally de-energized HFA relays as specified by this bulletin in item 1a which are used in safety-related systems at your facility(ies). Your schedule shall ensure that these relays are replaced before the scheduled date for OL issuance or within two years from the date of this bulletin, whichever is longer. If these relays are not planned to be replaced before OL issuance, item 1b shall be implemented at the time of license issuance and a response to item 1c is required. b. Provide a written report of the actions specified in Item 2a. This report is to be submitted to the NRC within 120 days of receipt of this bulletin. . IEB 84-02 March 12, 1984 Page 5 of 6 3. If your plant does not use or plan to use the nylon or Lexan-type GE HFA relays in the safety-related systems discussed above, a negative response is requested within 120 days of receipt of this bulletin, and no further action is required. 4. If your plant uses or plans to continue to use the nylon or Lexan-type HFA relay in systems other than those safety-related applications defined in this bulletin, then the appropriate administrative controls dealing with maintenance, storage, and handling of spare parts at your facility must be revised to ensure that the older and problematic HFA relay coils are not inadvertently used as a replacement part in safety-related applications in future maintenance efforts at your facility(ies). Although the specific details involving the identified relay failures described above may not directly apply to your facility(ies), you are asked to review the general concerns expressed in the bulletin for applicability at your facility(ies). For example, if a different type of relay is used for the same safety functions described in this bulletin, or relays with similar materials are used for other safety-related functions, past operating history and the manufacturer's recommendations should be reviewed to determine if additional action is appropriate. Your response should describe the results of the review, and, if the general concerns apply, you should describe the short-term and long-term corrective actions to be taken and the schedules thereof. The written report required shall be submitted to the appropriate Regional Administrator under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also, the original copy of the cover letters and a copy of the reports shall be transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 for reproduction and distribution. This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and Budget under a blanket clearance number 3150-0011 which expires April 30, 1985. Comments on burden and duplication may be directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Reports Management, Room 3208, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503. Although no specific request or requirement is intended, the following information would be helpful to the NRC in evaluating the cost of this bulletin: 1. Staff time to perform requested review. 2. Staff time spent to prepare requested documentation. . IEB 84-02 March 12, 1984 Page 6 of 6 If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or the technical contact listed below. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical Contact: V. D. Thomas, IE 301-492-4755 Attachments: 1. GE SALs and SILs 2. List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021