Bulletin 79-26: Rev. 1, Boron Loss From BWR Control Blades

                                                            SSINS No.: 6820 
                                                            Accession No.: 
                                                            8006190042 

                                UNITED STATES
                       NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
                    OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                           WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 

                               August 29, 1980

                                             IE Bulletin No. 79-26 Rev. 1 

BORON LOSS FROM BWR CONTROL BLADES 

Description of Circumstances: 

The General Electric Company (GE) has informed us of a failure mode for 
control blades which can cause a loss of boron poison material. Hot cell 
examinations of both foreign and domestic blades have revealed cracks near 
the upper end of stainless steel tubing and loss of boron from the tubes. 
The cracks and boron loss have so far been confined to locations in the 
poison tubes with more than 50 percent Boron-10 (B10) local depletion. 
Observed crack sizes range from a quarter to a half inch in length and from 
one to two mils in width. 

GE has postulated that the cracking is due to stress corrosion induced by 
solidification of boron carbide (B4C) particles and swelling of the 
compacted. B4C as helium and lithium concentrations grow. Once primary 
coolant penetrates the cladding (i.e., the cracking has progressed through 
the cladding wall and the helium-lithium pressures are sufficient to open 
the crack), boron is leached out of the tube at locations with more than 50 
percent B10 local depletion (local depletion is considered to be twice the 
average depletion).  It was further found with similar cracking but with 
less than 50 percent local depletion of B10, that leaching did not occur 
even though primary coolant had penetrated the cladding. 

The cracking and boron loss shorten the design life of the control blade. 
According to the GE criteria the end of design life is reached when the 
reactivity worth of the blade is reduced by 10 percent, which corresponds to
42 percent B10 depletion averaged over the top quarter of the control blade.
Because of the leaching mechanism, GE has reduced the allowance for B10 
depletion averaged over the top quarter of the control blade from the 42 
percent value to 34 percent. 
.

IE Bulletin No. 79-26 Rev. 1                           August 29, 1980 
                                                       Page 2 of 5 

The safety significance of boron loss is its impact on shutdown capability 
and scram reactivity. Although shutdown capability is demonstrated by 
shutdown margin tests after refueling, the calculated control blade worths 
used in the tests are based on the assumption that no boron loss has 
occurred. Reduction in scram reactivity due to boron loss could increase the
severity of Critical Power Ratio (CPR) reductions during the plant 
transients and could increase the consequences of control rod drop 
accidents. 

Because the locations of limiting Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR), CPR, 
and Average Planar LHGR (APLHGR) are not in controlled cells, local power 
limit monitoring is not affected by boron loss. 

GE has evaluated the potential effect of boron loss on shutdown capability, 
CPR reduction and the consequences of control rod drop accidents. GE's 
evaluation is based on the hot cell result that no boron loss is observed 
until 50 percent local B10 depletion is attained. For each B4C tube, 
complete loss of B4C was assumed when the calculated B10 depletion exceeded 
50 percent locally.  For any blade expected to reach a B10 depletion greater 
than 34 percent during a cycle, GE assumed a B10 depletion distribution 
typical of blades at the previously defined end of design life. 

Based on these evaluations GE arrived at the following conclusions: 

(a)  Control rod drop accident consequences are not sufficiently sensitive 
     to small reductions in scram reactivity to be affected by boron loss 
     before the end of design life of the blades involved. 

(b)  If no more than 26 percent of the control blades have experienced a 10 
     percent reduction in projected worth taking boron loss into 
     consideration, there is a negligible effect on transient CPR reduction 
     and MCPR limits. 

(c)  If any control blades have experienced more than 10 percent reduction 
     in projected worth, taking boron loss into consideration, the shutdown 
     margin should be demonstrated to be at least the sum of the shutdown 
.

IE Bulletin No. 79-26 Rev. 1                           August 29 , 1980  
                                                       Page 3 of 5 

     margin required by Technical Specifications plus an increment 
     sufficient to account for the potential for boron loss. 

We have examined the bases for GE's conclusions, including the hot cell 
tests and the calculational assumptions. The preferred action is to re,place 
all blades expected to have greater than 34 percent B10 depletion averaged 
over the upper one-fourth of the blade. However, based on our review we 
believe the relation between boron loss and B10 depletion (i.e., the 
observations to date show that boron loss does not occur until 50 percent 
local depletion of B10) is sufficiently understood to justify BWR operation 
on an interim basis provided the following actions have been taken by 
licensees. 

Action to be taken by Licensees: 

For all BWR power reactor facilities with an operating license: 

1.   The operating history of the reactor is to be reviewed to establish a 
     record of the current B10 depletion averaged over the upper one-fourth 
     of the blade for every control blade; the record is to be maintained on
     a continuing basis. This action is required on all reactors whether 
     shutdown for refueling or operating. 

2.   Identify any control blades predicted to have greater than 34 percent 
     B10 depletion averaged over the upper one-fourth of the blade by the 
     next refueling outage. 

     a.   Describe your plans for replacement of identified control blades. 

     b.   Describe measures which you plan to take justifying continued 
          operations until the next refueling specifically addressing (1) 
          any blade with greater than 42 percent depletion averaged over the 
          upper one-fourth of the blade; and (2) the condition where you 
          find greater 
.

IE Bulletin No. 79-26 Rev. 1                           August 29, 1980 
                                                       Page 4 of 5 

          than 26 percent of the control blades calculated to have greater 
          than 34 percent depletion averaged over the upper one-fourth of 
          the blade. 

3.   At the next cold shutdown or refueling outage, conduct shutdown margin 
     tests to verify that: 

     a.   full withdrawal of any control blade from the cold xenon-free core
          will not result in criticality; and 

     b.   compliance with the shutdown margin requirement in a manner that 
          accommodates the boron loss phenomenon (i.e., by including a plant
          specific increment in the shutdown margin that takes the potential
          loss of boron from control blades identified from evaluation of 
          Item 1 into consideration). 

4.   Perform a destructive examination of the most highly exposed control 
     blade at the end of the next cycle and provide results of the 
     examination within one calendar year after removal of the blade. The 
     results to be reported should include: 

     a.   Tube number or identification. 

     b.   The elevation of each crack in the tubing. 

     c.   The calculated B10 depletion versus elevation for each tube. 

     d.   The measured B10 loss versus elevation for each tube. 

     e.   The maximum local depletion for tubes have no cracks. 

     f.   The maximum local depletion for tubes having no loss of boron. 
.

IE Bulletin No, 79-26 Rev. 1                           August 29, 1980  
                                                       Page 5 of 5 

     Alternately, the results of a destructive examination of a blade of 
     SiMilar fabrication and operational history may be provided no later 
     than April 15, 1981. If the highest local B10 depletion is less than 50
     percent, this examination can be deferred until the next refueling and 
     the examination results provided within one calendar year of the 
     removal of the blade.  

5.   Submit within 45 days of the date of issuance of this Bulletin, a 
     written report of the findings as to Items (1) and (2). For facilities 
     in a refueling outage, and all other facilities at their next refueling
     outage, submit the written report on Item (3) within 30 days after 
     plant startup following the outage. A written report on Item (4) is 
     requested within one year after removal of a control blade for 
     destructive examination. 

Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional 
Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and 
Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 
20555. 

For all BWR facilities with a construction permit and all other power 
reactor facilities with an operating license or construction permit, this 
Bulletin is for information only no written response is required. 

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires July 31, 1980. 
(Application for renewal pending before GAO.) Approval was given under a 
blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.