United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9910120156

10/06/1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 1
Power Reactor Event# 36265
Site: CRYSTAL RIVER Notification Date/Time: 10/06/1999 14:57 (EDT)
Unit: 3 Region: 2 State: FL Event Date / Time: 08/06/1999 (EDT)
Reactor Type: [3] B&W-L-LP Last Modification: 10/06/1999
Containment Type: DRY AMB Notifications: BRIAN BONSER R2
NRC Notified by: W. BAUDHAUER VERN HODGES (FAX) NRR
HQ Ops Officer: FANGIE JONES
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section: 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Unit Scram Code RX Crit Init Power Initial RX Mode Curr Power Current RX Mode
3 No No 0 Hot Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

10 CFR PART 21 REPORT-DAMAGED SAFETY GRADE ELECTRICAL CABLING FOUND IN SUPPLY

"On August 31, 1999, damage to a new power cable being installed in a non-safety-related application under Modification Approval Record MAR 98-04-06-01 (Instrument Air Compressor Upgrade) was identified. The insulation on one conductor of three conductor cable (BICC Brand Rex Company power cable 1108582, 1.Kv, 3/C, #2/0, Class B, 90C, XLPE Insulated, Black Jacket) was found to be damaged when the outer jacket was removed for termination. This was the first issuance of the cable (4 Reels containing approximately 4,000 feet total in stock), which had been procured as safety grade and Environmentally Qualified (EQ) (PO #F830409D). A total of six samples of the pulled cable were inspected. Damage to the same conductor was found in all six samples. The cable appeared to have been damaged during fabrication rather than by cable pulling techniques.

"The vendor stated that the damage was created during the cabling process while combining the three conductors just prior to closing. The damaged conductor fell off the cabling unit pulley due to loss of tension, causing the insulation to be scraped "Although never used in the plant, the subject cable could have been used in a safety-related application in a harsh environment such as the Reactor Building or Intermediate Building. In a harsh environment created under accident conditions, the damaged cable insulation could allow the cable conductor to "leak" through moisture to nearby grounds, thus tripping and rendering inoperable, equipment downstream of the fault. Normally, conductor insulation is the primary barrier to leaks in loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) tests when jacket material occasionally cracks. Also, if the cable was installed in a metal cabinet so that the cable outer jacket had been stripped near the defect to allow cable termination, the damaged cable insulation on the one conductor could potentially allow contact with the cabinet or a nearby ground during a seismic event and cause the circuit to malfunction. In either case, safety-related loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or to perform a safety-related function, could be impacted to the extent that a substantial safety hazard could be created.

"The above evaluation was completed on October 4, 1999. The FPC director/responsible officer was notified of the above determination on October 6, 1999. The vendor has been notified of FPC's intent to report this issue under 10CFR21.21."


10/06/1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2
Power Reactor Event# 36265

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Florida Power CORPORATION

FAX COVER SHEET

Date:
From
Voice: (352) 795-6486, ext.
FAX: (352) 563-4697 (or 7-240-3751 via FPC IntraNet)

Crystal River Unit 3
Nuclear Admin Bldg
2nd Floor Xerox Room
15760 West Power Line Street
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708

TO:
Company:
FAX
Telephone:
COMMENTS:

Total Number of Pages to Follow:


FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

10 CFR PART 21.21

TWO DAY NOTIFICATION

October 6, 1999

Florida Power Company (FPC)
Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3)
Docket No. 50-302

On August 31, 1999, damage to a new power cable being installed in a non-safety-related application under Modification Approval Record MAR 98-04-06-01 (instrument Air Compressor Upgrade) was identified. The insulation on one conductor of three conductor cable (BICC Brand Rex Company power cable #1 108582, 1Kv, 3/C, #2/0, Class B, 90C, XLPE Insulated, Black Jacket) was found to be damaged when the outer jacket was removed for termination. This was the first issuance of the cable (4 Reels containing approximately 4,000 feet total in stock), which had been procured as safety grade and Environmentally Qualified (EQ) (PO #F830409D). A total of six samples of the pulled cable were inspected. Damage to the same conductor was found in all six samples. The cable appeared to have been damaged during fabrication rather than by cable pulling techniques.

The vendor stated that the damage was created during the cabling process while combining the three conductors just prior to closing. The damaged conductor fell off the cabling unit pulley due to loss of tension, causing the insulation to be scraped

Although never used in the plant, the subject cable could have been used in a safety related application in a harsh environment such as the Reactor Building or Intermediate Building. In a harsh environment created under accident conditions, the damaged cable insulation could allow the cable conductor to "leak' through moisture to nearby grounds, thus tripping and rendering inoperable, equipment downstream of the fault. Normally, conductor insulation is the primary barrier to leaks in Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) tests when jacket material occasionally cracks. Also, if the cable was installed in a metal cabinet so that the cable outer jacket had been stripped near the defect to allow cable termination, the damaged cable insulation on the on conductor could potentially allow contact with the cabinet or a nearby ground during a seismic event and cause the circuit to malfunction. In either case, safety-related loads required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or to perform a safety-related function, could be impacted to the extent that a substantial safety hazard could be created.

The above evaluation was completed on October 4, 1999. The FPC director/responsible officer was notified of the above determination on October 6, 1999. The vendor has been notified of FPC's intent to report this issue under 10CFR21.21.


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