United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment


ACCESSION #:  9702240341      



POWER REACTOR                           EVENT NUMBER: 31822



FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1     NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/20/97

UNIT: [ ] [2] [ ]          STATE: NY    NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13 [ET]

RX TYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5              EVENT DATE:        02/18/97

                                        EVENT TIME:        14:30[EST]

NRC NOTIFIED BY: K.  LAMPMAN, M.        LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/20/97

McCORMICK

HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE



                                                  NOTIFICATIONS

EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE

10 CFR SECTION:                              LARRY NICHOLSON     RDO

CCCC 21.21          UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH

                                             VERN HODGE, RVIB    NRR



UNIT  SCRAM CODE  RX CRIT  INIT PWR  INIT RX MODE  CUR PWR   CURR RX

MODE



 2      N            Y       100     POWER OPERATION 100  POWER OPERATION



                               EVENT TEXT



10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE EXCESSIVE FAILURE RATE OF

BORG-WARNER (BWIP) PRESSURE SWITCHES USED IN THE GAS TREATMENT,

SERVICE

WATER, AND HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS



SEVERAL BWIP PRESSURE SWITCHES FAILED DURING OPERATION AND INITIAL

CALIBRATION, AND AN EVALUATION CONCLUDED THAT THE SWITCHES ARE

UNABLE TO

MAINTAIN THE CORRECT RESET POINT WHEN THE SETPOINT IS ADJUSTED. 

ACCORDING TO THE MANUFACTURER, THE SUBJECT SWITCHES DO NOT HAVE

AN

ACCURATELY ADJUSTABLE RESET VALUE.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

SETPOINT

OF THE SWITCHES AND THEIR RESET POINT IS NOT LINEAR NOR CONSISTENT

BETWEEN DIFFERENT SWITCHES OF THE SAME MODEL.  THEY ARE DESIGNED TO

OPERATE WITH A MAXIMUM SETPOINT AND MINIMUM RESET WINDOW ONLY. 

AS A

RESULT, THE SWITCHES ARE NOT CONSISTENTLY ABLE TO BE INITIALLY

CALIBRATED

TO THE DESIRED SETPOINT; AND ONCE INSTALLED AND CALIBRATED, MINOR

SETPOINT DRIFT MAY PLACE THE SWITCHES OUTSIDE THEIR ACCEPTABLE

TOLERANCES.



THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 40 QUESTIONABLE BWIP PRESSURE SWITCHES

INSTALLED IN

THE PLANT (22 IN THE GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM, 6 IN THE SERVICE WATER

SUPPLY

TO COOLERS AND CHILLERS, AND 12 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION

SYSTEM).  EACH OF THE ASSOCIATED VALVES HAS TWO OR THREE OF THE

SWITCHES

WITHIN ITS HYDRAULIC CONTROLS.  THE TYPE OF FAILURE ASSOCIATED WITH

THE

SWITCH DEPENDS ON WHICH SWITCH HAS FAILED.  THE EFFECTS OF A FAILED

SWITCH CAN BE A VALVE FAILING TO OPEN AND BEING UNABLE TO CLOSE OR A

VALVE FAILING CLOSED AND BEING UNABLE TO OPEN.



THE LICENSEE PERFORMED AN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION AND CONCLUDED

THAT

THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THE SWITCHES WILL OPERATE AS

REQUIRED. 

THIS DETERMINATION WAS BASED ON SUCCESSFUL INITIAL CALIBRATION

TESTING,



                        (Continued on next page)





FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT                 PAGE # 2 OF EVENT NUMBER: 31822



POSITIVE TEST DATA OF INSTALLED CALIBRATIONS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO SHORTEN THE CALIBRATION

FREQUENCY.



THE LICENSEE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ENERTECH (THE VENDOR) IN

CALIFORNIA

AND WITH BORG-WARNER (THE MANUFACTURER).  THE LICENSEE ALSO

BELIEVES THAT

ENERTECH HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE NRC.



THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  (REFER TO

THE

HOO LOG FOR SITE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBERS.)



                                 NIAGARA

                                 MOHAWK



NINE  MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION

P.O.  BOX 63, LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093



FROM:     FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER:              (315) 349-1400 

          NAME:  

          DEPARTMENT:    LICENSING/ENVIRONMENTAL

          TELEPHONE NUMBER:



                                                       FAX #



TO:



TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES FAXED (INCLUDING COVER LETTER):



DATE:               TIME:



MESSAGE:



ENCLOSURE 1

EVALUATION OF DEVIATION, DEFECT, FAILURE TO COMPLY FORM



PART I - REPORTING



Nine Mile Point 2 (Affected Unit)       DER No.  2-96-3145

                                        Date of Discovery - 12/19/96

TYPE OF CONDITION



A.  Deviation                           B.  Defect



     1.   Basic Component ()                 1.  Deviation       ()

          a.  Structure   ()                 2.  Other Condition ()

          b.  System      ()            C.  Failure to Comply

          c.  Component   ()                 1.  Atomic Energy Act()

          d.  Design      ()                 2.  Rule            ()

          e.  Inspection  ()                 3.  Regulation      ()

          f.  Testing     ()                 4.  Order           ()

          g.  Consulting  ()                 5.  License         ()

              Service     ()



2.  Other Condition       ()



Description; Excessive failure rate of BWIP Pressure switches used in the

GTS, SWP, and HVK systems.



PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST



A deviation related to a Basic Component or a failure to comply shall be

evaluated to determine if it presents a substantial safety hazard.  A

condition is a substantial safety hazard if it causes a major reduction

in the degree of protection to the public.  Criteria for determining

substantial safety hazards include: a) Moderate exposure to or release of

licensed material; b) Major degradation of essential safety-related

equipment; and c) Major deficiencies involving design, construction,

inspection, test or use of license facilities or materials (see NUREG-

302).



The following checklist is used to determine if a major reduction in

safety exists.  If the answer is "yes" to any of the following, it may be

reportable per 10CFR part 21 and requires further evaluation.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 10                          Rev.  01





                           ENCLOSURE 1 (Cont)



PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Cont)



          CONSEQUENCE                                  YES            NO



1.   Exposures received in excess of 10CFR20 limits 

     for immediate notification.



2.   Exposure of an individual in an unrestricted 

     area in excess of 10CFR20 limits,



3.   Release of radioactive material to an 

     unrestricted area in excess of 10CFR20 limits.



4.   Exceeding a safety limit as defined in the 

     facility technical specifications.



5.   A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of a system required for safe 

     shutdown, emergency core cooling, post 

     accident containment heat removal or post 

     accident containment atmosphere cleanup.



6.   A condition which could disable or reduce 

     the safety margins for the reactor coolant 

     pressure boundary, core or reactor internals, 

     functions or operation.



7.   A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of the spent fuel storage pool 

     cooling and storage including the fuel racks.



8.   A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of redundant Class IE electrical

     systems, including electric and mechanical

     devices and circuitry.



9.   A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of the reactivity control systems;

     that is, control rods, control rod drives,

     and boron injection systems.



10.  A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of radioactive waste systems that 

     could create offsite, doses greater than 

     Part 100.



11   A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of the primary and secondary 

     containment.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 11                          Rev.  01





                           ENCLOSURE 1 (Cont)



PART II - EVALUATION CHECKLIST (Cont)



               CONSEQUENCE                             YES            NO



12.  A condition which could disable or prevent 

     operation of structures, components, or systems

     whose continued function is not required, but

     whose failure could reduce or disable systems

     that are required.



13.  A condition involving the security system which 

     could cause a substantial safety hazard.



14.  Other deviations in Basic Components or failures 

     to comply which cause a substantial safety hazard.



15.  A condition that creates an unreviewed safety 

     question (10CFR50.59).



16.  A condition which does not meet a rule, 

     regulation, license or order and creates a 

     substantial safety hazard.





PART III - EVALUATION (to be completed by Nuclear Licensing)

                         (check applicable category)



[ ]  Condition does not meet criteria for a potential defect or failure

     to comply because (attach additional sheets as necessary):



[ ]  Condition does not involve a substantial safety hazard because

     (attach additional sheets as necessary):



[x]  Condition involves a potential substantial safety hazard (attach

     additional sheets as necessary): See attached 



[ ]  Condition does not meet criteria for Potential Defect or Failure to

     Comply, but is reportable under 10CFR50.9.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 12                          Rev.  01





PLANT:    Nine Mile Point Unit 2             DER NO.  2-96-3145



TITLE:    High Failure Rate - BWIP Pressure Switches



DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION:



Several BWIP pressure switches have failed during operation and initial

calibration.  An evaluation has concluded that the switches are unable to

maintain the correct react point when the setpoint is adjusted. 

According to the manufacturer, the subject switches do not have an

accurately adjustable reset value.  The relationship between the setpoint

of the switches and their reset point is not linear nor consistent

between different switches of the same model. They are designed to

operate with a maximum setpoint and minimum reset window only.  As a

result, the switches are not consistently able to be initially calibrated

to the desired setpoint, and once installed and calibrated, minor

setpoint drift may place the switches outside their acceptable

tolerances.



The subject switches were supplied and recommended by the vendor as

replacement switches.  The vendor is aware of the specific setpoints

associated with each switch part number ordered by Niagara Mohawk. 

However, instead of providing switches designed to operate at the

specific setpoint and reset, the vendor supplies a switch made to operate

somewhere within the maximum setpoint and reset range for all switches of

this type.



Each of the associated valves has 2 or 3 of the switches within its

hydraulic controls.  The type of failure associated with a switch depends

on which switch has failed.  The effects of a failed switch can be a

valve failing open and unable to close, or a valve failing closed and

unable to open.



For the HVK or SWP systems, due to their design and application, an

assumed switch failure would cause the associated valve to fail open. SWP

valves 2SWP*TV35A and 35B provide temperature control for the control and

relay room chillers.  HVK valves 2HVK*TV21A, 21B, 22A, and 22B provide

individual temperature control for air conditioning units in both the

control room and relay rooms.  If these valves were to fail, control

/relay room temperature could increase potentially beyond its acceptable

design range.  Redundant air conditioning units are available in addition

to the ability to manually control cooling flow if required, however,

under design basis assumptions neither are credited as being available.



For GTS (2GTS*MOV2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 28A, 28B, and 2GTS*PV5A, 5B) should an

associated pressure switch fail by not actuating at the desired setpoint,

the setpoint overlap would prevent correct actuator response.  Since the

subject valves are located on the entrance, exit, bypass and

recirculation lines around each Standby Gas Filter Train, the system may

not be able to perform its intended safety functions.



Notwithstanding the fact that all systems are designed redundant and the

ability exists to manually control flow around SWP valves 2SWP*TV35A and

35B, a deviation exists with the pressure switches for HVK, SWP, and GTS

systems that assuming the coincident failure of all switches or a second

unrelated single failure (as required by the design basis and Part 21

guidelines), the presence of the switches created a substantial safety

hazard as defined by Part 21.  Presently an engineering operability

determination is in place that documents reasonable assurance that the

switches will operate as required.  This determination is based on having

passed initial calibration testing, positive test data trends of

installed calibrations and implementation of additional administrative

controls to shorten the calibration frequency.



This evaluation concludes that although operable at this time, under the

guidance of Part 21, the BWIP pressure switches are reportable.



                                                             NLAP-IRG-140

                                Page 13                          Rev.  01





SWITCH    PRESSURE, OPERATOR MODEL NUMBER 85430,       2GTS*MOV2A-ACT

          ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED ON NMPC PURCHASE         2GTS*MOV2B-ACT

          ORDER NOS.  NMP2-P304Y.  SPARE /             2GTS*MOV3A-ACT

          REPLACEMENT PARTS ORIGINALLY                 2GTS*MOV3B-ACT

          SUPPLIED UNDER NMPC PURCHASE ORDER 

          NUMBER NMP2-P304Y SHALL BE QUALIFIED

          TO BORG WARNER TEST REPORT NUMBER 2125, 

          REV B 



SWITCH    PRESSURE, OPERATOR MODEL NUMBERS 85960,      2GTS*MOV28A-ACT

          86060, AND 86040, ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED        2GTS*MOV28B-ACT

          OR NMPC PURCHASE ORDER NOS. NMP2-P304Y       2TCS*TCV125-ACT

          AND NMP2-C051M, BWIP P/N                       2SWP*TV35A

          89739.  SPARE / REPLACEMENT PARTS              2SWT*TV35B

          ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED UNDER NMPC PURCHASE 

          ORDER NUMBERS NMP2-P304Y AND NMP2-C051M 

          SHALL BE QUALIFIED TO BORG WARNER 

          TEST REPORT NUMBERS 2125, REV B AND 2140 

          REV A.  



SWITCH    PRESSURE, OPERATOR MODEL NUMBERS 85960,      2GTS*MOV28A-ACT

          86060, 86080, AND 86040, ORIGINALLY          2GTS*MOV28B-ACT

          SUPPLIED ON NMPC PURCHASE ORDER NOS.         2TCS*PCV115-ACT

          NMP2-P304Y AND NMP2-C051M,                     2SWP*TV35A

          BWIP P/N 86819.  SPARE / REPLACEMENT           2SWP*TV35B

          PARTS ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED UNDER NMPC 

          PURCHASE ORDER NUMBERS NMP2-P304Y AND NMP2-

          C051M SHALL BE QUALIFIED TO BORG WARNER 

          TEST REPORT NUMBERS 2125, REV B AND 2140 

          REV A. 





*** END OF DOCUMENT ***



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