United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9704080133

                             Victoreen, Inc.

                              April 1, 1997


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Center

Washington, DC 20555

Reference:     10CFR21 Report of Noncompliance dated January 30, 1997

               Model 960 RDU Fixed Display and Outputs

Subject:       Corrective Action and Close-out, 10CFR21 Report of


               Model 960 RDU Fixed Display and Outputs


Further to our notification dated January 30, 1997, this letter has been

prepared to provide formal notification of the corrective action

performed, and to close-out the subject 10CFR21 Report of Noncompliance.

General Description:

For Safety-Related applications, the Model 960 microprocessor based

digital radiation monitoring system (DRMS) consists of a local radiation

processor (LCU or LRP) and a remote, control room located, display and

control unit (RDU or SRD).  In this design, the LCU is configured as a

"master," stand alone, radiation input processor.  The RDU operates as a

"slave" control and indication device, driven by the LCU.  The LCU

communicates with the RDU via a dedicated serial communication link.  The

design also supports interface with a supervisory computer, electrically

isolated from the Safety Related components via a fiber optic isolation


The subject Report of Noncompliance identifies the potential for the

microprocessor in the RDU to "lock up." In this mode, the RDU will not

respond to status and value information transmitted from the LCU.  That

is, the RDU digital display and analog outputs will stop updating, and

the RDU alarm relays will not change state to indicate a radiation alarm

or monitor fail condition.  Note that this notification does not apply to

the digital display, analog output and relay contact outputs originating

directly from the LCU.  Only the display, analog and relay outputs

originating from the RDU are affected.

                              6000 Cochran Road

                              Cleveland, Ohio 44139-3395

                              (216) 248-9300

                              FAX (216) 248-9301


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

April 1, 1997 -- Page 2 of 4 Pages

Victoreen Corrective Action:

1.   The PG&E RDU hardware was simulated in out test department.  The

event described has been replicated, identifying the potential for a

"lock up" to occur.  Further analysis of the RDU operation has identified

that a momentary loss of AC power may result in a "lock up." This was

simulated by rapidly toggling the AC power switch on and off.  By rapidly

cycling the AC power switch, a "lock up" condition was produced

approximately one (1) out of ten (10) times.

2.   To correct the problem, Victoreen has implemented the following

modifications to the test RDU:

     - Design Change Request No. 3CR47-97 was issued to revise the RDU

     operating firmware to include a WRITE operation to the analog output

     module at the end of each microprocessor cycle.  The WRITE operation

     is used to reset a Watchdog counter circuit.

     - A Watchdog counter circuit has been added to the RDU.  The

     Watchdog counter has been designed to time out in three (3) seconds

     and output a pulse to reset the microprocessor.  Receipt of the

     analog output WRITE operation will reset the counter and permit

     normal operation to continue.

     - An AC power sense circuit has been added to the RDU.  The circuit

     monitors the AC line voltage, and outputs a PWRFL pulse if the AC

     line voltage drops below a nominal 90 v AC.  The PWRFL pulse will

     hold the microprocessor in a RESET state until the AC line voltage

     returns to normal.  This action prevents operation of the

     microprocessor under low Vcc conditions, where the validity of the

     memory addressing operations may be questionable, and the potential

     for a "lock up" condition exists.

     - Job Request No. 3JR7-97 was issued to implement the above

     functions, resulting in the design of the Model 960WD-200 Watchdog

     timer and AC voltage sense module.  The design of the circuitry is

     based on similar circuitry that has been shown to be effective in

     preventing "lock ups" in the LCU.  This module, along with the

     change to the RDU operating firmware, has been shown to effectively

     prevent "lock ups" on our test RDU.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

April 1, 1997 -- Page 3 of 4 Pages

     - The operation of the microprocessor controlled isolator was also

     evaluated.  Although a Watchdog circuit and voltage monitor are not

     included in the design of the isolator, a "lock up" of this

     microprocessor will result in the display of a Communications Fail

     message on the computer console.  Because the computer system is not

     considered Safety Related, and is isolated from the LCU or RDU via a

     fiber optic isolation system, additional protection is not required

     to ensure the integrity of the Safety Related portion of the


Customer Action:

1.   Attachment A lists users of the Model 960 DRMS that are known to

initiate ESFAS operations from the RDU.  In the close-out letter for

these applications, an upgrade to add the 960WD-200 module to the RDU

hardware, will be made available.  Design upgrade packages to provide

"lock up" protection for Safety-Related monitors will be available within

90 days from the date of this letter.  Installation will be based upon

the schedule established by the user.

2.   Attachment B lists users of the Model 960 DRMS that DO NOT use the

RDU to generate Safety-Related ESFAS actions.  These users will be

formally notified of the potential for the RDU to "lock up".  For these

users, the "lock up" condition will be readily evident to the operator

via the lack of the normal statistical fluctuation of the digital

display.  Verification of the current radiation value may be obtained

from the LCU or, when supplied, from the supervisory computer system.

Because the frequency of occurrence is small, Safety-Related control

functions are not affected, and a method of detecting a "lock up" exists,

the close out letter to these users states that an upgrade to the

existing design is not considered mandatory.  Users will be further

advised that operation of the RDU may be verified by periodically

actuating the monitor Check Source.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

April 1, 1997 -- Page 4 of 4 Pages

Root Cause Analysis:

From our review of the original design of the Model 960 system, the

master/slave relationship between the LCU and RDU assumed ESFAS

interlocks would be obtained from relays located in the LCU, and

incorporation of a Watchdog timer or an AC power sense circuit in the RDU

was not warranted.  The Nonmaskable interrupt was used to recover from a

transient by forcing the processor to restart its mail loop every 0.25

seconds.  This concept was substantiated by the successful operation of

the installed RDUs for over 12 years (e.g. from 1984 through 1997).  In

addition, the original system design for PG&E included a serial interface

to a supervisory computer.  Although the computer system has not been

installed, this interface, which was to be routed through the RDU,

included a communications fail routine that was designed to provide a

fail message on the supervisory computer console.  Because of the

successful operation in the past, the need for additional microprocessor

protection was not considered when the system design, to include ESFAS

outputs actuated from the RDU, was implemented.  The root cause,

therefore, was basing the design on prior operating experience, and not

requiring the performance of a test to verify operation during short term

supply voltage transients.

We thank you for your cooperation in this matter.  Please advise if you

have any questions or comments of the information provided here-in.

                              Best Regards,

                              Andrew W. Lasko

                              Technical Support Manager

                              Linda S. Nash, Corporate Director,

                              Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance

                              Attachment A

                       960 Monitor Installations,

                    Safety Related RDU ESFAS Outputs

                       Mandatory Upgrade Required

Customer/Plant:                    Type:     Ship      Sales     Control

                                             Date:     Order:    Outputs:

PG&E/Diablo Canyon 1, 2            IIA       91/93     35554     RDU

RDU = Control Outputs available at RDU

                              Attachment B

                       960 Monitor Installations,

                 No Safety Related ESFAS Outputs at RDU

                Upgrade NOT Required, - Notification Only

Customer/Plant:                    Type:     Ship      Sales     Control

                                             Date:     Order:    Outputs:

Bechtel/KEPCO/KORI 3, 4            I         83/85     260032    LCU

Bechtel/KEPCO/Yonggwang 1, 2       I         84/86     370001    LCU

Tractebel/Tihange 1                I         85/86     49021     N/A

Tractebel/Tihange 2                I         85        69014     N/A

Electrobel/Tihange 3               I         85        89036     N/A

PSE&G/Salem 2                      I         86        860020    LCU

PSE&G/Salem 2                      I         86        780018    LCU

Con Edison/Indian Point 2          II        86/87     830023    LCU

Con Edison/Indian Point 2          II        87/90     190004    LCU

GPU/TMI 1                          II        87        960024    LCU

KEPCO/KORI 1, 2                    IIA       92        36726     LCU

Proray/Jose Cabrerra               IIA       93        55885     N/S

KEPCO/KORI 1, 2; Wolsung 1         IIA       93        58047     LCU

Electrobel/Tihange 3               IIA       96        71320     N/A

LCU = Control Outputs available at LCU

N/A = RDU configured as LCU

N/S = Not Supplied


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