EA-96-474 - Nine Mile Point 1 & 2 ( Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation)
April 10, 1997
EA Nos. 96-474, 96-475, 96-494, & 96-541
Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Executive Vice President, Generation Business
Group and Chief Nuclear Officer
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nuclear Learning Center
450 Lake Road
Oswego, New York 13126
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL
PENALTIES - $200,000
(NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-220/96-13, 50-410/96-13,
50-220/96-16 and 50-410/96-16)
Dear Mr. Sylvia:
This letter refers to the NRC inspections conducted between October 7 and November 30, 1996, at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, the findings of which were discussed with you and members of your staff during several exit meetings, the last of which was held on December 20, 1996. These inspections included an inspection of the motor-operated valve (MOV) programs, an engineering inspection, and a routine resident inspection. The related inspection reports were sent to you previously. On February 25, 1997, a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (conference) was conducted with you and members of your staff to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions.
During the inspections, a number of deficiencies were identified due to: (1) the failure to control reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level following a scram of the Unit 1 reactor on November 5, 1996, that resulted in inadvertently filling the main steam lines (MSLs) with approximately 30,000 gallons of water; (2) the failure to take adequate corrective action after the Unit 2 suppression pool was cleaned during the refueling outage in the spring of 1995, that resulted in failure to identify debris in the drywell-to-suppression pool downcomers; (3) the inadequate justification for use of a certain design input in calculations used to estimate the ability of four safety-related motor-operated valves (MOVs) on Unit 2 to overcome pressure locking forces; (4) inadequate evaluations and corrective actions associated with the failure of the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine lube oil cooler pressure control valve (PCV); and (5) an incorrect setpoint for the Unit 2 control room (CR) chiller condenser water low flow trip.
Based on the information developed during the inspections, and the information provided during the conference regarding these deficiencies, a number of violations are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). The violations have been categorized into two areas, namely: (1) the failure to identify and/or correct several conditions adverse to quality that existed at your facility, including deficiencies associated with the overfill of reactor water into the MSLs at Unit 1; and (2) the failure to maintain appropriate design controls at the facility.
With respect to the corrective action violations, the overfill event at Unit 1 is particularly disturbing. A lack of sensitivity to the significance of high reactor water level on the part of both plant management and operations personnel, resulted in inadequate control of RPV water level and filling the MSLs with approximately 30,000 gallons of water. Previously, NMP did not adequately respond to industry information to ensure that the combination of training, procedures, and system design were adequate to have prevented an overfill event. When reactor water level increased rapidly following the reactor scram, the system for overfill protection did not prevent this overfill event because of leakage past the feedwater flow control valve (FCV). Operators allowed feedwater injection to continue for approximately 50 minutes and failed to take action to lower and restore water level to the band specified in the scram procedure. The operators were unaware that the wide range (WR) level indication that they were relying on was not accurate for the specific plant conditions and, as a result, failed to maintain RPV water level below the elevation of the MSLs. Even though the inaccuracy of the WR level indication during hot conditions had been previously identified in 1992 on a deviation/event report (DER), the information was not effectively communicated to the operators. The 1992 DER, as well as an actual high RPV water level event at Unit 1 in July 1996, in which operators failed to take action for approximately 15 minutes, provided prior opportunities to emphasize sensitivity to high RPV water level, and the importance of the high level trip function to protect against an overfill event.
Beyond the corrective action issues, this event raises concerns about operator knowledge of some fundamental aspects of plant design and operating procedures. Operator knowledge deficiencies associated with RPV level instrumentation limitations, feedwater system operation, and procedural requirements, combined with weak diagnostic activities and failure to fully understand integrated plant response resulted in failure to take timely action to comply with operating procedures. The NRC is concerned that your evaluation of the event did not address the broader implications of these weaknesses in operator knowledge and abilities. At the conference you acknowledged that operator performance was unsatisfactory and, while you indicated that you took corrective action to provide training on high reactor vessel level events, you did not indicate that any action was taken to assess whether the type of knowledge and performance deficiencies revealed during this event may exist in other areas of Unit 1 operator knowledge and ability.
These failures that contributed to the November 1996 overfill event represent a violation of NRC requirements and are described in Section I.A of the enclosed Notice. Even though there was only minor equipment damage as a result of this event, the failure to have adequate controls in place to prevent an overfill event, despite the prior opportunities to identify the need for such controls, is a significant regulatory concern since it had the potential to cause a serious safety event. Water hammer and two-phase flow caused by flooding of the MSLs can result in the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) or the turbine pressure control valves being damaged which could render them inoperable. More severe transients could lead to a MSL break due to increased dead weight and seismic loading. As such, the fundamental weaknesses in operator performance, as well as management's failure to provide appropriate oversight by clear communication of the expectations for control of plant parameters, represents a significant regulatory concern. Therefore, the violation is classified at Severity Level III in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions " (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
In addition to the failure to take adequate corrective actions to preclude the overfill event, other instances of failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality were identified, which could have resulted in degradation or inoperability of safety-related equipment. These findings are described in Sections I.B, I.C, and I.D of the enclosed Notice. For example, between 1991 and 1996, the RCIC turbine lube oil cooler PCV was failed open, resulting in the downstream piping and lube oil cooler being routinely exposed to operating pressures above the design pressure of 150 psig. During the 5 year period, you depended upon a downstream relief valve for pressure control. Other failures included not identifying debris in the downcomers at Unit 2, as well as a deficiency with the Unit 2 control room chillers. Failure to promptly identify and correct conditions which could degrade safety equipment also represents a significant regulatory concern; and, therefore, the three violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
The violations described in Section II of the enclosed Notice relate to inadequate design control at your facility and indicate significant weaknesses in your engineering programs. Lack of rigor in technical evaluations, personnel errors, and lack of management oversight and verification led to questionable design decisions for safety-related MOVs, long-standing deficient conditions (RCIC and CR chillers), and incorrect equipment modifications (RCIC orifice). With respect to the MOV issue, at the time of the inspection, you were using motor-actuator run efficiency in calculations used to estimate the ability of high pressure core spray (HPCS), RCIC, and containment spray MOVs to overcome pressure locking forces. The use of run efficiency in this case represented a deviation from the guidelines published by the motor-actuator manufacturer. At the conference you contended that the use of motor-actuator run efficiency (in lieu of pull-out efficiency) in the short duration unwedging portion of the opening stroke may have been acceptable. Notwithstanding the qualitative merits of the discussion, the limited nature of the data makes it insufficient for the purpose of design input. Therefore, uncertainty exists as to whether the unmodified valves would have functioned in a pressure locking condition. Further NRC review is not warranted since the valves have been modified.
In any case, we concluded that at the time of the inspection, the use of motor-actuator run efficiency in lieu of pull-out efficiency was not adequately validated. The NRC is concerned that, had the inspectors not raised this issue during the inspection, the calculations would not have been revised and the valves would not have been modified. Failure of the HPCS and RCIC discharge valves to open due to pressure locking could have made the high pressure injection function unavailable in an accident situation. Additionally, with respect to design control, an incorrect trip setpoint for the CR chillers led to the chillers being inoperable, contrary to the Technical Specifications and calculation errors could have led to degradation of the RCIC system. Failure to have sufficient controls in place to ensure that design functions are performed correctly, including verifying the adequacy of the design, is indicative of a programmatic problem; therefore, these four violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for each Severity Level III violation or problem1. Since Nine Mile Point has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years,2 the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy for each of the Severity Level III issues. Although you identified the WR level indication deviation/event report that was not dispositioned adequately, the NRC identified the remainder of the corrective action problems. Therefore, credit was not warranted for Identification for either of the Severity Level III issues related to corrective actions in Section I. With respect to the design control problem, the NRC identified three of the four violations; therefore, credit was not warranted for Identification for the Severity Level III design control problem.
With respect to Corrective Action, credit was not warranted for the corrective action violation associated with the November 1996 overfill event because despite though your staff having provided training on high RPV level events and reinforced management expectations for control of RPV water level, you did not address the broader aspects of the operator performance problems as discussed above. Credit was warranted for Corrective Action for the other corrective action problem and the design control problem, because subsequent to identification of the issues by NRC inspectors, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) initiated prompt and comprehensive corrective actions. These corrective actions, which were discussed during your presentation at the conference, included, but were not limited to: (1) revising your corrective action program, including establishing qualification requirements for personnel who perform root cause evaluations; (2) revising procedures and guidelines to incorporate lessons learned from the various problems and reinforcing the lessons learned with plant personnel; and (3) reviewing related items, such as calculations and trip setpoints, to identify similar problems.
Therefore, to emphasize the importance of identification and correction of significant conditions adverse to quality, quality design control, and appropriate management oversight of all areas of licensed activities, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) in the total amount of $200,000 (a penalty of $100,000 (twice the base) for the corrective action violation associated with the overfill event and a base penalty of $50,000 for each of the other Severity Level III problems).
With respect to the RCIC lube oil cooler PCV, the NRC identified the design control and corrective action violations after your staff had determined, in July 1996, that a safety evaluation to determine that the change did not involve an unreviewed safety question should have been performed when the PCV was left in the failed open position, a condition contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Since the failure to perform the safety evaluation, contrary to 10 CFR 50.59, was identified by your staff and corrective action was taken by restoring the valve to a configuration consistent with the UFSAR, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
Also, another apparent violation listed in the engineering inspection report, namely a violation of 10 CFR 50.71 for failure to update the UFSAR to reflect that the RCIC lube oil PCV valve type had been changed prior to initial startup in 1987, is considered a minor violation and is being treated as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section IV of the Enforcement Policy. Additionally, the NRC has determined that the concerns about RCIC operability and the procedure for drywell closeout that were discussed at the enforcement conference did not constitute violations of NRC requirements.
The NRC is still considering escalated action regarding the deficiencies identified with the implementation of your maintenance rule program at Unit 1 that were discussed at the enforcement conference. Enforcement action for these violations will be covered by separate correspondence at a later date.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
Hubert J. Miller
Docket Nos. 50-220; 50-410
License Nos. DPR-63; NPF-69
Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties
R. Abbott, Vice President & General Manager - Nuclear
C. Terry, Vice President- Safety Assessment and Support
M. McCormick, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
N. Rademacher, Unit 1 Plant Manager
J. Conway, Unit 2 Plant Manager
D. Wolniak, Manager, Licensing
J. Warden, New York Consumer Protection Branch
G. Wilson, Senior Attorney
M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strawn
J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation
Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
C. Donaldson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law
J. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.
P. Eddy, Power Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
F. Valentino, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) Docket Nos. 50-220/50-410
Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2 License Nos.DPR-63/NPF-69
EA Nos. 96-474; 96-475;
During three separate NRC inspections conducted between October 7 and November 30, 1996 for which several exit meetings were held (the last of which was on December 20, 1996), violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
I. Violations Related to Corrective Actions
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and that corrective actions are taken to preclude recurrence.
A. Contrary to the above, as of November 5, 1996, measures were not established to assure a condition adverse to quality, namely, potential overfill of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel (RPV), was promptly identified and corrected despite several opportunities to do so, as evidenced by the following examples. Specifically:
1. Following a reactor scram on November 5, 1996, the system for overfill protection failed to prevent FW injection on high water level due to leakage past the FW flow control valve. Additionally, the procedure for response to a reactor scram (N1-SOP-1, Revision 5) did not provide direction to verify that the overfill automatic protective actions occurred nor direction to take manual action if those actions did not occur, and training did not reinforce the actions necessary to prevent an overfill event.
2. Deviation/event report (DER) 1-92-3353 was initiated on August 27, 1992, to document that the wide range reactor water level indication read lower than expected during power operations. The condition was evaluated to be acceptable and it was determined that no equipment modifications were required. However, the corrective action was deficient because the operators in the control room were not made aware of the discrepancy to ensure correct interpretation of RPV level indication so as to prevent an overfill event.
3. On July 29, 1996, following a Unit 1 normal plant shutdown with a manual reactor scram, the operators allowed RPV water level to remain above the high level setpoint (95 inches) for approximately 15 minutes before taking action to lower level, a condition adverse to quality. Subsequent to the shutdown, the licensee's corrective actions were narrowly focused in that training was provided and procedure changes were made to address the assumed cause of the high level, but no action was taken to identify why the operators did not recognize the need to take prompt action to restore level to less than 95 inches, as specified by N1-SOP-1.
As a result, operators allowed FW injection to continue for approximately 50 minutes when FW injection was not stopped automatically after the high level trip setpoint was exceeded due to leakage past the FW flow control valves following a scram on November 5, 1996. As a result, approximately 30,000 gallons of water entered the main steam lines. (01013)
Violation I.A is a Severity Level III violation. (Supplement I)
Civil Penalty - $100,000.
B. Contrary to the above, prior to September 1996, measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the pressure control valve (2ICS*PCV115) for the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine lube oil cooler was failed in the open position on January 26, 1991. However, this failure, constituted a condition adverse to quality because the downstream piping and lube oil cooler were routinely operated above their design pressure of 150 psig. This resulted in system degradation and could have adversely affected the RCIC operability. This condition adverse to quality was not corrected until September, 1996. (02013)
C. Contrary to the above, prior to August 14, 1996, measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, in 1992, NMPC reviewed the control room chiller condenser water low flow trip setpoint following cancellation of Modification PN2Y87MX057 and concluded that the setpoint was conservative. In September 1995, the Unit 2 Division II control room chiller tripped twice due to low condenser flow concurrent with the start of the emergency diesel generator (EDG). The evaluation of these events and the 1992 review failed to recognize that, in response to a postulated design basis condition, the EDGs are expected to start, resulting in service water pressure and flow transients; and that sufficient margin was not provided for the control room chiller low flow trip setpoint to compensate for these transients. This constituted a condition adverse to quality because the CR chillers could trip following a postulated design basis accident. As a result of the narrowly focused evaluations, the licensee did not identify this condition adverse to quality until August 14, 1996. (02023)
D. Contrary to the above, prior to October 1996, measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, while cleaning the Unit 2 suppression pool during a refueling outage (RF04) in 1995, NMPC recognized and documented in a deviation/event report (DER) that most of the foreign material removed from the suppression pool must have entered through the downcomers. Despite this recognition, NMPC did not examine the downcomers. As a result of this failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality, a significant amount of debris was left in the downcomer from June 1995 until October 1996. The foreign material could have adversely affected the performance of the emergency core cooling system pumps by clogging the suction strainers. (02033)
Violations I.B, I.C, and I.D are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - $50,000.
II. Violations Related to Design Control
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design basis for structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, and procedures. These measures shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled. The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews. Design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design.
The NMPC Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR), Section B.3, states that station modifications are accomplished in accordance with approved designs and procedures. The design controls apply to preparation, review and revision of design documents, including the correct translation of applicable regulatory requirements and design bases into those documents.
Nuclear Engineering Procedure NEP-DES-340, "Design Calculations," Step 2.1, requires the discipline supervisor to review calculation assumptions, and the validity of their application. Step 2.3 requires the calculation reviewer to check the calculation assumptions.
A. Contrary to the above, as of October 11, 1996, regulatory requirements and design basis were not correctly translated into specifications, and calculation assumptions were not reviewed at Unit 2. Specifically, NMPC did not adequately verify or check the adequacy of design for motor-operated valves 2CHS*MOV107, 2ICS*MOV126, 2RHS*MOV25A, and 2RHS*MOV25B in the high pressure core spray, RCIC, and containment spray systems. Motor-actuator run efficiency was utilized as a design input without verifying the validity of the application. Consequently, the functionality of the valves under design-basis pressure locking conditions was not adequately assured. (03013)
B. Contrary to the above, as of November 1, 1996, regulatory requirements and design basis were not correctly translated into specifications, and calculation assumptions were not reviewed at Unit 2. Specifically, the calculation entitled "RCIC pump cooler differential pressure evaluation", dated June 15, 1992, was incorrect in that it did not include the suction pressure of the RCIC pump when calculating the downstream pressure of 2ICS*PCV115, assuming the relief valve failed to open. Also, this calculation was not reviewed by the discipline supervisor. The calculation was used as the basis for two operability determinations for the RCIC system dated June 16, 1992, and August 24, 1993. As a result of the incorrect calculation, the operability determinations incorrectly concluded that the downstream pressure would not exceed the hydrostatic test pressure for the piping if the relief valve failed to open. Consequently, the RCIC system was operated with 2ICS*PCV115 failed open which had the potential to exceed the design of the system if the relief valve failed to open. (03023)
C. Contrary to the above, as of November 1, 1996, regulatory requirements and design basis were not correctly translated into specifications, and calculation assumptions were not reviewed at Unit 2. Specifically, calculation A10.1-H-005 dated September 23, 1996, used an incorrect pressure input in determining the required size for the RCIC turbine lube oil cooler restricting orifice (2ICS*RO207). The independent review and the station operation review committee review failed to identify the incorrect design input. As a result, when 2ICS*RO207 was rebored in support of the design change to replace 2ICS*PCV115, the resulting orifice size was too small. With the incorrect orifice size, the RCIC turbine lube oil cooler and its associated piping could be operated at a pressure exceeding their design pressure and the relief valve could continuously lift during RCIC operation. (03033)
D. Contrary to the above, as of August 14, 1996, regulatory requirements and design basis were not correctly translated into specifications, and calculation assumptions were not reviewed at Unit 2. Specifically, a 1988 setpoint calculation for the low condenser flow trip of the control room chillers, had failed to consider the effects of the service water pressure and flow transients that would be expected to occur when the EDGs started following a postulated design basis accident. As a result, when the setpoint change was implemented in 1989, the low flow trip setpoint was set excessively high. This resulted in both control room chillers being inoperable, contrary to Technical Specification 3.7.3 which requires two independent control room chiller subsystems to be operable when the plant is in operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and when irradiated fuel is being handled in the reactor building, during core alterations, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel and uncovering irradiated fuel. With the excessively high setpoint, the control room chillers could have inadvertently tripped when the EDGs started following a postulated design basis accident rendering them unable to perform their intended safety function without operator action. (03043)
Violations II.A - II.D are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - $50,000.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil penalties.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently have been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.
Dated at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
this 10th day of April, 1997
1 While the existing base amount for a Severity Level III violation was increased to $55,000 on November 12, 1996, the base amount being issued in the case $50,000 since the violations occurred prior to the date of the base civil penalty amount increase.
2 A $80,000 civil penalty was issued on August 23, 1996 (EA 96-116) and a $50,000 civil penalty was issued on June 18, 1996 (EA 96-079).
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