United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9803040316

Paul H. Kinkel

Vice President

                                             February 17, 1998

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

Indian Point Station                    Re:  Indian Point Unit No. 2

Broadway & Bleakley Avenue                   Docket No. 50-247

Buchanan, NY 10511

Telephone (914) 734-5340

Fax: (914) 734-5923

Document Control Desk

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mail Station P1-137

Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:  10 CFR Part 21 Written Notification

On January 14, 1998, Con Edison provided the initial notification of a

condition at Indian Point Unit No. 2 which we determined to be reportable

under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.  The reported condition

involved several safety-related 480 Volt, Type DB-50 breakers that were

sent to an approved 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, qualified vendor for overhaul.

These breakers were returned to Indian Point Unit No. 2 and found to be

outside of the manufacturer's specified tolerances.  The requirements of

10 CFR 21.21(d)(4) identify specific information to be included in a

written notification following the initial notice.  That information is

provided in the attachment to this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr.

Charles W.  Jackson, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing.

                                        Very truly yours,

CC:  Mr. Hubert J. Miller

     Regional Administrator - Region I

     US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

     475 Allendale Road

     King of Prussia, PA 19406

     Mr. Jefferey F. Harold, Project Manager

     Project Directorate I-1

     Division of Reactor Projects I/II

     US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

     Mail Stop 14B-2

     Washington, DC 20555

     Senior Resident Inspector

     US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

     PO Box 38

     Buchanan, NY 10511


         Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 480 Volt Breaker Overhaul Work

The following information is provided as required by 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(4).

(i)       Name and address of individual informing the Commission.

          Paul H. Kinkel, Vice President - Nuclear Power

          Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

          Indian Point Unit No. 2

          Broadway and Bleakley Ave.

          Buchanan, NY 10511

(ii)      Identification of the basic component which contains a defect.

          Component:     480 Volt Breaker

                         Breakers - CCP 2051-002 -     component cooling

                                                       pump breaker

                         AFP-CSP 2008-005 -            auxiliary

                                                       feedwater or

                                                       containment spray

                                                       pump breaker

                              CRF 2035-004 -           containment

                                                       recirculation fan


          Model:         Type DB-50

(iii)     Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which

          contains a defect.

          Nuclear Logistics, Inc.

          7461 Airport Freeway

          Ft. Worth, Texas 76118

(iv)      Nature of the defect and the safety hazard which could be

          created by such a defects.

          In late July 1997, three DB-50 breakers were sent by Con Edison

          to National Switchgear Systems, Inc.  (NSSI) for overhaul under

          the super-vision of Nuclear Logistics, Inc.  (NLI).  These

          breakers were originally manufactured by Westinghouse.  When

          these breakers were returned following overhaul in late

          September 1997, anomalies were found during the performance of

          Station Preventive Maintenance Procedure (PM) BRK-B-002A,

          Revision 12.  These anomalies are described below:

          1.   Breaker CCP 2051-002 had a jumper missing that prevented

               the breaker alarm switch from being reset from the Central

               Control Room (CCR).  This jumper was missed when it was

               disconnected during the final check of the auxiliary

               switches and was not reconnected.  This missing jumper

               would not have prevented the breaker from performing its

               intended functions, but it would not have permitted

               resetting the alarm switch from the CCR to re-establish

               the breaker closing circuit.  An operator would have to be

               dispatched to the 480 VAC Room to manually reset the alarm

               switch for the breaker to close upon the next close



         Nuclear Logistics, Inc. 480 Volt Breaker Overhaul Work

          2.   While manually closing Breakers AFP-CSP 2008-005 and CRT

               2035-004, intermittent binding of the breaker roller

               bearing was found.  The intermittent binding of the roller

               bearing occurred when the roller bearing jammed as the

               breaker was manually closed but then dropped when the

               breaker was tripped.  This binding became more consistent

               as the breaker was manually exercised.  The bearing outer

               surface was found to be scored, indicating unusual wear.

               Although this roller bearing anomaly did not affect the

               electrical operation of the breaker, this anomaly could

               affect the manual tripping of the breaker.

          3.   The left side A phase "G" gap of Breaker AFP-CSP 2008-005

               was measured at 0.100", which was greater than the 0.050"

               to 0.093 " tolerance as specified by the breaker

               manufacturer.  The right side A phase "G" gap was measured

               at 0.065", which was within specified tolerance.  When

               this breaker was inspected at NLI, the "as-left"

               measurement was 0.082" for both the right and the left

               side, which was within specification.  This excessive gap

               would have resulted in an increased force being exerted on

               the arc and main contacts in closing the breaker.

               However, the breaker manufacturer indicated that the gap

               would have to be significantly higher to prevent the

               breaker from closing.  Although the "G" gaps can vary

               slightly with cycling of the breaker, this variation can

               not account for a 0.018 change.

          A Con Edison Quality Assurance surveillance report, performed

          after the anomalies were discovered during the Station PM's,

          identified several discrepancies (missing signatures) in NLI's

          inspection documentation that may have compromised the NLI

          independent review and led to the discovered breaker anomalies.



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