Part 21 Report - 1998-021

ACCESSION #: 9712240281 RGE AND E ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001 AREA CODE 716 546-2700 ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nuclear Operations December 22, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Facsimile Number 301-816-5151 Telephone Number 301-816-5100 Subject: Initial Notification of 10 CFR Part 21 Defect R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, Section 21 (d) (3) (i), which requires "Initial notification by facsimile", the enclosed initial notification is provided. Written notification, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), will be provided by January 16, 1998. Very truly yours, Robert C. Mecredy Enclosures PAGE 2 10CFR21 INITIAL FACSIMILE NOTIFICATION I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION: NAME: Robert C. Mecredy Vice President Nuclear Operations Group ADDRESS: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT: The facility is the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The basic component is the shunt trip coil an the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Supply Breaker to Bus 16. This breaker is a Westinghouse DB-75 breaker and the Ginna equipment identification number is EIN 52/EG1B1. III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT: The shunt trip coil was supplied by: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems Switchgear Division 700 Braddock Avenue East Pittsburgh, PA 15112 IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY: The plunger of the assembly-shunt trip coil was binding. The bound plunger was not returning to its deenergized position. This maintained the breaker tripper bar in the trip free position and prevented the DB-75 circuit breaker from closing. PAGE 3 Testing of the "B" EDG Supply Breaker to Bus 16 was performed during the 1997 outage. The breaker failed to close. The breaker could not be closed electrically or manually with the tripper bar in the trip free position. This failure would prevent the "B" EDG from supplying power to the safeguards loads on Bus 16. This is considered a major degradation since, in conjunction with a single failure on the redundant train, required safety functions could not be performed. V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY WAS OBTAINED: The information was obtained on November 14, 1997. VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION: There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers permanently installed at Ginna Station, in safeguards buses 14 and 16. One of the-se breakers is manually operated and the shunt trip coil is not used. In addition, there is one spare DB-75 breaker in stock. The 52/EG1B1 breaker is the only DB-75 breaker that has had the shunt trip coil replaced. The replacement shunt trip coil that failed was one of ten purchased in 1977 as spares. VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION: Corrective action is complete. The failed shunt trip coil was replaced with a spare from stock. The assembly was manually and electrically bench tested. The remaining eight assemblies in stock were inspected. Two assemblies had coil plungers that did not fully return to the deenergized position during manual manipulation. These were removed from stock. The other DE-75 breakers were visually inspected. Acceptable plunger movement is indicated by adequate plunger to tripper bar gap and full retraction of the alarm switch attachment push rod, No additional binding concerns were found. PAGE 4 VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES: Receipt inspection could verify acceptable plunger movement. During DB-75 breaker maintenance, consider verifying that the shunt trip coil plunger moves freely in the coil assembly. GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER EVENT NUMBER: 33442 LICENSEE: ROCHESTER GAS ELECTRIC CORP NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/22/97 CITY: ROCHESTER REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:10 [ET] COUNTY: STATE: NY EVENT DATE: 11/14/97 LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST] DOCKET: LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/22/97 NOTIFICATIONS JAMES NOGGLE RDO NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN ST. MARTEN VERN HODGE NRR HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH EVENT TEXT PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SHUNT TRIP COILS THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A WESTINGHOUSE DB - 75 BREAKER THAT WAS FAILING TO CLOSE. THE PLUNGER OF THE SHUNT TRIP COIL ASSEMBLY WAS BINDING, MAINTAINING THE BREAKER TRIPPER BAR IN THE TRIP FREE POSITION. THE LICENSEE HAS SEVEN DB-75 BREAKERS ON SITE, ONLY ONE HAD THE PROBLEM DESCRIBED. THE BREAKER WITH THE FAILED SHUNT TRIP COIL IS THE ONLY ONE TO HAVE HAD THAT PART PREVIOUSLY REPLACED. THE REPLACEMENT SHUNT TRIP COIL THAT FAILED WAS ONE OF TEN PURCHASED IN 1977 AS SPARES. THE FAILED SHUNT TRIP COIL WAS REPLACED WITH A SPARE FROM STOCK. THE REMAINING EIGHT ASSEMBLIES IN STOCK WERE INSPECTED. TWO ASSEMBLIES HAD COIL PLUNGERS THAT DID NOT FULLY RETURN TO THE DEENERGIZED POSITION DURING MANUAL MANIPULATION. THESE WERE REMOVED FROM STOCK. LICENSEE RECOMMENDS RECEIPT INSPECTION TO VERIFY ACCEPTABLE PLUNGER MOVEMENT AND ALSO VERIFYING THAT THE SHUNT TRIP COIL PLUNGER MOVES FREELY IN THE COIL ASSEMBLY DURING BREAKER MAINTENANCE. *** END OF DOCUMENT ***

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021