Part 21 Report - 1998-021
ACCESSION #: 9712240281
RGE AND E
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER,
14649-0001 AREA CODE 716 546-2700
ROBERT C. MECREDY
December 22, 1997
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Facsimile Number 301-816-5151
Telephone Number 301-816-5100
Subject: Initial Notification of 10 CFR Part 21 Defect
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance, Section 21 (d) (3) (i), which requires "Initial
notification by facsimile", the enclosed initial notification is
provided. Written notification, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21,
Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), will be provided by January 16, 1998.
Very truly yours,
Robert C. Mecredy
10CFR21 INITIAL FACSIMILE NOTIFICATION
I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:
NAME: Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President Nuclear Operations Group
ADDRESS: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC
COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR
CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The facility is the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The basic
component is the shunt trip coil an the "B" Emergency Diesel
Generator (EDG) Supply Breaker to Bus 16. This breaker is a
Westinghouse DB-75 breaker and the Ginna equipment
identification number is EIN 52/EG1B1.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR
SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR
The shunt trip coil was supplied by:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
700 Braddock Avenue
East Pittsburgh, PA 15112
IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY
WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE
The plunger of the assembly-shunt trip coil was binding. The
bound plunger was not returning to its deenergized position.
This maintained the breaker tripper bar in the trip free
position and prevented the DB-75 circuit breaker from closing.
Testing of the "B" EDG Supply Breaker to Bus 16 was performed
during the 1997 outage. The breaker failed to close. The
breaker could not be closed electrically or manually with the
tripper bar in the trip free position. This failure would
prevent the "B" EDG from supplying power to the safeguards
loads on Bus 16. This is considered a major degradation since,
in conjunction with a single failure on the redundant train,
required safety functions could not be performed.
V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:
The information was obtained on November 14, 1997.
VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR
FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH
IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:
There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers permanently installed
at Ginna Station, in safeguards buses 14 and 16. One of the-se
breakers is manually operated and the shunt trip coil is not
used. In addition, there is one spare DB-75 breaker in stock.
The 52/EG1B1 breaker is the only DB-75 breaker that has had the
shunt trip coil replaced. The replacement shunt trip coil that
failed was one of ten purchased in 1977 as spares.
VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE
TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE
TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:
Corrective action is complete. The failed shunt trip coil was
replaced with a spare from stock. The assembly was manually
and electrically bench tested.
The remaining eight assemblies in stock were inspected. Two
assemblies had coil plungers that did not fully return to the
deenergized position during manual manipulation. These were
removed from stock.
The other DE-75 breakers were visually inspected. Acceptable
plunger movement is indicated by adequate plunger to tripper
bar gap and full retraction of the alarm switch attachment push
rod, No additional binding concerns were found.
VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT
FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING,
OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:
Receipt inspection could verify acceptable plunger movement.
During DB-75 breaker maintenance, consider verifying that the
shunt trip coil plunger moves freely in the coil assembly.
GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER EVENT NUMBER: 33442
LICENSEE: ROCHESTER GAS ELECTRIC CORP NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/22/97
CITY: ROCHESTER REGION: 1 NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:10 [ET]
COUNTY: STATE: NY EVENT DATE: 11/14/97
LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST]
DOCKET: LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/22/97
JAMES NOGGLE RDO
NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN ST. MARTEN VERN HODGE NRR
HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER
EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE
10 CFR SECTION:
CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SHUNT TRIP COILS
THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A WESTINGHOUSE DB - 75 BREAKER THAT WAS
TO CLOSE. THE PLUNGER OF THE SHUNT TRIP COIL ASSEMBLY WAS BINDING,
MAINTAINING THE BREAKER TRIPPER BAR IN THE TRIP FREE POSITION. THE
LICENSEE HAS SEVEN DB-75 BREAKERS ON SITE, ONLY ONE HAD THE PROBLEM
DESCRIBED. THE BREAKER WITH THE FAILED SHUNT TRIP COIL IS THE ONLY
TO HAVE HAD THAT PART PREVIOUSLY REPLACED. THE REPLACEMENT SHUNT
COIL THAT FAILED WAS ONE OF TEN PURCHASED IN 1977 AS SPARES.
THE FAILED SHUNT TRIP COIL WAS REPLACED WITH A SPARE FROM STOCK. THE
REMAINING EIGHT ASSEMBLIES IN STOCK WERE INSPECTED. TWO ASSEMBLIES
COIL PLUNGERS THAT DID NOT FULLY RETURN TO THE DEENERGIZED POSITION
DURING MANUAL MANIPULATION. THESE WERE REMOVED FROM STOCK.
LICENSEE RECOMMENDS RECEIPT INSPECTION TO VERIFY ACCEPTABLE
MOVEMENT AND ALSO VERIFYING THAT THE SHUNT TRIP COIL PLUNGER MOVES
IN THE COIL ASSEMBLY DURING BREAKER MAINTENANCE.
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