United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment


ACCESSION #: 9609100105

                       LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)



FACILITY NAME:  SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 2           PAGE: 1 OF 4



DOCKET NUMBER:  05000311



TITLE:  Inoperable Battery Chargers Due To Manufacturing

        Discrepancies



EVENT DATE:  07/29/96   LER #:  96-008-00   REPORT DATE:  08/24/96



OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED:  Salem Unit 1            DOCKET NO:  05000272



OPERATING MODE:  N   POWER LEVEL:  000



THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR

SECTION:

50.73(a)(2)(iv)

50.73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHER:  Part 21



LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:

NAME:  Dennis V. Hassler, LER Coordinator   TELEPHONE:  (609)-339-1989



COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:

CAUSE:  B   SYSTEM:  EJ   COMPONENT:  BYC  MANUFACTURER:  C127

REPORTABLE NPRDS:  Y



SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED:  NO



ABSTRACT:



On July 27, 1996, while trouble shooting wiring discrepancies during

pre-installation testing of the 2A2 125V DC Battery Charger {EJ/BYC} (C&D

Charter Power Company model ARR130H300F), a terminal block screw ejected

from its terminal.  Subsequent inspection of the other newly installed

battery chargers on Unit 2 as well as other battery chargers awaiting

installation for Unit 1 revealed a number of discrepancies.  Based upon

these discrepancies, on July 29, 1996, all remaining Unit 2 battery

chargers were maintained available, but were declared to be inoperable

due to concerns about seismic qualification.  The replacement Unit 1

battery chargers remained in storage.  There was no impact on Unit 1 as a

result of the battery charger discrepancies.



The apparent cause of the discrepancies identified is poor workmanship

during manufacturing and shipping damage.



This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), any

condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety

function for structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the

consequences of an accident and in accordance with 10 CFR

50.73(a)(2)(vii), any event where a single cause or condition caused at

two independent trains to become inoperable in a single system designed

to mitigate the consequences of an accident.



This event is also reportable per 10 CFR 21.2(c).



END OF ABSTRACT



TEXT                                                          PAGE 2 OF 4



PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION



Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor



125 VDC Power System - Class 1E/Battery Charger {EJ/BYC}*_/



*_/Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component

function identifier codes appear as (SS/CCC)



CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE



At the time of identification, Salem Units 1 and 2 were shutdown and

defueled.



DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE



On July 27, 1996, while trouble shooting wiring discrepancies identified

during pre-installation testing of the High Voltage Shutdown (HVSD) Board

on the newly installed 2A2 125V DC Battery Charger {EJ/BYC} (C&D Charter

Power Company model ARR130H300F), the HVSD board terminal block (-) DC

terminal screw ejected from its terminal.  Subsequent inspection of the

other newly installed battery chargers on Unit 2 as well as other battery

chargers awaiting installation for Unit 1 revealed a number of

discrepancies.  On July 29, 1996, all remaining Unit 2 battery chargers

were maintained available, but were declared to be inoperable due to

concerns about seismic qualification.  The replacement Unit 1 battery

chargers remained in storage.  There was no impact on Unit 1 as a result

of the battery charger discrepancies since the Unit 1 chargers are a

different design.



The discrepancies listed below represent a general list of manufacturing

deficiencies found in these safety related pieces of equipment:



     o    broken welded mounting brackets for the filter choke and DC

          Capacitor assembly



     o    loose and/or missing mounting bolts on the transformers



     o    strands of wires not properly soldered



     o    loose wire terminations



     o    plastic lock-in standoff tabs broken and not locking circuit

          boards in place



     o    stressed breaker terminations due to cable routing



     o    insufficient terminal screw length for 3 lug connections



     o    loose DC breaker mounting bolts



     o    bad solder connections for various wires



     o    frame ground for various components not clean to steel



     o    terminal strips missing brass cover screw and/or cover rings



     o    stressed wire terminations due to wire routing



     o    damaged AC breaker due to stressed terminations



TEXT                                                          PAGE 3 OF 4



CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE



The apparent cause of the discrepancies identified is poor workmanship

during manufacturing and shipping damage.



PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES



LER 272/96-009-00, Potential Common Mode Failure for 4KV Magne-Blast

Breakers, documented a potential common mode failure due to misalignment

of breaker mechanisms and internals that was undetected by the overhaul

vendor (Nuclear Logistics Inc.).  The corrective actions included

correction of the misalignment and revised breaker testing methods.



LER 272/96-014-00, Potential Hydrogen Embrittlement on 4KV Breaker Parts,

documents defective parts created by incorrect overhaul practices of a

qualified vendor.  The corrective actions included refurbishment of

affected breakers and a stop work order issued to the overhaul vendor

(Nuclear Logistics Inc.).



SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS



The 125V DC battery system for Salem Station Unit 2 consists of three

125V DC battery sets, each of which has a primary and alternate battery

charger.  Each charger maintains a floating charge on its associated

battery, and is capable of supplying the required equalizing charge when

necessary.  During normal operation, the DC load is fed from the battery

chargers with the batteries floating on the system.  Upon loss of DC

power from a battery charger, the DC load is drawn from the batteries.

The batteries are sized for 2 hours of operation after a loss of the

battery chargers, based upon required operation of the 125V DC emergency

equipment.



The 125V DC busses supply power to the 125V DC Control Power System.

This system provides power to the medium and high voltage breaker

controls; 480V AC pressurizer heater circuit breakers; vital instrument

bus inverters; computer inverters, emergency lighting inverters;

alternate shutdown system; the Diesel Generator 125V DC distribution

panel; and various other 125V DC controls and instruments required for

safe shutdown of the reactor under transient and accident conditions.



Based on significant problems identified with all of the battery

chargers, there was no reasonable assurance that the battery chargers

would be operable following a seismic event.  For the current defueled

condition, the worst case postulated accident is a Loss of Spent Fuel

Pool Cooling for Unit 2.  Assuming a loss of all Unit 2 primary and

backup battery chargers following a seismic event, the two hours of

battery capacity provides time to restore vital buses if needed and

reestablish spent fuel pool cooling for Unit 2.  If spent fuel pool

cooling cannot be restored for Unit 2 due to a prolonged inability to

repower vital buses, procedures followed during a loss of spent fuel pool

cooling allow for the use of the Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system in

a cross connection with Unit 2.  Therefore, the implications for the

inoperability of the battery chargers were minimal and thus the health

and safety of the public was unaffected.



TEXT                                                          PAGE 4 OF 4



CORRECTIVE ACTIONS



1.   The Unit 2 battery chargers will be reworked to design

     specifications by September 15, 1996.



2.   The Unit 1 battery chargers will be reworked to design

     specifications prior to installation in Unit 1.  Testing will follow

     installation.



3.   PSE&G Nuclear Procurement and Materials Management is undertaking an

     investigation of common cause analysis for procurement concerns

     identified as a result of LER 272/96-009-00, LER 272/96-014-00, this

     LER, and a recent 10CFR21 report concerning defects found in NUS

     logic modules.  Further corrective actions will be taken as a result

     of the evaluation currently being conducted.  Significant corrective

     actions that affect the discussion in this LER, if any, will be

     reported in a supplement to this LER.



10CFR21 REPORTING



10CFR21 reporting is applicable to the defects found.



ATTACHMENT TO 9609100105                                      PAGE 1 OF 2



PSE&G



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge,

New Jersey 08038-0236



Nuclear Business Unit



                                        AUG 24 1996



                                        LR-N96265



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Document Control Desk

Washington, DC 20555



Gentlemen:



LER 311/96-008-00

SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75

DOCKET NO. 50-311



This Licensee Event Report entitled "Inoperable Battery Chargers Due To

Manufacturing Discrepancies" is being submitted pursuant to the

requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v),

10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii), and 10CFR21.2(c).



                                   Sincerely,



                                   David F. [illegible print]

                                   General Manager

                                   Salem Operations



Attachment



SORC Mtg. 96-114



JMO/tcp



C    Distribution

     LER File 3.7



The power is in your hands.

                                                        95-2168 REV. 6/94



ATTACHMENT TO 9609100105                                      PAGE 2 OF 2



Document Control Desk

LR-N96265



                              Attachment A



The following items represent the commitments that Public Service

Electric & Gas (PSE&G) made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

relative to this LER (311/96-008-00).  The commitments are as follows:



1.   The Unit 2 battery chargers will be reworked to design

     specifications by September 15, 1996.



2.   The Unit 1 battery chargers will be reworked to design

     specifications prior to installation in Unit 1.  Testing will follow

     installation.



3.   PSE&G Nuclear Procurement and Materials Management is undertaking an

     investigation of common cause analysis for procurement concerns

     identified as a result of LER 272/96-00900, LER 272/96-014-00, this

     LER, and a recent 10CFR21 report concerning defects found in NUS

     logic modules.  Further corrective actions will be taken as a result

     of the evaluation currently being conducted.  Significant corrective

     actions that affect the discussion in this LER, if any, will be

     reported in a supplement to this LER.



*** END OF DOCUMENT ***





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