Part 21 Report - 1996-130
ACCESSION #: 9511150379
ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION OF
4KV BREAKER SECONDARY
CONTACT BLOCK FAILURE
RCE 95-010
ATTACHMENT #1
ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION OF
4KV BREAKER SECONDARY
CONTACT BLOCK FAILURE
RCE 95-010
AUGUST 11, 1995
AUTHORED BY:
J. B. Riddle
Root Cause Engineer
M.S. Mostafa, PhD
Sr, Root Cause Engineer
REVIEWED BY:
W. W. Strom, Supervisor
Independent Safety Engineering
APPROVED BY:
A. J. Schramm, Manager
Safety Engineering
CLARIFICATION OF PURPOSE
This report is intended to be a self-critical use of hindsight to
identify all problems and the sources of those problems. The root causes
identified in this report were discovered and analyzed using all
information and results available at the time it was written. All such
information was, of course, not available during the timeframe in which
relevant actions were taken and decisions were made.
The purpose of using such a self-critical approach is to provide the most
comprehensive analysis possible for identifying "lessons learned" as a
basis for improving future performance. The use of an open, documented
self-critical analysis program is imperative in the nuclear power
industry and cannot be compromised or confused with a management prudency
assessment.
Thus, this report does not attempt to make a balanced judgement of the
prudency or reasonableness of any of the actions or decisions that were
taken by vendors, utility management, or individual personnel based on
the information that was known or available to them at the time.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EVIDENCE COLLECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
LABORATORY ANALYSIS AND TESTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER SUSCEPTIBLE ITEMS. . . . . . . . . . . 13
OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10 CFR 21 EVALUATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
PHOTODOCUMENTATION
ATTACHMENT I - CONTACTOR APPLICATION SCHEMATICS
ATTACHMENT II - VENDOR DATA
ATTACHMENT III - METALLURGICAL REFERENCE
ATTACHMENT IV - HARDNESS TEST AND MATERIAL ANALYSIS
DATA
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At the return to service of Component Cooling Water Pump 3P026, on June
13, 1995, the control room had no indication from the breaker when the DC
was turned on. The subsequent investigation determined that an
electrical contact finger had broken in the stationary secondary contact
block for the 4KV breaker in 3A0605.
Laboratory analysis of the failed contact block and three other contact
blocks of the same vintage revealed that the root cause of failure was
the use of hardened, brittle brass material in the manufacturing of the
contact fingers. Cracks and work hardening were induced in the finger
bends during fabrication. Mechanical cycling during removal and
insertion of the breaker further hardened the material eventually causing
an overload fracture.
The corrective actions for this event are identified as follows:
-Provide an operability assessment for the affected Safety Related
trains.
-Issue NCR's against each Class 1E 4KV Switchgear with operability
requiring checking of proper functioning after racking in the
breaker.
-Ordered replacement Class 1E contact blocks from ABB with
verification that the strips meet the current specification which is
a softer material and not susceptible to cracking.
-Replace all Class 1E Unit 3 Train A contact blocks during the Unit
3 Cycle 8 outage in July/August 1995 and evaluate the removed
contact blocks for-cracking problems.
-Replace Class 1E Unit 2 Train A and B and Unit 3 Train B contact
blocks during scheduled online equipment outages with full
replacement complete no later then the end of the U2/3, Cycle 9
outage.
-Sent failed contact block to ABB for Part 21 evaluation.
5
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
BACKGROUND
At the return to service of Component Cooling Water Pump 3P026, on June
13, 1995, the control room had no indication from the breaker then the DC
was turned on. The subsequent investigation determined that a finger in
the stationary secondary contact assembly (referred hereafter as the
"contact block") for the 4KV breaker in 3A0605 had broken. The contact
block was removed and delivered to the Root Cause Group for failure
analysis and Root Cause Evaluation. Reference NCR 95060044 and MO
95060799001. The following NCR's were written to address the operability
of the Class 1E 4KV Switchgear:
NCR 95060065 Bus 2A04
NCR 95060069 Bus 2A06
NCR 95060070 Bus 3A04
NCR 95060071 Bus 3A06
The Busses are considered operable based on a seismic review,
verification of contact connection when the breaker is racked in, and the
fact that the fracturing of the contact block fingers only occurs when
racking in/out the breakers. A detailed discussion is in the operability
Assessment section of this report.
Three (3) additional contact blocks were supplied to support the
analysis. The first sample was a contact block from spare position
2A0602, removed under MO 95060832. The second sample was an unused
warehouse stock unit. The third sample was removed from the Salt Water
Cooling Pump 2P114, breaker location 2A0611, under MO 95061249. The
2P114 contact block was selected because there had been a relatively
large number of rack in/out cycles on the breaker. All three samples are
of the same manufacturing vintage as the failed unit.
6
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
EVIDENCE COLLECTION
The contact blocks were originally manufactured for ITE Metal-Clad 4KV
switchgear by Brown Boveri as part number 834838-T1. The material Code
for the block is 026-26208. The current vendor, ABB Power T&D Company,
was contacted and they have no history of problems with the contact
blocks. The specification sheet and Critical Characteristic Analysis for
the contact block fingers was obtained for correlation of the laboratory
analysis data. The specification sheets are in the attachments to this
report.
A review of maintenance history revealed only two (2) failures in 155
breakers in the past 15 years. This includes the current failure in
3A0605 and a failure in 1990 in 3A0606 documented in NCR 90090043. The
1990 failure was considered an isolated incident.
An NPRDS search revealed no records of failed contacts on ABB breakers.
Nine utilities with ABB 4KV breakers were contacted and they have not
experienced any problems with contact block finger breakage with the
exception of a contact finger failure at Waterford which was caused by
misalignment of the breaker when racking it in.
7
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
LABORATORY ANALYSIS AND TESTING
The contact fingers were arbitrarily numbered 1 through 12 to the
analysis. These contact numbers correspond to the electrical connection
numbering scheme in the following way:
Analysis Electrical
Numbering Numbering
1 5
2 7
3 13
4 14
5 3
6 1
7 6
8 9
9 10
10 15
11 4
12 2
3A0605 Contact Block
Preliminary examination of the 3A0605 contact block revealed that one of
the contact fingers ( #4) was fractured at the 90 degree bend at the
inside end of the long section. See Figures 1, 2 and 3. The four bends
in the contact fingers are designated A through D. See Figure 4. The
fracture and cracks on this contact block are at bend C. Cracks were
present in two other contact fingers (#9 & #10) at the same location.
See Figures 5 and 6.
Scanning Electron Microscope examination (SEM) of the fracture face on
contact 4 revealed a fresh intergranular fracture which is a sign of
embrittled material. See Figure 10. Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy
(EDS) of the contact finger surface revealed that it was silver plated.
See Figure 11. EDS of the base material revealed that it was 70% copper
and 30% zinc which is a 70/30 brass. See figures 12 and 13. No
contamination was present on or near the fracture surface.
8
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
The fractured area of contact 4 was mounted for metallurgical gross
sectioning and the sample was cross sectioned from the side into the base
metal. Microhardness testing.was performed on the base metal at bend B
and in the straight section between bend B and the fracture area at bend
C. The Rockwell Hardness, b scale at the bend was 91. The Rockwell
Hardness, b scale, in the Straight area was 71. This data indicates that
the bend area is hardened and embrittled in the bend area. All of the
Hardness testing data is in an Attachment to this report.
Optical microscope examination of the cross sectioned fracture area on
contact 4 revealed a grain structure indicative of Extra and temper. See
Figure 7. Intergranular cracks extended into the brass from the fracture
face. The fracture face was also along grain boundaries. Optical
microscopy of the cross section bend B revealed a small intergranular
crack in the inner diameter of the bend. The grain structure in the bend
area was characteristic of Extra Hard temper. See Figures 8 and 9. The
grain structure in the straight. area, away from the bend, was
characteristic of Hard temper.
The mechanical fatigue test was performed on the 3A0605 Contactor Block
to determine the number of insertion and removals were required to
fracture the cracked fingers. A fixture was fabricated with the mating
contacts to the same dimensions as on the breaker. Finger 12 fractured
on the thirty-second insertion in the fixture. The finger fractured
across the preexistent crack at bend C.
Optical Emission Spectrometry was Performed on samples from all 12
contact fingers. The analysis confirmed that the base material was 70/30
brass in all cases. The Current ABB specification for the contact
material is Alloy 230 which is an 35% copper, 15% zinc brass which is
less brittle than Alloy 260, 70% copper, 30% zinc. The material
specification was changed to alloy 230 in 1982. Information from the
vendor on the material specification prior to 1982 was not available.
9
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
2A0602 Spare Contact Block
Optical microscope inspection of the 2A0602 contact block revealed that
nine of the twelve contact fingers had cracks. The cracks were mostly on
the outer diameter of bend B and D. The inner diameter of the bends
could not be inspected until the fingers were removed.
The contact block was disassembled by mechanical means. First,
made to open bend D but four of the five fingers bend during this
process. It is significant that 10 was removed by opening the D bend and
the crack. It was decided that the most effective way fingers was to cut
them in half along the straight procedure keeps the bend areas intact for
analysis.
Contact 10 was subjected to several cycles of reverse bending at an
original bend area and no cracks developed. The finger was cross
sectioned. Examination of the microstructure revealed that the grain
structure in the straight area was characteristic of Half Hard temper and
the grain structure at the bend was characteristic of a less brittle
material and consequently less work hardening. See Figures 14 and 15.
Metallurgical examination of other fingers revealed the same Extra Hard
temper condition as on the failed contact block.
Microhardness testing on contact 7 revealed a Rockwell hardness, b scale,
of 72 and 94 on the straight and bent areas, respectively. Microhardness
testing on contact 10 revealed a Rockwell hardness, b scale, of 76 and 90
on the straight and bent areas, respectively. Note that the Hardness
numbers are similar for both contacts while contact 10 is significantly
more ductile as indicated in the microstructure. Microhardness is not a
sensitive indicator for slight variations in material temper.
10
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
Warehouse Contact Block
Optical microscope examination of the unused contact block obtained from
the warehouse revealed cracks at the outer diameter radius of the B bend
on all the contact fingers. The contact fingers were removed from the
block by sawing the fingers in half at the center of the straight
section. Inspection of the inner diameter of the bends revealed cracks
in all the samples at the B bend.
Contacts 7 and 8 were examined in the SEM to document the surface
cracks at bend B. See Figures 16 and 17. Both contacts were cross
sectioned to determine the depth of the cracks and the microstructure.
The inner diameter crack on contact 7 was deep, approximately one third
of the thickness of the contact. See Figures 18 and 19. The grain
structure at the bend was characteristic of Extra Hard temper and the
grain structure in the straight area is characteristic of Hard temper.
The cracks on contact 8 were shallower than those on contact 7. See
Figures 20 and 21. The grain structure at the bend was characteristic of
Extra Hard temper and the grain structure in the straight area is
characteristic of Hard temper.
Microhardness testing on three contacts revealed the following Rockwell
Hardness, b scale, data:
Contact straight area bend area
4 83 90
7 78.5 91.5
8 76 91.5
The material condition of the unused block is similar to that of the
failure and the spare block. The unused block from the warehouse is to
be of the same vintage as the blocks installed in the plant.
11
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
2A0611 Contact Block
The contact block was removed from the plant because it was installed on
Salt Water Cooling Pump P114 and is considered to have a large number of
insertion and removal cycles. See Figures 22 and 23.
Optical examination of the contact fingers revealed cracks on the outer
diameter of the B Bend on contacts 2, 5, 6 and 11. See Figures 24
through 27.
The contact block was cycled in the test fixture 500 times and the cracks
did not grow perceptibly. The test cycling was so extensive that the
silver plating was scraped off the brass fingers. This test demonstrated
that cracks in the fingers do not necessarily grow to fracture in the
short term.
New Contact Finger Material
In the process of reordering contact blocks for replacement of all unit 3
Train A applications during the U3C8 outage, a sample of twenty contact
finger bars were obtained from ABB. Elemental analysis of the bars
revealed that they were Alloy 230, 85% copper and 15% zinc in accordance
with the current ABB specification. The Rockwell b scale hardness was
found to be in the range of 40-60. According to the ASTM B36 Standard,
the material is in the Quarter Hard temper range which is less likely to
crack in the contact block application. Microstructural analysis
revealed that none of the fingers had cracks in the bend area and the
grain structure was characteristic of Quarter Hard in the straight area
and Half Hard in the bend area. See Figures 28 through 31. Based on
this analysis, production of the replacement contact blocks was
authorized.
12
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION
The root cause of the fracturing of the finger on the 3A0605 contact
block was improper material used in the finger construction. The 70/30
brass used in the older (Pre-1982) contact blocks is too brittle for the
application. Examination of the other contact blocks supports the
conclusion that cracks originate at the bends during fabrication due to
work hardening of the brass. The variation in material hardness accounts
for the degree of cracking and susceptibility to fracture during the
stress of removal and insertion of the associated 4KV breakers.
IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER SUSCEPTIBLE ITEMS
This type of connector is associated with 64 Class 1E 4KV breakers in 4
buses and 91 Non-1E breakers in 8 buses in Units 2 and 3. All of the
affected breakers have been identified by Station Technical.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW
As discussed in the Evidence Collection section of the report there were
no reports of failed contacts in ABB breakers in the NPRDS data base.
The manufacturer, ABB Power T&D Company, was contacted and they have no
records or recollection of fractured contact fingers.
Nine power plants, with the same kind of breakers, were contacted by
Station Technical. One contact failure event occurred at Waterford due
to breaker misalignment during rack in. Several other plants reported
breaking of the plastic frame due to breaker misalignment during rack in.
The plants contacted were Waterford, Vogtle, Catawba, Crystal River,
Limerick, Zion, Prairie Island, Hope Creek and Beaver Valley.
13
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
10CFR21 EVALUATION
ABB Power T&D Company of Sanford, Florida is currently analyzing contact
block finger material from SONGS and several other sources. As soon as
the testing and data gathering are complete, ABB currently intends to
issue a 10CFR Part 21 Report covering the broken and cracked contact
finders. If ABB does not issue a 10CFR Part 21 Report, than ISEG will
evaluate the need to write a 1CFR Part 21 Report on the defective contact
blocks discovered at SONGS.
OPERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Seismic Considerations
The control fingers are not stressed by a seismic event because the
control assembly is supported firmly by the circuit breaker and cubicle.
The circuit breaker is held in place firmly by its attachment to the bus
and cubicle. Therefore, the control fingers do not support any seismic
loads and fractures of the control fingers would not be caused by a
seismic event.
All 4kv breakers contain these stationary secondary contact blocks
which provide breaker control and indication.
The breakers are operable for the following reasons and under the
following conditions:
Operational Considerations
The secondary contact control fingers provide power for four different
functions. Control fingers 2 and 5 provide for the charging of the
breaker control spring. When the breaker is racked into the operate
position from the disconnected position, and the DC control power is
applied, the breaker control spring will be charged. This action is
quite noisy and readily apparent. If the breaker control spring has not
been
14
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
discharged, the charging spring motor will not be heard upon closing of
the DC control power. Spring charging can be verified after the first
breaker operation by either hearing the charging spring motor operate
(per above) or by viewing the "SPRING CHARGED CAUTION" tag through the
breaker viewing port in the lower right hand corner of the breaker
cubicle door. Caution tag is located at either bottom right or left
center of the circuit breakers front.
Control fingers 13 and 14 provide the green, circuit open indication.
This indication is received at the local cubicle door and in the control
room when the DC is turned on and the breaker open.
Control fingers 6 and 7 cause the breaker x y scheme to operate closing
the breaker.
Control fingers 9 and 10 (for all breakers except the Diesel Generator
breakers) provide the trip path and also provide the red indicating light
when the breaker is closed. Any time the breaker is closed the red light
performs the function of monitoring the breaker trip path. If the red
lights are on (when the breaker is closed) the trip path is operable.
For the diesel generator breakers, the red light does not monitor the
trip Coil. T-F the red light is on (with the breaker closed) then
contact fingers 14 (also used in green indicating lights) and 15 are
functioning properly. And, if the Diesel Generator circuit breaker trips
by operator control action at the end of its run, then secondary control
fingers 9 and 10 are operating properly.
Whenever a circuit breaker is returned to service, operations as a normal
routine, functions it to show operability of the equipment.
To determine that all 1E breakers presently racked into the operating
position have their control springs charged, station technical inspected
all breakers (through the sliding cubicle
15
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
door) on 2A04, 2A06, 3A04 and 3A06 at approximately 1100 hours on
6/21/95. Each breaker racked into the energized position had its control
spring charged.
Restricted Operability
1. Any time a breaker is racked out of the connected (racked in)
position, to be considered operable after having been returned to
the connected (racked in) position it must:
a. Verify charging spring charges when DC is applied to breaker
cubicle, or, if charging spring was not discharged, verify
spring is charged after the first operation by inspection (per
above) .
b. With the breaker open and DC power on, green indications lights
must be observed at the proper locations.
c. Close the breaker and observe red indicating lights at the
proper locations and the load is energized.
d. For the Diesel Generator Breakers only, red indicating lights
must be illuminated at the proper locations and the diesel
breaker must be tripped by operator control action at the end
of the appropriate diesel run.
16
RCE 95-010 August 11, 1995
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Non-Conformance Reports have been issued against each Class 1E 4KV
switchgear to require operability verification after the breaker is
racked in. These NCR's are NCR 95060065 for Bus 2A04, NCR 95060069 for
Bus 2A06, NCR 95060070 for Bus 3A04 and NCR 95060071 for Bus 3A06.
New contact blocks have been ordered from ABB to replace the blocks in
the plant. The contact finger material has been verified to be the
correct Quarter Hard 85/15 brass as discussed in the Laboratory Analysis
section of the report.
All of the contact blocks in Unit 3, Train A, will be replaced during the
U3C8 outage in July/August 1995. The tracking documents for this
activity are the above mentioned NCR's. An MO has been written for each
cubicle and each MO references the associated NCR. The removed contact
blocks will be evaluated by ISEG/RCG for the degree of cracking and the
results will be used to validate the overall replacement schedule.
All of the remaining old type contact blocks will be replaced in Unit 2
Train A and B and Unit 3 Train B during Scheduled Equipment outages with
all the blocks being replaced no later that the end of the Cycle 9 outage
on both Units.
The failed 3A0605 contact block was sent to ABB, Power T&D Company for
failure analysis and Part 21 evaluation.
17
PHOTODOCUMENTATION
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 1: "Optical photograph of the failed 3A0605 contact block. Note
the fractured finger at location #4." omitted.
Figure 2: "Optical photograph of the back of the 3A0605 contact block
showing the fracture at finger #4. omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 3: "Optical photograph of one end of the fractured finger #4 at
bend C. Crack in finger #9 is on lower right." omitted.
Figure 4: "Optical photograph of a finger showing the labeling of the
bends. Bend D was fractured during removal." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 5: "Optical photograph of the crack in finger #9, at bend c, on
the 3A0605 contact block." omitted.
Figure 6: "Optical photograph of the crack in finger #12, at bend c, on
the 3A0605 contact block." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 7: "Optical Micrograph of a cross section of one the finger #4
fracture showing the intergranular cracks and extra hard temper grain
structure. Mag:200X" omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 8: Optical Micrograph of finger #4 cross section at bend B showing
a crack at the inner diameter and the extra hard temper grain structure
at the bend. Mag:50X" omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 9: "Close-up of the inner diameter crack in finger 4, bend
B in Figure 8. Mag:400X" omitted.
Figure 10: "Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) photograph of the fracture
face on finger 4 showing the intergranular structure." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 11: "Energy Dispersive spectrum (EDS) showing the elemental
composition of the plating on the surface of finger #4, contact block
3A0605." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 12: "EDS of the base metal of 3A0605, finger #4 showing copper and
zinc are present." omitted
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
15-Jun-1995 15:53:37 CONTACT #4, FRACTURE
Accelerating voltage 20.0 KeV
Beam - sample incidence angle 60.0 degrees
Xray emergence angle 29.0 degrees
Xray - window incidence angle 1.5 degrees
STANDARDLESS EDS ANALYSIS
(ZAF CORRECTIONS VIA MAGIC V)
ELEMENT WEIGHT ATOMIC PRECISION
& LINE PERCENT PERCENT* 2 SIGMA K-RATIO**
Cu KA 69.19 69.79 0.69 0.6959
Zn KA 30.81 30.21 0.54 0.3093
TOTAL 100.00
ITERATIONS 4
*NOTE: ATOMIC PERCENT is normalized to 100
**NOTE: K-RATIO = K-RATIO x R
where R = reference(standard)/reference(sample)
NORMALIZATION FACTOR: 1.000
Figure 13: Table of copper and zinc elemental percentages in the EDS
spectrum in figure 12. The material is 70/3 brass.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 14: "Optical micrograph of bend C on finger #10 from the Spare
2A0602 contact block. The grain structure shows why this finger was more
ductile than the others. Compare to Figure 8. Mag:50X" omitted.
Figure 15: "Close-up of the grain structure at the bend area of figure
14. The larger gains are a less hard temper than the cracked fingers.
Mag: 200X" omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 16: "SEM photograph of contact finger #7 from the warehouse
contact block showing the cracks at bend B." omitted.
Figure 17: "Close-up of the cracks in Contact #7, bend B, in Figure 16."
omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 18: "Optical micrograph of the cross section of contact finger #7,
bend b, showing the depth of the cracks. Mag:50X" omitted.
Figure 19: "Close-up of the inner diameter crack in finger #7, bend B, in
Figure 18. Mag:200X" omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 20: "Optical micrograph of the cross section of contact finger #8,
bend b, showing the depth of the cracks. Mag:50X" omitted.
Figure 21: "Close-up of the inner diameter crack in finger #8, bend B, in
Figure 20. Mag:200X" omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 22: "Optical photograph of removal of the 2A0611 contact block
after removal from the P114 breaker." omitted.
Figure 23: "Optical photograph of back of the 2A0611 contact block
showing the location of the cracked fingers." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 24: "Close-up of the crack in finger #2, bend B, in contact block
2A0611." omitted.
Figure 25: "Close-up of the crack in finger #5, bend B, in contact block
2A0611." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 26: "Close-up of the crack in finger #6, bend 3, in contact block
2A0611." omitted.
Figure 27: "Close-up of the crack in finger #11, bend B, in contact block
2A0611." omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 28: "Cross sectional micrograph of the new contact finger material
in the bend area showing a grain structure indicative of Half Hard
temper. Mag:50X" omitted.
Figure 29: "Magnified view of the new material at the bend area showing
the absence of cracks. Mag:200X" omitted.
RCE 95-010 Photodocumentation
Figure 30: "Cross sectional micrograph of the new contact finger material
in the straight area showing a grain structure indicative of Quarter Hard
temper. Mag:50X" omitted.
Figure 31: "Magnified view of the new material in the straight area
showing the acceptable grain structure. Mag:200X" omitted.
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations
CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMANCE
Customer: Certificate Number 1 Page 1 of 1
NAME ABB Power T&D-Sanford,FL Certificate Is CONDITIONAL [] Order is
INCOMPLETE []
UNCONDITIONAL[X] COMPLETE
[X]
ORDER NO. P311407-00 Record Checklist Attached YES NO
LATEST REV. NONE [X] [ ]
ABB CE Order No. 406265 - 01 Supplement No. 0
Cust. ABB CE Quality Part Number Description
item# Item# Order Ship
1 1.0 3 3 701902C00 Material Analysis of
Secondary Contacts-3/6
samples.
2 2.0 3 3 816978A00 Material Analysis of
Secondary Contacts-3/6
samples.
3 3.0 6 6 81697BA00 Material Analysis of
Secondary Contacts-6/6
samples.
As checked off; the following apply to the item(s) and /or services being
certified:
[ ] Nuclear Spare Paris Quality Assurance Program description
(QAM-300), revision 09.
[ ] System Staging Group Quality Assurance Program (QAM-400),
revision 01.
As checked off; the following method(s) for acceptance apply:
[ ] Source Verification [ ] Dropship/Receiving Inspection
[ ] Post Assy Test/Inspection [ ] Documentation Review
Whereby this order has been processed in accordance with the ABB
Combustion Engineering Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (QAM-100),
4th Edition, revision 2, dated 2/1/95 and any of the above checked.
ABB hereby certifies that the item(s) and/or services described
above meet the referenced purchase order requirements, including
applicable codes, specifications, standards and equipment
qualification requirements. Any exceptions to these requirements
have been documented and evaluated properly executed deviation
notices as noted within this documentation. Additionally; this(s)
and or services is supplied from ABB/CE's facility at Windsor, Ct.
or from a supplier that has been previously approved by ABB/CE
Windsor, Connecticut.
Comments: (1) THIS CERTIFICATION PROVIDES RESULTS OF MATERIAL ANALYSES
ON
SAMPLE SECONDARY CONTACTS PROVIDED BY ABB POWER T&D, DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEMS
DIVISION, SANFORD, FL (2) THIS WORK WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY
COMPLIANCE
WITH MATERIAL/PROCESS SPECIFICATIONS AS DEFINED ON ABB DRAWING
701902,
REV, 6 AND 816978, REV. 7, THESE SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDED:...BASE
MATERIAL: C.F. BRASS #2, ALLOY 230,... SILVER PLATING: ABB SPEC. 51664A,
REV. 5 (3) COPIES OF ORIGINAL TEST REPORTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS WILL BE
FORWARDED BY MAIL.
Distribution:
Quality Assurance File
Purchasing File
Engineering QA Representative Date
Other M. W. STEWART
Customer ABB POWER T&D N/A N/A
Cognizant Engineer Date
COFCE 3/95 ATTACHMENT #2
ATTACHMENT "ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Operations RECORDS
CHECKLIST (RCL)" omitted.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
Tom S. Preston Report Number 226979
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Date 29-AUG-95
Nuclear Spare Parts Page 1 of 2
P.O. Box 500 M/S 9425-DH24 Client Number 004400
Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Client Order 406265-01
Release ITEM 1.0
RECEIVED 6 Contacts
IDENTAS P/N 701902C00
MATERIAL .050 CF Brass #2, Alloy 230
Silver Plated
CONDITION *
TEST TO ITE 51664A Rev. 5 and Client Instructions
TEST PER *
PURPOSE *
SPEC INST Return specimens and 3 unused parts
PROPERTIES AS SUPPLIED
SEMI-QUANTITATIVE SPECTRO CHECK OF PLATING Disp
S/N 1 In Spec
The spectrographically detectable elements
are present in approximately the required
amounts for Silver.
S/N 2 In Spec
The spectrographically detectable elements are
present in approximately the required
amounts for Silver.
S/N 3 In Spec
The spectrographIcally detectable
elements are present in approximately
the required amounts for Silver.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BY XRF
Sample 1 2 3
Base Metal Base Metal Bass Metal
%
Cu 84.91 84.91 85.16
Fe <0.01 0.01 <0.01
Pb 0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Zn REM REM REM
Cu + sum of
named
elements 99.99 99.95 99.99
Disp: For Info For Info For Info
The symbol < signifies not detected at the defectability limit Indicated.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Number 226979
Nuclear Spars Parts Report Date 29-AUG-95
Windsor, CT 06096-0500 Page 2 of 2
HARDNESS TEST Of BASE METAL
Sample Hardness Disp
1 HR30T 67 For Info
2 HR30T 67 For Info
3 HR30T 66 For Info
Note: No authorized hardness conversion table for this material.
METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF PLATING Disp
Sample: 1 In Spec
Thickness: Min. 0.00005", Max. 0.00010", Predom,
0.00005"
Sample: 2
Thickness Min. 0.00005", Max. 0.00010", Predom, 0.00010" In Spec
Sample: 3 In Spec
Thickness: Min. 0.00005", Max. 0.00010", Predom, 0.00005" In Spec
WE CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF OUR RECORDS
Signed for J. Dirats and Co. by Richard C. Simmons, Technical Manager
NOTE: The recording of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
entries an this document may be punished as a felony under federal law.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
Tom B. Preston Report Number 226980
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Date 29-AUG-95
Nuclear Spare Parts Page 1 of 2
P.O. Box 500 M/S 9426-DH24 Client Number 004400
Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Client Order 406265-01
Release ITEM 2.0
RECEIVED 6 Contacts
IDENTAS P/N 816978A00
MATERIAL .050 OF Brass #2, Alloy 230
Silver Plated
CONDITION *
TEST TO ITE 51664A Rev. 5 and Client Instructions
TEST PER *
SPECINST Return specimens and 3 unused parts
PROPERTIES AS SUPPLIED
SEMI-QUANTITATIVE SPECTRO CHECK OF PLATING Disp
S/N 1 In Spec
The spectrographically detectable elements are
present in approximately the required
amounts for Silver.
S/N 2 In Spec
The spectrographically detectable elements are
present in approximately the required amounts for Silver.
S/N 3 In Spec
The spectrographically detectable elements
are present In approximately the required
amounts for Silver.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BY XRF
Sample 1 2 3
Bass Metal Base Metal Base Metal
%
Cu 85.55 85.46 85.57
Fe <0.01 0.01 0.01
Pb <0.01 0.01 <0.01
Zn REM REM REM
Cu+ sum of
named
elements 99.98 99.95 99.99
Disp: For Info For Info For Info
The symbol < signifies not detected at the delectability limit
Indicated.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Number 226980
Nuclear Spare Parts Report Date 29-AUG-96
Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Page 2 of 2
HARDNESS TEST OF BASE METAL
Sample Hardness Disp
1 HR30T 68 For Info
2 HR30T 68 For Info
3 HR30T 68 For Info
Note: No authorized hardness conversion table for this material.
METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF PLATING DLSP
Sample: 1 In Spec
Thickness, Min. 0.00010", Max. 0.00010",
Predom. 0.00010"
Sample: 2 In Spec
Thickness; Min. 0.00010", Max. 0.00010",
Predom. 0.00010"
Sample: 3 In Spec
Thickness: Min.0.00005", Max. 0.00010",
Predom. 0.00010"
WE CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF OUR RECORDS
Signed for J. Dirats and Co. by Richard C. Simmons, Technical Manager
NOTE: The recording of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
entries an this document may be punished as a felony under federal law.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
Tom B. Preston Report Number 226981
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Date 29-AUG-95
Nuclear Spare Parts Page 1 of 3
P.O. Box 500 M/S 9426-DH24 Client Number 004400
Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Client Order 406265-01
Release ITEM 3.0
RECEIVED 6 Contacts
IDENTAS P/N816978A00 Second Lot Identified as SCE1 thru SCE6
MATERIAL .050 CF Brass #2, Alloy 230
Silver plated
CONDITION *
TEST TO ITE 51664A Rev. 5 and Client Instructions
TEST PER *
PURPOSE *
SPECINST Return specimens
PROPERTIES AS SUPPLIED
SEMI-QUANTITATIVE SPECTRO CHECK OF PLAYING Disp
S/N SCE1
The spectrographically detectable elements are present In Spec
in approximately the required amounts for Silver.
S/N SCE2
The spectrographically detectable elements are present In Spec
in approximately the required amounts for Silver.
S/N SCE3
The spectrographically detectable elements are present In Spec
in approximately the required amounts for Silver.
S/N SCE4
The spectrographically detectable elements are present In Spec
approximately the required amounts for Silver.
S/N SCE5
The spectrographically detectable elements are In Spec
present in approximately the required amounts for Silver.
S/N SCE6 In Spec
The spectrographically detectable elements are
present in approximately the required amounts for Silver.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Number 226981
Nuclear Spare Parts Report Date 2 9-AUG-95
Windsor, CT 06096-0500 Page 2 of 3
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS BY XRF
Sample SCE1 SCE2 SCE3 SCE4
BASE METAL BASS METAL BASE METAL BASE METAL
%
Cu 85.68 85.58 65.67 85.80
Fe 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pb <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Zn REM REM REM REM
Cu and sum
of named
elements: 99.97 99.98 99.99 99.98
For Info For Info For Info For Info
Sample SCE5 SCE6
BASE METAL BASE METAL
%
CU 85.69 86.78
Fe 0.01 0.01
Fb < 0.01 <0.01
Zn REM REM
Cu and sum
of named
elements: 99.99 99.99
For Into For Info
The symbol < signifies not detected at the defectability limit indicated.
HARDNESS TEST OF BASE METAL
Sample Hardness Disp
SCE1 HR30T 67 For Info
SCE2 HR30T 67 For Info
SCE3 HR30T 67 For Info
SCE4 HR30T 67 For Info
SCE5 HR30T 67 For Info
SCE6 HR30T 68 For Info
Note: No authorized hardness conversion table for this material.
DIRATS TEST REPORT
LABORATORIES
ABB Combustion Engineering Report Number 226081
Nuclear Spare Parts Report Date 29-AUG-95
Windsor, CT 06095-0500 Page 3 of 3
METALLOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF PLATING Disp
Sample: SCE1 Off Spec
Thickness: Min, 0.00010", Max. 0-00020",
Predom. 0.00010"'; see photo.
Sample: SCE2 Off Spec
Thickness: Min. 0,00010", Max 0.00020",
Predom. 0.00020"'; see photo.
Sample: SCE3 In Spec
Thickness: Min. 0.00005". Max. 0.00010"',
Predom. 0.00010"
Sample: SCE4 In Spec
Thickness: Min, 0.00005", Max. 0,00010",
Predom., 0.00010"
Sample: SCE5 In Spec
Thickness: Min. 0.00005", Max. 0.00010",
Predom, 0.00010"
Sample: SCE6 In Spec
Thickness: Min. 0.00005", Max. 0,00010",
Predom, 0.00010"
PHOTOGRAPHS ARE ATTACHED
WE CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF OUR RECORDS
Signed for J. Dirats and Co. by Richard C. Simmons, Technical Manager
NOTE: The recording of false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
entries on this document may be punished as a felony under federal law.
Attachment #3 "HP Switchgear Which may incorporate Alloy 260 conductor
strips with possible forming cracks into secondary disconnect assembly"
omitted.
*** END OF DOCUMENT ***
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021