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Part 21 Report - 1996-010

ACCESSION #: 9509130222 SENTINEL Amersham Corporation 40 North Avenue Burlington, MA 01803 tel (617) 272-2000 8 September 1995 tel (800) 225-1383 fax (617) 273-2216 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Amersham Washington, DC 20555 QSA Dear Sir or Madam: Amersham is reporting a potential Part 21 defect in accordance with 10CFR 21.21. This interim report concerns a model 899 drive cable connector that pulled off the drive cable. The potential defect is related to the model 899 drive cable connector pulling off the drive cable during radiographic operations at a Dayton X-Ray facility. The drive cable was used with a Gamma Century exposure device and a model 899 style source assembly. The device had been in use and upon retracting the source into the device on the last exposure the drive cable connector became detached from the drive cable. No source retrieval was performed since the disconnect occurred after returning the source to the fully shielded position. The customer states that there were no unusual occurrences with this equipment. The drive cable (but not the male connector) was returned to Amersham for evaluation. A preliminary review of the equipment was made on 19 Dec 1994 on the cable without the rest of the equipment involved. Attempts were made to try and obtain the rest of the involved equipment for full evaluation. These attempts were unsuccessful and it was determined on 10 July 95 to try and perform the Part 21 evaluation based on the drive cable component alone. Since that time, preliminary investigation into this issue has included: 1. An examination of the drive cable which showed no obvious signs of damage, however, since the male connector was not available for review failure due to connector damage cannot be completely ruled out. The drive cable sleeve attached to the end of the drive cable showed evidence that the connector had been swaged onto the drive cable. 2. The drive cable did not shoot any signs of excessive age and had been fabricated at the Amersham facility in Burlington, MA. The exact age of the drive cable could not be determined based on our review, however, it was manufactured under our QA program and successfully passed a 125 pound pull test upon completion of the swage. 3. We did not receive the male connector, exposure device, source assembly, control housings or guide tubes used in conjunction with this event, so no determinations as to their impact and\or effect relating to this failure could be made. 4. Some additional testing has been done regarding hypothetical fabrication scenarios, but no conclusive results have surfaced as to the cause of this drive cable connector failure. We are reviewing all similar drive cable occurrences to determine if any related information is applicable to the potential causes for this occurrence. Also we are performing some additional testing of connector swages using worst case tolerances and undergoing potential field related use with Century type equipment to determine what if any impact these results might have related to this occurrence. Until this testing is complete we cannot make a full Part 21 determination. We expect to have those results by the end of November 95, I will update you on the evaluation's completion shortly thereafter. Please contact me if you require any additional information. Sincerely, Cathleen Roughan Regulatory Affairs Manager cc: Mr. Francis Costello U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Steve Baggett Sealed Source Safety Section Source Containment and Devices Branch Division of Industrial and Medical Safety, NMSS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 *** END OF DOCUMENT ***

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