Part 21 Report - 1995-228

ACCESSION #: 9507200264

RGE

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o
89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649-0001          AREA CODE 716
546-2700

ROBERT C. MECREDY
Vice President
Nuclear Operations

                                             July 14, 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Attn: Allen R. Johnson
          PWR Project Directorate 1-1
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:  10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report
          R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
          Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and
Noncompliance, Section 21 (c) (3) (ii), which requires "Written
notification to the NRC ...  on the identification of a defect or
a
failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby
submitted.


                                             Very truly yours,

                                             Robert C. Mecredy


xc:  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     Mr.  Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)
     PWR Project Directorate I-1
     Washington, D.C. 20555

     Regional Administrator
     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     Region I
     475 Allendale Road
     King of Prussia, PA 19406

     Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector


                                                                  
PAGE 2
          10CFR21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT

I.        NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE
COMMISSION:

          NAME:     Robert C. Mecredy
                    Vice President Nuclear Operations

          ADDRESS:  Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
                    89 East Avenue
                    Rochester, New York 14649

II.       IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE
BASIC
          COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO
COMPLY OR
          CONTAINS A DEFECT:

          The facility is the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. 
The basic
          component is a 14 inch air-operated butterfly valve,
used as
          the Service Water outlet valve AOV-4561 (Fisher Series
7600
          valve) for the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers
(CRFC).
          The valve assembly (less actuator) was replaced during
the 1995
          refueling outage as preventive maintenance for
AOV-4561.

III.      IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR
          SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR
CONTAINS
          A DEFECT:

          The butterfly valve installed during the 1995 outage
was
          procured as a replacement for a specific serial
numbered
          original plant valve (AOV-4561).  Since the valve is
standard
          and commercially available, it was procured as
commercial grade
          and dedicated as safety-related by Rochester Gas and
Electric
          (RG&E) under Commercial Grade Item Engineering
Evaluation
          (CGIEE) 94-051.  The valve was supplied by:

               Fisher Controls Co.
               c/o Northeast Controls, Inc.
               60 John Glenn DR
               Amherst, NY 14228


                                                                  
PAGE 3

IV.       NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE
SAFETY HAZARD
          WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR
FAILURE
          TO COMPLY:

          The replacement valve was installed as AOV-4561 in
mid-April,
          1995, with the plant in cold shutdown and this portion
of the
          Service Water system isolated for maintenance and not
required
          to be operable.  As part of the installation process
and prior
          to turnover for post-maintenance testing (PMT) and
return to
          operable status, Instrument and Control (I&C)
technicians were
          performing initial alignment of the valve to the valve
actuator
          and valve positioner, using a valve-specific
calibration data
          sheet.  On April 18, 1995, during this initial
alignment, the
          I&C technicians found that AOV-4561 actuated opposite
from the
          required configuration.  The difference in actuation
was caused
          by improper keyway placement, resulting in
"air-to-open"
          operation.  The original engineering requirements
stipulated
          "air-to-close" operation.

          The safety hazard which could be created by such a
defect is
          the loss of Service Water flow through the Containment
          Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC), when combined with
single
          failure considerations.  This condition could result in
the
          Containment pressure slightly exceeding design
limitations in
          the event of the limiting "Steam line break in
Containment"
          accident.

V.        THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR
FAILURE TO
          COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:

          The information was obtained on April 18, 1995.

VI.       IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A
DEFECT OR
          FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH
COMPONENTS
          IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA
STATION:

          One valve was procured for AOV-4561, and installed in
mid-
          April, 1995, in the Service Water system at Ginna
Station.


                                                                  
PAGE 4

VII.      THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL
BE
          TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION
RESPONSIBLE
          FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR
WILL BE
          TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:

          Corrective action was taken by the Ginna Station
Maintenance
          group.  A nonconformance report (NCR) was initiated,
and the
          valve was repaired in accordance with the Engineering
          disposition for this NCR, by cutting a new keyway in
the valve
          actuator lever.  The actuator lever was reinstalled,
and the
          valve actuator was calibrated per the requirements of
the
          calibration data sheet to verify proper valve
operation.  These
          corrective actions were completed within seven days of
          identification of the problem, with the plant in cold
shutdown
          and this portion of the Service Water system isolated
land not
          required to be operable.

          The CGIEE for this valve was revised by Procurement
          Engineering, to include verification of appropriate
component
          operation, with successful completion of PMT as the
acceptance
          criteria.  This provides assurance that the valve
interfaces
          correctly with the valve actuator and functions
correctly as
          part of the Service Water system.

          The purchasing description in the Materials Management
computer
          system was revised by Procurement Engineering to ensure
that
          future purchase orders will stipulate the original
design
          requirement that the valve be supplied as
"air-to-close".

          The importance of verifying equipment interfaces and
component
          interactions during consideration of critical
characteristics
          for dedication was reemphasized to procurement
engineers by
          Procurement Engineering supervision in June, 1995.

VIII.     ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY
ABOUT THE
          FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN,
IS BEING,
          OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:

          The critical characteristics selected for commercial
grade
          dedication should have required verification that the
valve
          would fail as designed on loss of air.  Associated
activities
          that are normally performed to assure that the valve
interfaces
          correctly with the valve actuator (such as I&C
calibration and
          PMT) should be included as part of the commercial grade
          dedication process.  Verification that dedicated
components
          interface correctly assures the configuration necessary
for
          proper component operation and system function.


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