United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9507050075

NIAGARA
MOHAWK

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION,
P.O. BOX 63, LYCOMING, N.Y. 13093/TEL. (315) 349-7263
                                  FAX  (315) 349-4753

CARL D. TERRY                      June 23, 1995
Vice President                     NMP1L 0955
Nuclear Engineering

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

               RE:       Nine Mile Point Unit 1
                           Docket No. 50-220
                                 DPR-63

Subject:  Part 21 - Wyle Laboratories Report

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,
Niagara Mohawk is reporting a deviation which could have created a
substantial safety hazard.  Niagara Mohawk had previously notified the
Commission of this issue on May 26, 1995, via telephone and facsimile.
The attached report contains the information required by
10CFR21.21(c)(4).

                                   Very truly yours,

                                       C. D. Terry
                           Vice President - Nuclear Engineering

CDT/JMT/lmc
Attachment

xc:  Regional Administrator, Region I
     Mr. L. B. Marsh, Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRR
     Mr. G. E. Edison, Senior Project Manager, NRR
     Mr. B. S. Norris, Senior Resident Inspector
     Records Management

                               ATTACHMENT

1.   Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the
     Commission.

     Mr. Carl D. Terry
     Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
     Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
     P. O. Box 63, Lake Road
     Lycoming, NY 13093

2.   Identification of the facility, the activity or the basic component
     supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States
     which fails to comply or contains a defect.

     Wyle Laboratories Report 17655-ARY-1.1, Revision A, dated March 31,
     1988, erroneously calculated the service life of various Agastat GP
     series relays at a non-conservative 26.3 years.

3.   Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying
     the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

     The qualification report for the Agastat GP series relays was
     provided by Wyle Laboratories of Huntsville, Alabama.

4.   Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard
     which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to
     comply.

     Niagara Mohawk has discovered that the report used to determine the
     service life of various Agastat GP series relays at Nine Mile Point
     Unit 1 was erroneous.  The report, Wyle Laboratories Report 17655-
     ARY-1.1, Revision A, dated March 31 1988, incorrectly calculated the
     service life at 26.3 years.  The report utilized the electrical
     characteristics of the relay bobbin material in determining the
     activation energy instead of the mechanical properties of the Zytel
     material.  Consequently, the calculated service life and the relay
     changeout frequency were non-conservative.

     The Wyle Laboratories Report has been utilized for various
     deenergized relays at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 since original issuance
     of the report on September 19, 1986.  From April 9, 1993 until April
     1995 the use of the report was expanded to include energized relays
     located in various plant systems including the core spray system,
     reactor protection system, and ATWS/ARI system.  Due to the nature
     of the defect in the report, the basic components impacted by the
     defect are limited to these energized relays.

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     After discovery of the defect and further review of the safety
     functions of the energized relays, it has been determined that all
     of the energized relays are either safety-related passive, by which
     the report would be conservative, or can be excluded from the EQ
     program based on engineering analysis.  For those energized relays
     that are now excluded from the program, subsequent testing of the as
     found conditions has confirmed that no installed relays were
     inoperable.  Therefore, the defect in the Wyle Laboratories report
     did not cause a substantial safety hazard.

     However, since the potential existed that the energized active
     relays could have remained in the plant past their actual service
     life, there was the potential that the relays could degrade and
     render safety-related systems inoperable.  Therefore, a potential
     substantial safety hazard did exist, necessitating this report.

5.   The date on which the information of such defect or failure to
     comply was obtained.

     Niagara Mohawk identified the defect on March 29, 1995, as a
     potential Part 21 violation.  An investigation was conducted in
     accordance with Nuclear Licensing Procedure NLAP-IRG-140.

6.   In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to
     comply, the number and location of all such components in use at,
     supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or
     activities subject to the regulations in this part.

     The report identified with the defect is Wyle Laboratories Report
     17655-ARY- 1.1, Revision A, dated March 31, 1988.  No other Wyle
     Laboratories Reports have been discovered with this same defect.

7.   The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken;
     the name of the individual or organization responsible for the
     action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to
     complete the action.

     Immediate corrective action by Niagara Mohawk was to replace the
     subject energized Agastat GP relays and to discontinue use of the
     Wyle Laboratories Report.  The Agastat relays currently in the EQ
     program (safety-related passive) have been assigned a conservative
     service life.  Maintenance requirements of the remaining Agastat
     relays (non-EQ) are being evaluated.

8.   Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the
     facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or
     will be given to purchasers or licensees.

     The activation energy used in calculating a component's service life
     should be based on the appropriate material characteristics.

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