United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

ACCESSION #: 9504210137

TVA
Tennessee Valley Authority, 
1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

APR 17 1995

O. J. "Ike" Zeringue
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

CDR-50-390                                        10 CFR 50.55(e)

U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C.  20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of )         Docket Nos.  50-390 
Tennessee Valley Authority          )

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - INADEQUATE CONDUIT SEPARATION -
CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY REPORT (CDR) 390/95-03

The purpose of this letter is to provide a report to address the
subject
deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).  The subject
deficiency
identified as Significant Corrective Action Report (SCAR)
WBSCA950003 was
initially reported to the NRC Operations Center on March 17,
1995.

Enclosure 1 to this submittal contains the report for this
deficiency. 
Enclosure 2 provides the list of commitments made in this
submittal.  If
you have any questions, please telephone P. L. Pace at (615)
365-1824.

Sincerely,


O. J. Zeringue

Enclosures
cc:  See page 2


U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Page 2

APR 17 1995

cc (Enclosures):
     INPO Record Center
     700 Galleria Parkway
     Atlanta, Georgia 30339

     NRC Resident Inspector
     Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
     Rt. 2, Box 700
     Spring City, Tennessee 37381

     Mr. P. S. Tam, Senior Project Manager
     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     One White Flint North
     11555 Rockville Pike
     Rockville, Maryland 20852

     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     Region II
     101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
     Atlanta, Georgia 30323


                               ENCLOSURE 1

                 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 1
                      INADEQUATE CONDUIT SEPARATION
                              CDR 390/95-03
                              FINAL REPORT

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

During a Nuclear Assurance Assessment, TVA identified various
types of
conduit deficiencies on completed areas which include the
following
deficiencies: loose flex conduits, no conduit ID, minimum bend
radius
violations, inadequate support for marinite board, various
support
deficiencies (shanked out bolts, proper torque cannot be
achieved, no
IDs, etc.), and separation violations.  Of these deficiencies,
TVA
determined that the conduit separation deficiencies (involving
cables
having various safety functions) have the potential to create a
significant safety hazard.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Certain of these individual deficiencies would obviously not
result in an
adverse impact to plant safety in specific applications. 
However, based
on the number of safety-related cables involved with the
separation
deficiencies identified, TVA concluded that these deficiencies
could
represent an indeterminate safety condition had they remained
uncorrected.  Therefore, in light of this indeterminate
condition, TVA
has chosen to report this issue under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

CAUSE OF THE DEFICIENCY

The cause of these deficiencies was a combination of improperly
trained
personnel and a procedure inadequacy.  The Class 1E conduit
walkdown
program was established as a means to implement various
corrective
actions.  Early in its implementation, the program was very
successful
and appeared to be functioning adequately.  However, as
additional
walkdown personnel increased, these individuals were not given
the level
of training as were the initial personnel.  In addition, Walkdown
Procedure WD-039 did not specifically require the use of the "go,
no-go"
gauge previously established as a measuring device.  This
combination of
causes resulted in the deficiencies described above.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

TVA has retrained the walkdown field engineers to ensure they
fully
understand the walkdown requirements and provide them examples of
the
possible situations that they may encounter in the field.  This
training
also stressed that the only allowable method for measuring train
separation is by the use of an approved "go, no-go" gauge.  In
addition,
Walkdown Procedure WD-039 has been

                                  E1-1


revised to ensure the proper measuring technique for separation
is
maintained for the duration of the walkdown.

TVA has reviewed other corrective action documents referenced in
WD-039
to verify that their corrective actions are being adequately
addressed by
WD-039.  The review confirmed that WD-039 adequately addressed
these
other corrective actions.

Upon implementation of the above corrective actions, the Nuclear
Assurance organization performed Nuclear Assessment 95-066 which
did not
identify any additional deficiencies.  Therefore, no further
recurrence
control actions are considered necessary.

To address the previous conditions, TVA will walkdown the
previously
completed rooms to identify and to correct or evaluate the
conditions
found.  This action will be completed by August 18, 1995.

                                  E1-2


                               ENCLOSURE 2

                 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 1

                           LIST OF COMMITMENTS

1.   TVA will walkdown the previously completed rooms to identify
and to
     correct or evaluate the conditions found.  This action will
be
     completed by August 18, 1995.

                                  E2-1


*** END OF DOCUMENT ***

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