Morning Report for April 21, 2003
Headquarters Daily Report
APRIL 21, 2003
******************************************************
REPORT NEGATIVE
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III APRIL 21, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Nuclear Management Company MR Number: 3-03-0012
Prairie Island 1 Date: 04/15/03
Welch,Minnesota Lcnsee infrmd. Resd. Insp. via tel.
Dockets: 50-282
PWR/W-2-LP
Subject: Unit 1 Shutdown to Repair Main Transformer
Discussion:
At 10:50 p.m. on April 14, 2003, operators at Prairie Island Unit 1
commenced a normal plant shutdown to make repairs to the main power
transformer. The generator was taken off-line at 1:50 a.m. on April 15
and the reactor entered Mode 2. Operators are maintaining the plant
critical at one percent power while repairs are conducted.
The main power transformer experienced an oil leak on one of the
transformer's oil coolers. The cooler will be removed for repair off-site
and reinstalled. No other major work is scheduled during this forced
outage. The licensee expects to complete repairs on April 20 and then
return to full power.
Regional Action:
The Resident Inspectors observed the shutdown from the control room.
Contact: Ken Riemer, KXR (630)829-9757
HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 APRIL 21, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-03-0018
Rockbestos-Suprenant Corp Date: 04/21/03
Subject: Part 21-Initial Notification-Rockbestos-Suprenant Corporation
Cables manfactured between January 1992 thru June 1995
Discussion:
VENDOR: Rockbestos-Suprenant Corp. PT21 No.: 2003-003-00
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/14/03 ACCESSION NUMBER: ml030240121
SOURCE DOCUMENT: FAX REVIEWER: RORP, D. Billings
Equipment Identification: The KXL 760D insulation system (chemically
cross linked only) provided in some of the firewall III cables
manufactured from January 1992 thru June 1995 may include an alternate
resin which was not part of the baseline qualification testing.
Based on testing and analysis, both resin suppliers indicated that both
resins were quite similar and they were not able to distinguish or
identify one resin from the other. Documented evidence of their
conclusion has been requested. Rockbestos-Surprenant has instituted a
similarity analysis program on both resins that is expected to be
completed by March 14, 2003. Preliminary test results indicate that the
two resins are indistinguishable. A full report will be available upon
completion of the similarity analysis program.
Contact: D. Billings, NRR
(301) 415-1175
E-mail: deb1@nrc.gov
HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 APRIL 21, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-03-0019
Scientech Date: 04/21/03
Subject: Part 21 - Initial Notification - Square Root Function (CMM900)
modules have been found to be defective
Discussion:
VENDOR: Scientech PT21 No.: 2003-004-00
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 01/15/03 ACCESSION NUMBER: EN39516
SOURCE DOCUMENT: FAX REVIEWER: RORP, J. Dozier
The NRC Operations Center was sent a preliminary notification by
facsimile on January 16, 2003, indicating that SCIENTECH, Inc.'s
subsidiary, NUS Instruments, Inc. (NUSI) had determined that a Basic
Component, supplied in one safety related CMM9OO module to
Constellation-Nine Mile Point (P.O. #00-31440) contained a defect that
was reportable under 1OCFR21 (Two other modules supplied to
Entergy-Fitzpatrick listed in preliminary notification were later
discovered to be non-safe related). Additionally, NUSI determined that
other clients had been supplied assemblies containing components that may
contain similar defects. NUSI has notified all affected clients as stated
in the preliminary report.
The (3) known failures are NUSI Model CMM900 Modules configured for the
square root function and were used in the Feedwater Flow Control system
at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant and in the High Pressure
Coolant Injection System at Nine Mile Point. The NUSI CMM900 module
serves as a replacement for the GE/MAC 50-565100 module.
The NUSI evaluation determined that there was not a significant safety
hazard to the functionality of the modules, however; the utilities were
given the affected module ID numbers to determine the safety hazard
specific to their application. Client feedback to NUSI indicated that
there is not a significant safety hazard due to this defect, however it
is utility specific.
Contact: J. Dozier, NRR
301-415-1014
E-mail: jxd@nrc.gov
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021