United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for January 29, 2003



                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         JANUARY 29, 2003

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE         
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED   

HEADQUARTERS          X                                      
REGION I                                 X                   
REGION II                                X                   
REGION III                               X                   
REGION IV                                X    


               
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 29, 2003

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-03-0010
Spectrum Technologies                  Date: 01/29/03
                                                                          

Subject: Part 21 - Initial Notification - Cutler Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1 
         Starters                                                        


Discussion:

VENDOR: Cutler Hammer               PT21 FILE NO: 2002-033-00   

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/22/02          ACCESSION NUMBER: ML023330442        
                                                                         
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER             REVIEWER: RORP, D. Billings          
                                                                         
                                                                         
Equipment Identification: Starter, Non-Reversing, Size 1, 600 VAC, 3     
Pole, W/125 VDC coil, Westinghouse/Cutler-Hammer P/N A200M1CS, Type B    
Thermal Overloads, Ambient Compensated, Manual Reset Only                
                                                                         
In March 2002, Spectrum Technologies provided 20 Class 1E safety related 
Cutler-Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1 starters to Rochester Gas & Electric      
Company - Ginna Station. The starters were purchased as commercial grade 
items from Cutler-Hammer, and dedicated per EPRI NP5652, method 1,       
Special Tests and Inspections.                                           
                                                                         
Ginna Station recently experienced an open phasing failure of one of the 
starters. No current flow was noted on one phase when measured with a    
clamp-on ammeter. Current started to flow when hand pressure was applied 
to the moving plunger extension that protrudes out of the top of the     
starter. The overall travel of the plunger appeared to be less than that 
noted on a similar older vintage starter. The failed starter and the     
older vintage starter were provided to Spectrum Technologies for         
investigation. None of the testing performed could duplicate the single  
phasing condition observed by Ginna Station. The failed starter and the  
earlier vintage starter were then provided to Cutler-Hammer for an OEM   
evaluation.                                                              
                                                                         
Ginna Station verified that the starters have been installed in 11 safety
related locations. Cutler-Hammer has been requested to complete an audit 
at their manufacturing facility to identify the magnitude of the         
condition and to specify the date codes effected. Cutler-Hammer has also 
been requested to expedite acceptable replacements for the starters      
provided to Ginna Station.                                               
                                                                         
Contact:    D. Billings, NRR                                             
            301-415-1175                                                 
            E-mail: deb1@nrc.gov                                         
_


HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          JANUARY 29, 2003

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-03-0011
Abb, Inc.                              Date: 01/29/03
                                                                          

Subject: Part 21 - Power Shield Tap Solder Joints Defect                 

Discussion:

VENDOR: ABB, Inc.                   PT21 FILE NO: 2002-035-00            
                                                                         
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/20/02          ACCESSION NUMBER: ML030160169        
                                                                         
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER             REVIEWER: RORP, J. Foster            
                                                                         
                                                                         
On June 25, 2002 the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station reported that they 
found broken solder joints (crack in solder joint) on some pins on the   
tap blocks of ABB Inc.'s Power Shield trip devices in the 30000 serial   
number range.  Two Power Shield printed circuit assemblies were sent to  
ABB Inc. for review.  The cracked solder connections look similar to the 
cracked solder connections found on the connectors reported via Part 21  
on November 20, 1995. The most likely cause of the cracked solder joints 
is from normal mechanical stress on the tap block pins.                  
                                                                         
ABB Inc. stated that they reviewed their records concerning Power Shield 
returns and found that 21 Power Shields (.002 percent of our shipments)  
were returned since 1995 due to cracked solder joints on tap block pins  
on either the Long Time / Inst. Board or Short Time / Ground board.      
According to ABB, these are the only two boards where the tap blocks are 
located, and also, none of the returns were for 1E safety related        
applications. The serial numbers of the 21 Power Shields returned due to 
broken solder connections on tap blocks ranged from 22523 to 75095.      
                                                                         
All of the returns with broken solder joints were manufactured using     
single-sided printed circuit boards. Power Shields manufactured after    
serial number 80,000 year 1990 contain a technical improvement, namely   
double sided solder pads and plated through printed circuit board holes  
which increases the mechanical strength of the solder joints.  This      
improved design prevents deflection and fatigue failure of the solder    
connection.  There is no likelihood of similar failures at tap block pins
in the new printed circuit board design.                                 
                                                                         
Contact:    J. Foster, NRR                                               
            301-415-3647                                                 
            E-mail: jwf@nrc.gov                                          
_


HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          JANUARY 29, 2003

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-03-0012
Carboline Company                      Date: 01/29/03
                                                                          

Subject: Part 21 - Notification of Potential Safety Related              
         Noncompliance Deviation                                         


Discussion:

VENDOR: Carboline Company           PT21 FILE NO:  2002-036-00           
                                                                         
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 12/06/02          ACCESSION NUMBER: ML023500215        
                                                                         
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER             REVIEWER: RORP, J. Foster            
                                                                         
                                                                         
This Part 21 involves premature gellation or significant thickening prior
to the end of the 12-month shelf life expiration date of Carbozinc 11 SG 
Base manufactured by Carboline Co.  Such material will not atomize or    
spray properly, resulting in poor adhesion to the substrate.  As this    
occurs the coating cracks during the curing process and the coating      
flakes off the substrate.                                                
                                                                         
This problem was first identified last year and reported to the NRC and  
our customers in December 2001.  Since then, Carboline has performed root
cause analysis and determined that the cause is related to moisture      
contamination during manufacturing.  The vendor has instituted processing
changes to address this problem; however they continue to occasionally   
experience this problem in material that is older than 6-months.  A      
decision has been made by the vendor to change the published shelf-life  
to 6-months.                                                             
                                                                         
The vendor stated that if the material has already been used and is      
tightly adhered it will perform as intended and should remain in place. A
database has been created by Carboline documenting all shipments made    
within the 2002 calendar year; approximately 50 utilities/customers are  
affected.  Carboline intends to promptly notify all the customers who's  
records indicate the purchase of Carbozinc 11 SG in 2002.                
                                                                         
Contact:    J. Foster, NRR                                               
            301-415-3647                                                 
            E-mail: jwf@nrc.gov                                          
_


HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  4          JANUARY 29, 2003

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-03-0013
Framatome                              Date: 01/29/03
                                                                          

Subject: Part 21 - Error in Calculations of MCPR, LHGR, and MAPLHGR in   
         the POWERPLEX Incore Monitoring System                          


Discussion:

VENDOR: Framatome                       PT21 FILE NO: 2002-037-00        
                                                                         
DATE OF DOCUMENT:12/10/02               ACCESSION NUMBER: ML023470352    
                                                                         
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER                 REVIEWER: RORP, J. Dozier        
                                                                         
                                                                         
The defect consists of an error in calculating the values of MCPR, LHGR, 
and MAPLHGR for comparison to limits in the POWERPLEX incore monitoring  
system.  The error is the result of the use of incorrect orifice loss    
coefficients for BWR/6 reactors.  A 10 CFR Part 21 notification prepared 
by GE (PT21 2002-37-0) identified a problem with orifice pressure loss   
coefficients used as input to the GE core monitoring system for BWR/6    
reactors.  BWR/6 reactors have core plate support beams in the lower     
plenum that may affect the pressure drop at the inlet to a fuel assembly.
Assemblies may be adjacent to zero, one, or two core support beams       
depending on core location.  The GE Part 21 notification states that the 
orifice loss coefficient for an assembly adjacent to two beams will be 20
percent higher than the loss coefficient for one adjacent beam and 40    
percent higher than the loss coefficient without any adjacent beams.     
                                                                         
The GE core monitoring system uses average orifice loss coefficient      
values for all assemblies in the core with each orifice type This was    
previously evaluated to be an acceptable assumption.  A recent evaluation
by GE for current fuel designs indicates that the assumption may be      
non-conservative by up to .01 in predicted MCPR.                         
                                                                         
Framatome ANP provides incore monitoring system input decks for two BWR/6
reactors in the United States.  A uniform orifice loss coefficient has   
been used in the past for each orifice type.  The input does not reflect 
the variations in the orifice loss coefficients due to adjacent core     
support structure.  The concern identified for BWR/6 reactors using a GE 
core monitoring system applies to Grand Gulf and River Bend.  Analyses   
indicate for Grand Gulf that MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by
not more than 2 percent and that LHGR and MAPLHGR are non-conservatively 
under predicted by not more than 2 percent.  Analyses indicate for River 
Bend that MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by up to 1.2 percent,
that LHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.7 percent and 
that MAPLHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.6 percent. 
                                                                         
Contact:    J. Dozier, NRR                                               
            301-415-1014                                                 
            E-mail: jxd@nrc.gov                                          



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