Morning Report for January 29, 2003
Headquarters Daily Report
JANUARY 29, 2003
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REPORT NEGATIVE
ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED
HEADQUARTERS X
REGION I X
REGION II X
REGION III X
REGION IV X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JANUARY 29, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-03-0010
Spectrum Technologies Date: 01/29/03
Subject: Part 21 - Initial Notification - Cutler Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1
Starters
Discussion:
VENDOR: Cutler Hammer PT21 FILE NO: 2002-033-00
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/22/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML023330442
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, D. Billings
Equipment Identification: Starter, Non-Reversing, Size 1, 600 VAC, 3
Pole, W/125 VDC coil, Westinghouse/Cutler-Hammer P/N A200M1CS, Type B
Thermal Overloads, Ambient Compensated, Manual Reset Only
In March 2002, Spectrum Technologies provided 20 Class 1E safety related
Cutler-Hammer A200 NEMA Size 1 starters to Rochester Gas & Electric
Company - Ginna Station. The starters were purchased as commercial grade
items from Cutler-Hammer, and dedicated per EPRI NP5652, method 1,
Special Tests and Inspections.
Ginna Station recently experienced an open phasing failure of one of the
starters. No current flow was noted on one phase when measured with a
clamp-on ammeter. Current started to flow when hand pressure was applied
to the moving plunger extension that protrudes out of the top of the
starter. The overall travel of the plunger appeared to be less than that
noted on a similar older vintage starter. The failed starter and the
older vintage starter were provided to Spectrum Technologies for
investigation. None of the testing performed could duplicate the single
phasing condition observed by Ginna Station. The failed starter and the
earlier vintage starter were then provided to Cutler-Hammer for an OEM
evaluation.
Ginna Station verified that the starters have been installed in 11 safety
related locations. Cutler-Hammer has been requested to complete an audit
at their manufacturing facility to identify the magnitude of the
condition and to specify the date codes effected. Cutler-Hammer has also
been requested to expedite acceptable replacements for the starters
provided to Ginna Station.
Contact: D. Billings, NRR
301-415-1175
E-mail: deb1@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JANUARY 29, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-03-0011
Abb, Inc. Date: 01/29/03
Subject: Part 21 - Power Shield Tap Solder Joints Defect
Discussion:
VENDOR: ABB, Inc. PT21 FILE NO: 2002-035-00
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 11/20/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML030160169
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, J. Foster
On June 25, 2002 the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station reported that they
found broken solder joints (crack in solder joint) on some pins on the
tap blocks of ABB Inc.'s Power Shield trip devices in the 30000 serial
number range. Two Power Shield printed circuit assemblies were sent to
ABB Inc. for review. The cracked solder connections look similar to the
cracked solder connections found on the connectors reported via Part 21
on November 20, 1995. The most likely cause of the cracked solder joints
is from normal mechanical stress on the tap block pins.
ABB Inc. stated that they reviewed their records concerning Power Shield
returns and found that 21 Power Shields (.002 percent of our shipments)
were returned since 1995 due to cracked solder joints on tap block pins
on either the Long Time / Inst. Board or Short Time / Ground board.
According to ABB, these are the only two boards where the tap blocks are
located, and also, none of the returns were for 1E safety related
applications. The serial numbers of the 21 Power Shields returned due to
broken solder connections on tap blocks ranged from 22523 to 75095.
All of the returns with broken solder joints were manufactured using
single-sided printed circuit boards. Power Shields manufactured after
serial number 80,000 year 1990 contain a technical improvement, namely
double sided solder pads and plated through printed circuit board holes
which increases the mechanical strength of the solder joints. This
improved design prevents deflection and fatigue failure of the solder
connection. There is no likelihood of similar failures at tap block pins
in the new printed circuit board design.
Contact: J. Foster, NRR
301-415-3647
E-mail: jwf@nrc.gov
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HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 3 JANUARY 29, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-03-0012
Carboline Company Date: 01/29/03
Subject: Part 21 - Notification of Potential Safety Related
Noncompliance Deviation
Discussion:
VENDOR: Carboline Company PT21 FILE NO: 2002-036-00
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 12/06/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML023500215
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, J. Foster
This Part 21 involves premature gellation or significant thickening prior
to the end of the 12-month shelf life expiration date of Carbozinc 11 SG
Base manufactured by Carboline Co. Such material will not atomize or
spray properly, resulting in poor adhesion to the substrate. As this
occurs the coating cracks during the curing process and the coating
flakes off the substrate.
This problem was first identified last year and reported to the NRC and
our customers in December 2001. Since then, Carboline has performed root
cause analysis and determined that the cause is related to moisture
contamination during manufacturing. The vendor has instituted processing
changes to address this problem; however they continue to occasionally
experience this problem in material that is older than 6-months. A
decision has been made by the vendor to change the published shelf-life
to 6-months.
The vendor stated that if the material has already been used and is
tightly adhered it will perform as intended and should remain in place. A
database has been created by Carboline documenting all shipments made
within the 2002 calendar year; approximately 50 utilities/customers are
affected. Carboline intends to promptly notify all the customers who's
records indicate the purchase of Carbozinc 11 SG in 2002.
Contact: J. Foster, NRR
301-415-3647
E-mail: jwf@nrc.gov
_
HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JANUARY 29, 2003
Licensee/Facility: Notification:
Part 21 Database MR Number: H-03-0013
Framatome Date: 01/29/03
Subject: Part 21 - Error in Calculations of MCPR, LHGR, and MAPLHGR in
the POWERPLEX Incore Monitoring System
Discussion:
VENDOR: Framatome PT21 FILE NO: 2002-037-00
DATE OF DOCUMENT:12/10/02 ACCESSION NUMBER: ML023470352
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER REVIEWER: RORP, J. Dozier
The defect consists of an error in calculating the values of MCPR, LHGR,
and MAPLHGR for comparison to limits in the POWERPLEX incore monitoring
system. The error is the result of the use of incorrect orifice loss
coefficients for BWR/6 reactors. A 10 CFR Part 21 notification prepared
by GE (PT21 2002-37-0) identified a problem with orifice pressure loss
coefficients used as input to the GE core monitoring system for BWR/6
reactors. BWR/6 reactors have core plate support beams in the lower
plenum that may affect the pressure drop at the inlet to a fuel assembly.
Assemblies may be adjacent to zero, one, or two core support beams
depending on core location. The GE Part 21 notification states that the
orifice loss coefficient for an assembly adjacent to two beams will be 20
percent higher than the loss coefficient for one adjacent beam and 40
percent higher than the loss coefficient without any adjacent beams.
The GE core monitoring system uses average orifice loss coefficient
values for all assemblies in the core with each orifice type This was
previously evaluated to be an acceptable assumption. A recent evaluation
by GE for current fuel designs indicates that the assumption may be
non-conservative by up to .01 in predicted MCPR.
Framatome ANP provides incore monitoring system input decks for two BWR/6
reactors in the United States. A uniform orifice loss coefficient has
been used in the past for each orifice type. The input does not reflect
the variations in the orifice loss coefficients due to adjacent core
support structure. The concern identified for BWR/6 reactors using a GE
core monitoring system applies to Grand Gulf and River Bend. Analyses
indicate for Grand Gulf that MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by
not more than 2 percent and that LHGR and MAPLHGR are non-conservatively
under predicted by not more than 2 percent. Analyses indicate for River
Bend that MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by up to 1.2 percent,
that LHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.7 percent and
that MAPLHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.6 percent.
Contact: J. Dozier, NRR
301-415-1014
E-mail: jxd@nrc.gov
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021