United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for July 20, 2001

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         JULY 20, 2001

                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X                                      
REGION I                               X                   
REGION II                              X                   
REGION III                             X                   
REGION IV                              X                   

MR Number: H-01-0048

                           NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM
                           GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

Subject: Issuance of Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-14

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-14: Position on Reportability          
Requirements for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Failure, dated    
July 19, 2001                                                            
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this regulatory issue  
summary (RIS) to notify BWR addressees of its position regarding the     
reportability of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system failure.   
Technical contacts: Dennis Allison, NRR                                  
                    E-mail: dpa@nrc.gov                                  
Accession Number:  ML011940145                                           
HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          JULY 20, 2001

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-01-0049
Engine Systems                         Date: 07/20/01

Subject: Part 21 - Failure of electrolytic capacitors in Woodward 2301A  
         control devices                                                 


VENDOR: Engine Systems          PT21 FILE NO: m1-21-0                    
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 06/19/01      ACCESSION NUMBER: ML011770294            
SOURCE DOCUMENT: LETTER         REVIEWER: REXB, N. Fields                
The vendor, Engine Systems, reports failures of electronic controls with 
electrolytic capacitors used in diesel generator and turbine control     
systems. The devices were manufactured by Woodward. In August 2000, at   
the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station, a 2301A control device capacitor 
failed. Its designation is C17, part number 1660-111, with manufacturing 
date code 8804. In December 1995 and June 1994, at the Columbia          
Generating Station, similar failures occurred with 2301A capacitors, both
designated C17, part number 1660-111, with manufacturing code 8634.      
The Turkey Point licensee had a failure analysis performed on the failed 
capacitor by Seal Laboratories, who concluded that the most likely cause 
of failure to be electrolyte contamination that may have originated with 
solvent cleaning of the circuit board during manufacturing. The Columbia 
Generating Station licensee had a failure analysis performed on one of   
its failed capacitors by HI-REL Laboratories, resulting in a similar     
conclusion. The vendor learned in its investigation that all three       
devices were installed beyond the manufacturer's recommended replacement 
interval of 5-7 years. The vendor believes that the capacitors simply    
reached their end of life while not discounting the possible contribution
of the suspected contamination to the failures. The vendor has not       
received reports of other failures of 2301A controls.                    
The NRC will post ensuing reports on this subject on its Web site at     
Contact:    N. Fields, NRR                                               
            E-mail: enf@nrc.gov                                          
HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          JULY 20, 2001

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-01-0050
General Electric                       Date: 07/20/01

Subject: Part 21 - Potentially inadequate minimum critical power ratio   
         safety limit protection with respect to BWR power oscillations  


VENDOR: General Electric                PT21 FILE NO: m1-23-0            
DATE OF DOCUMENT: 06/29/01              ACCESSION NUMBER:                
SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 38104               REVIEWER: REXB, V. Hodge         
The vendor, General Electric, reports a potential for nonconservative    
reload licensing calculations for plants that implemented stability      
detect and suppress trip systems that may result in inadequate minimum   
critical power ratio (MCPR) safety limit protection.                     
Optional stability solutions requiring these calculations are defined as 
Options I-D, II, and III in the vendor's document NEDO-32465-A, "Reactor 
Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology for  
Reload Applications," August 1996. This document specifies two generic   
curves (Delta CPR/Initial CPR Vs. Oscillation Magnitude (DIVOM curves)), 
one for core-wide mode oscillations and one for regional mode            
oscillations, relating normalized critical power ratio to hot bundle     
oscillation magnitude.                                                   
In Option I-D, the generic core-wide curve is used to confirm that the   
flow-biased average power range monitor (APRM) flux trip provides        
adequate mcpr safety limit protection for a core-wide mode oscillation   
initiating on the rated flow control line.                               
Option II is not specifically addressed in the vendor's document, but the
vendor states that the generic regional mode curve has been used at Nine 
Mile Point Unit 1 to confirm that the APRM trip gives adequate MCPR      
protection for a regional mode oscillation initiating on the rated flow  
control line.                                                            
In Option III, the generic regional mode curve is used to determine      
setpoints for the implemented stability detect and suppress trip system  
to provide adequate MCPR protection. At plants using this option, these  
systems may be called oscillation power range monitors.                  
In recent evaluations, the vendor identified a nonconservative deficiency
for high peak bundle power-to-flow ratios in the generic regional DIVOM  
curve and for high core average power-to-flow ratios in the generic      
core-wide DIVOM curve. As a result, the Option III system trip setpoint  
is overpredicted by the generic regional DIVOM curve and MCPR safety     
limit protection is overpredicted for the flow-biased APRM flux trip by  
the generic core-wide DIVOM curve.                                       
The vendor states that it informed all affected nuclear power plants,    
which includes General Electric boiling water reactor nuclear power      

HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  4          JULY 20, 2001
MR Number: H-01-0001 (cont.)

plants, and the industry boiling water reactor owners' group. The vendor 
described compensatory actions taken by the Hatch licensee for both Units
1 and 2. The Perry, Nine Mile Point Unit 2, and Fermi Unit 2 licensees   
notified the NRC of their compensatory actions (Event Notifications      
38099, 38106, and 38119 respectively).                                   
The vendor expects to provide updated generic DIVOM curves and a         
corresponding figure of merit to determined curve applicability by       
August 17, 2001.                                                         
The NRC will post ensuing reports on this subject on its Web site at     
Contacts:   V. Hodge, NRR           Tai L. Huang, NRR                    
            301-415-1861            301-415-2867                         
            E-mail: cvh@nrc.gov     E-mail: tlh1@nrc.gov