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Morning Report for June 14, 2000
Headquarters Daily Report JUNE 14, 2000 *************************************************************************** REPORT NEGATIVE NO INPUT ATTACHED INPUT RECEIVED RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS X REGION I X REGION II X REGION III X REGION IV X PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE 14, 2000 Licensee/Facility: Notification: MR Number: H-00-0035 University Of Missouri At Columbia Date: 06/14/00 Subject: Removal of Control Rod With Improper Core Configuration Discussion: On June 13, 2000, the University of Missouri at Columbia reactor management contacted their Project Manager to report an event. A control rod was removed from the reactor without meeting the procedural requirement to unload two (of eight) fuel elements from the reactor core. On June 12, 2000, a normal maintenance day at the facility, the licensee planned to replace a control rod (one of four). The control rods are run in the reactor for two years with one control rod replaced every six months. As part of the procedure for removing the control rod, two fuel elements are removed from the reactor core to make the reactor subcritical under all conditions. The reactor was refueled on the morning of June 12, 2000, as part of the normal maintenance day procedure. At about 11:00 am the control rod was removed from the reactor. At about 12:15 the operations crew realized that the control rod had been removed without removing the two fuel elements. At that point, a fuel movement procedure was developed and approved, the reactor head was removed, and the two fuel elements were removed from the core (this was completed at 13:52). The requirement for minimum shut down margin of 0.02 delta K was met at all times (the reactor was subcritical by 0.08 delta K with the control rod removed from the reactor). A conference call was held between NRC and licensee management on June 14, 2000, to discuss root causes, corrective actions and the licensee's decision process for restarting the reactor. The licensee is investigating root causes and has preliminarily determined that a poorly written procedure coupled with the failure of operators to completely review the procedure prior to the task contributed to the event. The licensee also believes that the infrequent nature of removing control rods from the reactor contributed to the event. The licensee has discussed the event with a sub-committee of their safety committee and will hold additional discussions with the safety sub-committee to review corrective actions prior to reactor restart. The licensee plans to have a number of corrective actions in place before the reactor is restarted, including: conducting a training session with the operators to address lessons learned from the event, operator responsibilities and management expectations of operations personnel, and all operating procedures will be reviewed prior to reactor start-up. In addition, the licensee will have a longer-term corrective action to perform an in-depth review of procedures. It is anticipated that the reactor will be restarted late on June 14, 2000. Two NRC inspectors and the Chief of the Events Assessment, Generic Communications and Non-Power Reactors Branch will be on site June 15, HEADQUARTERS MORNING REPORT PAGE 2 JUNE 14, 2000 MR Number: H-00-0035 (cont.) 2000. Contact: Alexander Adams, NRR 301-415-1127 Email: axa@nrc.gov _
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