Morning Report for June 14, 2000

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         JUNE 14, 2000

                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV                              X

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

                                       MR Number: H-00-0035
University Of Missouri At Columbia     Date: 06/14/00

Subject: Removal of Control Rod With Improper Core Configuration


On June 13, 2000, the University of Missouri at Columbia reactor
management contacted their Project Manager to report an event. A control
rod was removed from the reactor without meeting the procedural
requirement to unload two (of eight) fuel elements from the reactor core.
On June 12, 2000, a normal maintenance day at the facility, the licensee
planned to replace a control rod (one of four). The control rods are run
in the reactor for two years with one control rod replaced every six
months. As part of the procedure for removing the control rod, two fuel
elements are removed from the reactor core to make the reactor
subcritical under all conditions.

The reactor was refueled on the morning of June 12, 2000, as part of the
normal maintenance day procedure. At about 11:00 am the control rod was
removed from the reactor. At about 12:15 the operations crew realized
that the control rod had been removed without removing the two fuel
elements. At that point, a fuel movement procedure was developed and
approved, the reactor head was removed, and the two fuel elements were
removed from the core (this was completed at 13:52). The requirement for
minimum shut down margin of 0.02 delta K was met at all times (the
reactor was subcritical by 0.08 delta K with the control rod removed from
the reactor).

A conference call was held between NRC and licensee management on
June 14, 2000, to discuss root causes, corrective actions and the
licensee's decision process for restarting the reactor.

The licensee is investigating root causes and has preliminarily
determined that a poorly written procedure coupled with the failure of
operators to completely review the procedure prior to the task
contributed to the event. The licensee also believes that the infrequent
nature of removing control rods from the reactor contributed to the

The licensee has discussed the event with a sub-committee of their safety
committee and will hold additional discussions with the safety
sub-committee to review corrective actions prior to reactor restart. The
licensee plans to have a number of corrective actions in place before the
reactor is restarted, including: conducting a training session with the
operators to address lessons learned from the event, operator
responsibilities and management expectations of operations personnel, and
all operating procedures will be reviewed prior to reactor start-up. In
addition, the licensee will have a longer-term corrective action to
perform an in-depth review of procedures. It is anticipated that the
reactor will be restarted late on June 14, 2000.

Two NRC inspectors and the Chief of the Events Assessment, Generic
Communications and Non-Power Reactors Branch will be on site June 15,
HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          JUNE 14, 2000
MR Number: H-00-0035 (cont.)


Contact:    Alexander Adams, NRR

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