United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for May 26, 2000

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         MAY 26, 2000

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV           X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS MAY 26, 2000

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-00-0033
Ppg Architectural Finishes             Date: 05/26/00


Subject: Part 21 - Changed formulation of coating

Discussion:

VENDOR: PPG Architectural Finishes      NO: mm-13-0

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 04/03/00              ACCESSION NUMBER:

SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 36861               REVIEWER: REXB, V. Hodge

On April 3, 2000, the coating vendor PPG Architectural Finishes reported
that for small quantities of a silicon stainless steel enamel coating
used inside primary containment, the formulation changed from that which
was originally supplied. The vendor states that it notified the single
affected nuclear power utility.

On May 3, 2000, the vendor updated its report (Accession Number
ML003712384). Since 1987, the vendor supplied exterior silicone stainless
steel enamel coating 8674 to the Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee licensee,
Duke Energy Company. The licensee used this coating inside containment on
mirror-insulated piping to minimize the potential for paint chip fouling
of sump pumps. In a postulated design basis accident, such fouling would
interfere with the emergency core cooling systems used for recovery from
the accident. The vendor stated that this product was not sold to any
other nuclear utility for use in containment.

In 1980, the vendor's predecessor, Keeler & Long, Inc., conducted design
basis accident qualification testing on the 8674 coating, concluding that
the product qualified for Coating Service Level I Exposure because it
disintegrated by powdering, leaving no sizeable pieces of coating to
interfere with the emergency core cooling systems. Nevertheless, the
product was not included in the predecessor's quality assurance program
and the formulation was thus not appropriately controlled.

Subsequent testing by the licensee indicates that the original
formulation and several variations of it exhibit large blisters with
paint chips being delaminated from the substrate. These chips could foul
sump pumps in a postulated design basis accident.

The vendor states that the licensee intends to continue purchasing this
product for use in containment as a non-qualified coating. The vendor
states that the mirror-insulation on piping currently coated with this
product should minimize the potential for paint chip fouling of sump
pumps.

The NRC will post ensuing reports, if any, on this subject on its website
at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/PART21/2000.

HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          MAY 26, 2000
MR Number: H-00-0033 (cont.)

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REGION IV  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          MAY 26, 2000

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Nebraska Public Power District         MR Number: 4-00-0015
Cooper 1                               Date: 05/26/00
Brownville,Nebraska                    From RIs
Dockets: 50-298
BWR/GE-4

Subject: EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES WITH OKONITE TAPED SPLICES
         - UPDATE


Discussion:

On April 10, 2000, Cooper Nuclear Station management informed the
resident inspectors that drywell temperature profiles during design basis
accidents may exceed their equipment qualification test temperatures.
Subsequent review by the licensee determined that the overall concern
with the environmental qualification of drywell equipment was bounded by
existing test results, as long as all electrical splices were in the
configuration bounded by the test.  To help confirm the actual
configuration, on April 14 a licensee electrician and the NRC's resident
inspector entered the containment to inspect a sample of splices.  The
electrician and resident inspector observed that, for most of the Okonite
splices observed, the outer tape was unraveling.  A special inspection
was chartered to review the circumstances surrounding these
discrepancies.

After comprehensive review and corrective actions, on May 26 at
9:58 a.m., operators at Cooper Nuclear Station began plant restart from
the forced outage. The licensee plans to close the main output breaker
early on May 27 and restore the facility to normal operation.

On May 23, licensee management and technical personnel conducted a
teleconference with the Regional Administrator and members of the
regional and NRR staffs to discuss the plant's corrective actions and
readiness to restart. Licensee personnel have replaced all taped
environmentally qualified splice treatments in the drywell and steam
tunnel with alternative qualified treatments.  During the licensee's
evaluations, certain terminal blocks were also replaced.

Regional Action:

The special inspection is continuing, in accordance with Inspection
Procedure 93102.  The inspection team reviewed the extent of the
condition and the licensee's repair plans and did not identify any
outstanding safety issues that affect the restart of the unit.

Contact:  David Loveless             (817)860-8161
          Wayne Sifre                (817)860-8193
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