United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for April 19, 2000

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         APRIL 19, 2000

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                               X
REGION II                              X
REGION III          X
REGION IV                              X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS APRIL 19, 2000

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-00-0026
Foxboro                                Date: 04/19/00


Subject: Part 21 - Potential loss of seal integrity in certain
         Foxboro transmitter display covers


Discussion:

VENDOR: Foxboro                         PT21 FILE NO: mm-09-0

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 03/17/00              ACCESSION NUMBER:

SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 36807               REVIEWER: REXB, R. Benedict

The vendor Foxboro reports a potential loss of seal integrity in certain
Foxboro transmitter display covers. The vendor initiated an investigation
upon the return of a commercial grade display that was reported to have
lost seal integrity and found that an unauthorized manufacturing change
occurred between August 4, 1997 (date code 9732) and March 12, 1999 (date
code 9911). These display covers may not be in compliance with certain
electrical and environmental requirements. Potentially affected nuclear
power plants include Indian Point Unit 3 and Cook Units 1 and 2.

The NRC will post ensuing reports on this subject on its website at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/PART21/2000.
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HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          APRIL 19, 2000

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-00-0027
Stone And Webster                      Date: 04/19/00


Subject: Part 21 - Failure to identify seal water temperature as
         critical parameter in design of river water pumps


Discussion:

VENDOR: Stone and Webster               PT21 FILE NO: mm-10-0

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 03/08/00              ACCESSION NUMBER: ml003692855

SOURCE DOCUMENT: LER 50-334/2000-02     REVIEWER: REXB, E. Benner

The Beaver Valley Unit 1 licensee reports a potential defect in the
design of the seal water supply system for river water pumps (Licensee
Event Report 50-334/2000-02 and Event Notification 36676). During
surveillance testing, the licensee got unexpected trips of both pumps in
their reactor plant river water system because of overcurrent. The
licensee determined that each overcurrent condition resulted from
physical contact between the impeller and the lower casing liner of the
pump, caused by differential thermal expansion between the pump shaft and
the pump casing. This condition was precipitated by an elevated seal
water temperature (about 70F) that elongated the shaft to the point of
physical binding. At the time, seal water was supplied by the filtered
water system, a backup system for the safety-related seal water source
from the Ohio River. The elevated seal water temperature was caused by
use of a temporary operating procedure, which was in place for 3 days, to
allow maintenance on the water treatment clarifier. Normally, the
filtered water system temperature is about the same as that of Ohio River
water, which at the time of the pump binding was about 35F.

The licensee determined the root cause of this event to be the failure to
identify seal water temperature as a critical parameter in the
installation of the filtered water system as a backup seal water supply
system, supplied by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation in
1976. The licensee evaluated the risk of this condition as low to medium,
according to the significance determination process. The change in core
damage frequency lies in the upper portion of the range 1.0E-6 to 1.0E-5.

The NRC will post ensuing reports on this subject on its website at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/PART21/2000.

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HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          APRIL 19, 2000

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-00-0028
Goodrich                               Date: 04/19/00


Subject: Part 21 - Emergency diesel generator air start motor bendix
         drive shafts lubricated with grease instead of oil


Discussion:

VENDOR: Goodrich                    PT21 FILE NO: mm-11-0

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 03/09/00          ACCESSION NUMBER: ml003692502

SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 36778           REVIEWER: REXB, E. Goodwin

The Salem licensee reports that emergency diesel generator air start
motors supplied by the B.F. Goodrich Company (formerly Coltec Industries)
had grease on the bendix drive shafts, contrary to the purchase order
specification that the bendix drive shaft be lubricated with SAE 10 oil.
Excessive grease could harden and prevent the drive pinion from engaging
the ring gear on the diesel flywheel during starting. The air start
motors, part numbers 21800136-1, 21800145, 21800146, and 21800147, were
purchased for use on Alco model 18-251 diesel engines.

The NRC will post ensuing reports on this subject on its website at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/PART21/2000.
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REGION III  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  4          APRIL 19, 2000

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Commonwealth Edison Co.                MR Number: 3-00-0020
Braidwood 2                            Date: 04/19/00
Braceville,Illinois                    SRI/RI/ PC
Dockets: 50-457
PWR/W-4-LP

Subject: REACTOR TRIP OF BRAIDWOOD UNIT 2

Discussion:

On April 15, 2000, at 5:14 p.m. (CDT), the Braidwood Unit 2 reactor
tripped on a negative flux rate trip initiated by a dropped control rod.
Operators later identified a blown fuse for control rod P-10 stationary
gripper coil as the cause of the dropped control rod. The motor-driven
and diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps actuated on low steam
generator levels and maintained steam generator inventory until operators
restored the feedwater system.

At 4:20 a.m. (CDT) on April 16, 2000, the reactor trip breakers were
manually opened while withdrawing the shutdown bank B control rods. There
was a difference between the group demand for rod G-13 of 17 steps and
the digital rod position indication of 210 stops. With this difference,
the Technical Specification requires the reactor trip breaker to be
opened immediately. All rods inserted and the reactor was stabilized. An
encoder card was determined to be the cause. The licensee identified that
3 of the 4 feedwater check valves were not seated properly. These will be
repaired before returning the unit to power.

Regional Action:

Resident inspectors responded to the site to assess plant conditions.

Contact:  MICHAEL JORDAN             (630)829-9637
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