United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Morning Report for June 9, 1999

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         JUNE 09, 1999

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                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS        X
REGION I                                                  X
REGION II                              X
REGION III                             X
REGION IV                                                 X
PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED  MORNING REPORT - HEADQUARTERS JUNE  9, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

                                       MR Number: H-99-0051
Add'l Info - Indian Point 2            Date: 06/09/99


Subject: Environmental Qual Issue Involving Failure to Properly Coat
         Cable-to-Accelerometer Connectors with Sealant-LER 50-247/99-04


Discussion:

On March 5, 1999, with Indian Point Unit 2 at power, a potential
equipment qualification (EQ) deficiency was identified in the acoustic
monitoring system for the pressurizer safety valves. The acoustic
monitoring system consists of sensors installed on the pressurizer code
safety valves discharge lines that provide position indication in the
central control room. In the as-found condition, the acoustic monitoring
system may not have been capable of post accident monitoring. This placed
the plant in a condition that was outside its design basis. This
condition has persisted since the initial environmental qualification of
the acoustic monitoring system.

The EQ problem was identified during an Indian Point Unit 2 EQ self
assessment. Qualification requirements for the acoustic monitors were
discussed with Indian Point Unit 3 personnel. Based on these discussions,
the need for sealing the hardline cable-to-accelerometer connection was
recognized and was confirmed by the acoustic monitor manufacturer,
Technology for Energy Corporation (vendor). EQ personnel at the Palo
Verde Plant also verified the need to apply the sealant. The Indian Point
Unit 2 EQ documentation did not contain any requirement to apply sealant
to the connectors. The vendor stated that RTV sealant was used on the
connectors during EQ testing. The results of this testing were used in
qualifying the acoustic monitors for nuclear application. However, there
was no reference to RTV sealant in the vendor's EQ test report. However,
the vendor's installation procedure requires the application of RTV
sealant to the connectors at both ends of the hardline cables. The Indian
Point licensee declared the acoustic monitors inoperable. RTV sealant was
subsequently applied to the connectors. After all newly applied RTV
sealant had cured for 48 hours, as required, the monitors were declared
operable.

Further inspections of EQ equipment and files were performed. A sample
size of 50 of 380 EQ items outside containment were selected. Upon
finding some anomalies, such as incomplete RTV application, missing tags,
and inconsistent data, the scope of the inspection was expanded to
include nearly 200 items. This expanded scope included all items
requiring RTV, both inside and outside containment, that were accessible
with the plant at power. The basis for determining RTV requirements was
the existing EQ files. No operational deficiencies were found for any
other EQ equipment.

As a result of the Indian Point Unit 2 findings, the licensee for the
Susquehanna Nuclear plant determined that sealant was also missing from
the connectors in their acoustic monitoring system.

Contact:    E. Nick Fields, NRR
            (301) 415-1173

HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          JUNE  9, 1999
MR Number: H-99-0051 (cont.)

            Email: enf@nrc.gov
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