Morning Report for March 19, 1999

                       Headquarters Daily Report

                         MARCH 19, 1999

                    REPORT             NEGATIVE            NO INPUT
                    ATTACHED           INPUT RECEIVED      RECEIVED

REGION I                               X
REGION II           X
REGION III                                                X
REGION IV                              X

MR Number: H-99-0027

                           NRR DAILY REPORT ITEM
                           GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS


NRC Information Notice: Failed Fire Protection Deluge Valves and
Potential Testing Deficiencies in Preaction Sprinkler Systems, dated
March 22, 1999

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this information notice
to alert addressees to test methodologies for fire protection deluge
valves that may not adequately demonstrate valve operability.

Technical contacts: Mark H. Salley, NRR     Robert Caldwell, RII
                    301-415-2840            334-899-3386
                    E-mail:    E-mail:

                    William F. Burton, NRR
                    E-mail: NRC

Information Notice 99-06: 1998 Enforcement Sanctions as a Result of
Deliberate Violations of NRC Employee Protection Requirements, dated
March 19, 1999

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to remind licensees and their employees of the sanctions that
could result from deliberately violating NRC requirements in the area of
employee protection.

Contact:    Michael Stein, OE
HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  2          MARCH 19, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Part 21 Database                       MR Number: H-99-0028
Coltec/Fairbanks Morse                 Date: 03/19/99

Subject: Part 21 - Improper Heat Treatment of Cam Rollers for
         FM-ALCO 251 Engines


VENDOR: Coltec/Fairbanks Morse          PT21 FILE NO: 99-16-0


SOURCE DOCUMENT: EN 35448               REVIEWER: PECB, D. Skeen

NEW ISSUE.  On March 8, 1999, the Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of
Coltec Industries determined that the wrong hardening process had been
used on six air and exhaust valve cam rollers shipped to Consolidated
Edison's Indian Point 2 nuclear power station for use in their emergency
diesel generators (EDG's). The Indian Point 2 EDG's use Fairbanks Morse
Model FM-ALCO 251 engines. In addition to the wrong heat treatment, the
vendor also found that non-conservative tolerances were used for the
surface hardness of the rollers. A review of the vendor's records found
that Indian Point 2 was the only nuclear customer to receive the suspect
cam rollers. The rollers (Catalog No. 2241342) were shipped to Indian
Point 2 as part of six fuel pump support kits (Catalog No. 2500605) on
November 14, 1997.

The vendor discovered the problem after some cam rollers used in a
commercial application were returned after exhibiting premature wear
after approximately 200 hours of operation. Vendor investigation found
that the rollers, procured from a commercial grade subsupplier, were
induction hardened, contrary to Fairbanks Morse specifications, which
call for the rollers to be carburized to ensure adequate case depth
hardness and surface hardness. Fairbanks Morse receipt inspection
personnel failed to identify the improper heat treatment process during
review of the certifications of the cam rollers.

During the vendor's review another minor discrepancy in the dedication
process was discovered. The proper Fairbanks Morse specification for cam
roller hardness is 50 to 62 Rockwell C. However, the specification used
for dedication of the rollers stated that the hardness specification was
58 +/-10 Rockwell C. The vendor stated that the dedication specification
would be corrected to ensure the proper range is used in the future, but
it was not believed to be a significant concern for cam rollers already
in service.

In addition to correcting the hardness specification, the vendor has
retrained the receipt inspection personnel and will review other
tolerance specifications as parts are dedicated. The vendor notified
Indian Point 2 of the six defective cam rollers. The cam rollers were
still in the licensee warehouse and will not be installed in the plant.

Contact:    Dave Skeen, NRR/PECB
HEADQUARTERS      MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          MARCH 19, 1999
MR Number: H-99-0028 (cont.)

            (301) 415-1174

REGION II  MORNING REPORT     PAGE  3          MARCH 19, 1999

Licensee/Facility:                     Notification:

Georgia Power Co.                      MR Number: 2-99-0004
Vogtle 1                               Date: 03/19/99
Dockets: 50-424



On March 18, 1999, Vogtle Nuclear Plant notified the NRC of a worker
receiving an unanticipated radiation exposure to the worker's extremity
(hand). The worker was performing decontamination activities of the Unit
1 reactor sump drain cavity when he picked up a piece of debris and
placed it on a ledge with other materials for later disposal. The
materials were remotely transferred to a bag where a qualified health
physics technician measured unanticipated dose rates exceeding 900 rem
per hour (rem/hr) or greater. All work was stopped and the licensee
determined that the elevated dose rates resulted from the debris which
the worker had physically placed on the cavity ledge. No other workers
handled the debris material.

The licensee is in the process of evaluating radiation exposure to the
worker. The individual was wearing three pairs of protective gloves and
the debris was handled for a brief period of time (approximately one
second). The subject worker was wearing extremity and whole-body
thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), and teledosimetry. The licensee sent
the TLD s for analysis and evaluation. The worker's whole body TLD
indicated a radiation dose of approximately 249 millirem for the quarter
and was consistent with the quarterly electronic dosimetry data. The
worker's extremity TLD indicated a maximum dose of 244 mrem to the hand
(left) which grasped the material. The licensee plans to perform
additional extremity dose assessments for the individual who handled the
material after additional surveys of the debris have been conducted.

Regional Action:

Region II notified the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and the
Office of the Executive Director for Operations regarding this incident.

The NRC RII Office was initially notified of this incident by the
licensee on March 18, 1999.

Contact:  G. KUZO                    (404)562-4658

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