Event Notification Report for March 28, 2025
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/27/2025 - 03/28/2025
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57633
Facility: Palo Verde
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tadiar
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tadiar
HQ OPS Officer: Jon Lilliendahl
Notification Date: 03/28/2025
Notification Time: 07:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 01:06 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2025
Notification Time: 07:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 01:06 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/2/2025
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 3/28/2025 at 0106 MST, Palo Verde Generating Station Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 due to discovering `A' essential chiller (EC) oil temperature at 80 degrees Fahrenheit, which is below the operability limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. `A' EC inoperable rendered the `A' high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump inoperable. At the time of discovery, `B' HPSI was inoperable due to recirculating the refueling water tank for chemistry purposes (LCO 3.5.3 condition B entered on 3/27/2025 at 2127 MST). This resulted in inoperability for both trains of HPSI, leading to a loss of the HPSI safety function.
"On 3/28/2025 at 0115 MST, `B' HPSI was restored to operable condition, LCO 3.0.3 was exited, and the loss of safety function was restored.
"There were no power reductions (control rod insertions or boron concentration changes). The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any release of radioactive materials. Unit 2 and 3 remained at 100%.
"NRC resident has been notified of the event."
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"On 3/28/2025 at 0106 MST, Palo Verde Generating Station Unit 1 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 due to discovering `A' essential chiller (EC) oil temperature at 80 degrees Fahrenheit, which is below the operability limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. `A' EC inoperable rendered the `A' high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump inoperable. At the time of discovery, `B' HPSI was inoperable due to recirculating the refueling water tank for chemistry purposes (LCO 3.5.3 condition B entered on 3/27/2025 at 2127 MST). This resulted in inoperability for both trains of HPSI, leading to a loss of the HPSI safety function.
"On 3/28/2025 at 0115 MST, `B' HPSI was restored to operable condition, LCO 3.0.3 was exited, and the loss of safety function was restored.
"There were no power reductions (control rod insertions or boron concentration changes). The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any release of radioactive materials. Unit 2 and 3 remained at 100%.
"NRC resident has been notified of the event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57636
Facility: Brunswick
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Charlie Brookshire
HQ OPS Officer: Rodney Clagg
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Charlie Brookshire
HQ OPS Officer: Rodney Clagg
Notification Date: 03/28/2025
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 14:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2025
Notification Time: 19:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 14:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Pearson, Laura (R2DO)
Pearson, Laura (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 1 | Startup |
EN Revision Imported Date: 4/2/2025
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At approximately 1409 EDT on March 28, 2025, with Unit 2 in mode 2 at approximately 1 percent power during reactor startup, an actuation of group 1 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (i.e., main steam line, main steam line drain, and reactor water sample line isolation valves) occurred during performance of the Unit 2 turbine control/stop valves tightness test procedure. The group 1 PCIV actuation resulted when the turbine stop valves were opened (with control valves remaining closed) while main condenser vacuum was below 10 inches Hg [inches of Mercury]. The PCIVs automatically closed as designed when the group 1 actuation signal was received.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"At approximately 1409 EDT on March 28, 2025, with Unit 2 in mode 2 at approximately 1 percent power during reactor startup, an actuation of group 1 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) (i.e., main steam line, main steam line drain, and reactor water sample line isolation valves) occurred during performance of the Unit 2 turbine control/stop valves tightness test procedure. The group 1 PCIV actuation resulted when the turbine stop valves were opened (with control valves remaining closed) while main condenser vacuum was below 10 inches Hg [inches of Mercury]. The PCIVs automatically closed as designed when the group 1 actuation signal was received.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 57635
Rep Org: Texas Dept of State Health Services
Licensee: unknown
Region: 4
City: Texas City State: TX
County:
License #: Unknown
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Rodney Clagg
Licensee: unknown
Region: 4
City: Texas City State: TX
County:
License #: Unknown
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Arthur Tucker
HQ OPS Officer: Rodney Clagg
Notification Date: 03/28/2025
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 15:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2025
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 15:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Deese, Rick (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On March 28, 2025, the Department was contacted by the radiation safety officer (RSO) of an industrial radiography company licensed in the state of Texas. The RSO stated they were contacted by a local fire chief about a device found on the side of the road in Texas City, Texas. The RSO went to the location and identified the device as a Troxler model 3411-B moisture density gauge. The RSO stated he measured 1.4 mR/hr at the surface of the gauge. The radionuclide was identified as cesium-137. The RSO stated he transported the gauge to their facility to store it in their vault. The gauge label plate states the gauge contains an 8 millicurie cesium - 137 source and a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source. The gauge cesium operating rod was fully retracted, and a lock was in place on the cesium source operating rod. The operating rod and lock were very corroded. The storage case the gauge was contained in looked to be in very good condition. The RSO provided pictures of the gauge to the Department. The RSO also provided the serial number for the gauge. The Department searched both its local and the national Nuclear Materials Event Database and did not find a record of the gauge being reported as lost in the State of Texas. The Department contacted the RSO for the gauge manufacturer and was provided with the name of the licensee the gauge had been sold to. A search of the Department's licensing records found the license of the company who had purchased the gauge had been revoked by the Department on July 1, 1991. The Department has arranged to take possession of the gauge on Monday March 31, 2025. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident number: 10187
NMED number: TX250021
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email:
"On March 28, 2025, the Department was contacted by the radiation safety officer (RSO) of an industrial radiography company licensed in the state of Texas. The RSO stated they were contacted by a local fire chief about a device found on the side of the road in Texas City, Texas. The RSO went to the location and identified the device as a Troxler model 3411-B moisture density gauge. The RSO stated he measured 1.4 mR/hr at the surface of the gauge. The radionuclide was identified as cesium-137. The RSO stated he transported the gauge to their facility to store it in their vault. The gauge label plate states the gauge contains an 8 millicurie cesium - 137 source and a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source. The gauge cesium operating rod was fully retracted, and a lock was in place on the cesium source operating rod. The operating rod and lock were very corroded. The storage case the gauge was contained in looked to be in very good condition. The RSO provided pictures of the gauge to the Department. The RSO also provided the serial number for the gauge. The Department searched both its local and the national Nuclear Materials Event Database and did not find a record of the gauge being reported as lost in the State of Texas. The Department contacted the RSO for the gauge manufacturer and was provided with the name of the licensee the gauge had been sold to. A search of the Department's licensing records found the license of the company who had purchased the gauge had been revoked by the Department on July 1, 1991. The Department has arranged to take possession of the gauge on Monday March 31, 2025. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas incident number: 10187
NMED number: TX250021
Power Reactor
Event Number: 57733
Facility: Browns Ferry
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Sarah Torgersen
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Sarah Torgersen
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 05/27/2025
Notification Time: 11:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 16:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2025
Notification Time: 11:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2025
Event Time: 16:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2025
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - Invalid Specif System Actuation
Person (Organization):
Desai, Binoy (R2DO)
Desai, Binoy (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system [for Browns Ferry Unit 2].
"On March 28, 2025, operations personnel were performing post-maintenance testing of 2-HS-64-33 [hand switch], which operates 2-FSV-64-33, the suppression chamber exhaust outboard isolation valve. When the hand switch was taken to 'open' multiple annunciators were received, including 9-5B window 34, 'Fuse Failure'. Light indications above the hand switch were not lit. This condition resulted in a 'B'-side partial group 6 isolation. All systems responded as expected.
"Plant conditions which initiate primary containment isolation system (PCIS) group 6 actuations are reactor vessel low water level (level 3), high drywell pressure, or reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation (reactor zone or refuel zone).
"At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid and there were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"Upon investigation a fuse was found to be cleared, which was the cause of the isolation. The fuse was replaced, the condition was cleared, and all systems were realigned as necessary.
"This event was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2002404.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Units 1 and 3 were not affected.
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system [for Browns Ferry Unit 2].
"On March 28, 2025, operations personnel were performing post-maintenance testing of 2-HS-64-33 [hand switch], which operates 2-FSV-64-33, the suppression chamber exhaust outboard isolation valve. When the hand switch was taken to 'open' multiple annunciators were received, including 9-5B window 34, 'Fuse Failure'. Light indications above the hand switch were not lit. This condition resulted in a 'B'-side partial group 6 isolation. All systems responded as expected.
"Plant conditions which initiate primary containment isolation system (PCIS) group 6 actuations are reactor vessel low water level (level 3), high drywell pressure, or reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation (reactor zone or refuel zone).
"At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid and there were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"Upon investigation a fuse was found to be cleared, which was the cause of the isolation. The fuse was replaced, the condition was cleared, and all systems were realigned as necessary.
"This event was entered into the corrective action program as condition report 2002404.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Units 1 and 3 were not affected.