Event Notification Report for November 14, 2024

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was provided by the the Texas Department of State Health Services (Department) via phone and email:

"On November 6, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensee that the shutters of two Vega model SH-F2 gauges were stuck in the open position. Open is the normal operating position. Each gauge contains a Cs-137 sealed radioactive source and the activities for the sources are 500mCi and 600mCi respectively. The discovery was made by the licensee on November 5, 2024, [at 1745 CST] during a routine semi-annual visual inspection of the gauges. The licensee has made arrangements for a service provider to conduct repairs on the shutters on November 8, 2024. The licensee stated the gauges do not pose a risk of additional exposure to any worker or member of the public.

"Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: 10142
Texas NMED # TX240041

MSIV FAILED TO CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 2250 EST on November 11, 2024, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2. The following technical specification limiting conditions of operation (LCOs) were entered at 1939 EST on November 11, 2024:

"LCO 3.6.3, containment isolation valves, condition C, one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable; required action C.1, isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

"LCO 3.7.2, main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), condition C, one or more MSIVs inoperable in mode 2 or 3; required action C.1, close MSIV within 8 hours.

"These technical specification required actions will not be completed within the completion time; therefore, a technical specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

"With one main steam isolation valve inoperable, this condition is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The failure occurred during planned surveillance testing in preparation for reactor startup.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 0902 EST, on 10/10/2024, with Millstone Unit 3 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, it was discovered that the secondary containment boundary was inoperable when the latch that secured a hatch that was part of the secondary containment boundary was not functional. The latch was repaired by 1115, on 10/10/2024, and the secondary containment boundary was declared operable at 1200, on 10/10/2024. The initial assessment of reportability concluded that an immediate report was not required. However, upon additional review, it has been determined that because the secondary containment boundary is a single-train system that performs a safety function, an 8-hour report was required in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and (D).

"This report should have been made on 10/10/2024 and is late.

"There has been no impact to Unit 2, and Unit 3 continues to operate in mode 1 at 100 percent power.

"There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 11/15/2024

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE FROM RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE

The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

"Radiography was being performed in a tank at the refinery. [A radiation protection boundary was set up around a tank], and the source was secured in the exposure device. One radiographer was outside the boundary and the other radiographer was inside the boundary with another individual (contractor) outside of the tank. The contractor was in a lift moving upwards next to the tank. Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between the radiographers and the contractor, the two individuals outside the tank and within the radiation boundaries were exposed to the source for 2 minutes.

"The licensee radiation safety officer (RSO) estimates 1.8 R radiation exposure for the 2 minutes duration right outside the tank as a worst-case scenario. The RSO is currently performing a dose investigation of the affected contract personnel and radiographer. The RSO recommended the contactor to receive medical monitoring (blood draw) as a precaution. The Department set expectations for the licensee to send a full detailed report on findings for this incident. More information to follow for this incident report."

Device information:
Isotope: 87 Ci of Ir-192
Manufacturer: QSA Global
Device Model: 880D

Incident number: WA-24-022

* * * UPDATE ON 11/14/2024 AT 1958 EDT FROM JOHN MARTELL TO TENISHA MEADOWS * * *

The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection (the Department) via email:

"On 11/14/2024, inspectors from the Department will be conducting a reactive onsite visit of the overexposure event which occurred on 11/12/2024. The inspectors will be meeting at the refinery site where the overexposure occurred with the licensee representatives including the RSO to gather information on the event related to what and how the event occurred and to review related records.

"The Department staff will continue to gather information on the event to determine the extent of the exposures, the potential root cause of this incident, any correlation to previous incidents with this licensee, and appropriate corrective actions. This may include potential enforcement actions in addition to the corrective actions. Updates will be provided as additional information is received."

Notified R4DO (Young), NMSS MSST Deputy Division Director (Silberfeld), and NMSS (email)